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ABSTRACT 
 Current and emerging technologies and equipment, such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground sensors, networked 
radios, operator-worn sensor vests, and nanotechnology 
applications offer warfighters unprecedented command and 
control and information detection capabilities, yet the use 
of this technology has not been fully realized.  The current 
protocol, IPv4, is incapable of providing enough addresses 
due to a depletion of IPv4 address space.  IPv6, however, 
offers unprecedented network support for tactical-level 
sensor and communications assets in terms of increased 
address space, Quality of Service (QoS), flexibility, and 
security. 
 The Department of Defense is transitioning from IPv4 to 
IPv6 in order to capitalize on IPv6’s expanded capabilities. 
However, one unresolved area is proper IPv6 network 
management. Currently, the majority of the configuration and 
operational knowledge is in the mind of a very few 
individuals. The expertise currently available must be 
developed for application by the tactical network manager 
operating out on the edge of the network, in order to 
properly administer both an IPv4/IPv6 dual stacked network 
during the phased protocol transition and a purely native 
IPv6 network. Second, IPv6 features a robust Quality of 
Service (QoS) capability previously unavailable through 
IPv4, which requires research to determine the optimum 
configuration to support the warfighter’s diverse 
requirements.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 The size of the address space provided by the Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) protocol (2128 or 
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 
addresses) is large enough to give every grain of sand in 
the world its own unique Internet Protocol (IP) address 
(Hagen, 2006). Compared to the 232 addresses provided by the 
current Internet Protocol, version 4 (IPv4) protocol, the 
networking opportunities and the services that can be 
provided by IPv6 networks, such as globally accessible 
sensor networks, outpace current capabilities on an 
exponential scale. If each sensor on the battlefield had its 
own globally-unique IP address and were connected to a 
network, such as the Department of Defense (DoD) Global 
Information Grid (GIG), then information from a single 
sensor to clusters of tens of thousands of sensors could be 
directly accessed from anywhere. On the macro-level, entire 
mission-defined or functionally-defined clusters of 
thousands of sensors could provide tailored real-time 
information, made possible in part by the IPv6 address space 
and by the use of Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms built 
into the IPv6 protocol. The exponential increase in on-line 
sensors would mean that the potential for end-to-end QoS 
assurances would be essential due to the increase in network 
traffic. In order to carry mission critical, real-time 
information from the edge sensor nodes through a constantly 
changing and adapting network to a command and control node 
and ultimately to decision maker(s) would mean that the 
network would have to “know” what information is more 
important at any given time. For example, a rifle company 
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commander could be given access, via a QoS management 
technique such as a Service Level Agreement (SLA) (Bordetsky 
& Hayes-Roth, 2007), to a set of preconfigured sensor 
clusters for a virtual “real-time” leader’s reconnaissance 
without having to leave friendly lines, spend time traveling 
to his vantage point, and risk breaking operational security 
(OPSEC). He could have battalion representatives, his 
company staff, and subordinate leadership physically 
present, (or through video teleconferencing, if at a 
distance), so all interested parties could build situational 
awareness (SA) together while viewing and discussing the 
information gathered from the virtual reconnaissance through 
the sensor network. On the move towards their attack and 
assault positions, the battalion staff could monitor the 
specific mission-tailored clusters for any deviations, as 
discussed during the virtual leader’s reconnaissance. During 
the assault, the company commander and the battalion staff 
could monitor the sensor nodes to detect any changes that 
might be exploitable or cause for alarm.  
As more and more sensors of increasing capacity are 
deployed into the field, the current IPv4 address space will 
not be adequate for anything other than local use. 
Currently, network administrators must use creative means to 
ensure that each of their hosts has a “unique” IP address. 
Techniques such as network address translation (NAT) and 
port address translation (PAT) provide a way to add more 
hosts to a network when there are not enough IP addresses 
for each. The drawback is that the “outside” world cannot 
talk directly to the privately-addressed hosts behind the 
NAT/PAT network device. Global end-to-end connectivity is 
not a current reality. IPv4 network administrators must also 
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manage the process that governs the addition or removal of 
each network device, which requires additional personnel and 
equipment as the network size and level of complexity scales 
up. While not ordinarily difficult, problems can and do 
arise. In a tactical environment where sensors will add and 
join with a much higher frequency, the level of complexity 
increases. Joining two or more private space networks, such 
as multiple clusters of sensors, means that either one 
network must be renumbered or that complex translation 
mechanisms must be put into place. Another common issue is 
when planning the address space does not allow for adequate 
growth, or when the mission requirements outpace the space 
allowed. Under the IPv4 scheme, system administrators need 
to become directly involved when the network capacity does 
not match operational needs. This problem is not an issue 
with IPv6, although an optional implementation of DHCPv6 
could be undertaken. 
A.  WHY IPv6? 
IPv6 was developed, in part, to address the 
increasingly obvious shortcomings of IPv4. Developed in the 
early 1960s and implemented in the 1970s as a means to 
communicate between government-owned and academia-owned 
nodes separated by a physical distance, IPv4 was not 
designed in consideration of the enormous range of the 
applications it supports today. After 30 years of use, 
modifications, and hard lessons learned, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) determined in 1993 that IPv4 
would soon near the end of its service life and they began 
to design its successor. Address space, “auto-
configuration,” security, header length, and Quality of 
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Service (QOS) are among the many concepts the IETF developed 
while designing the next generation IP protocol (as it was 
called); all of which are considered extremely relevant for 
large-scale sensor networks (Hagen, 2006).  
1.  Address Space 
The driving factor behind the creation of IPv6 is the 
need for increased address space. Every networking device, 
whether a personal computer, server, router interface, or a 
sensor connected to the Internet, needs its own globally-
unique address. No two devices can have the same address or 
delivery conflicts will arise and those devices will not be 
able to communicate on the network. In the Internet’s 
infancy, IP addresses were not allocated efficiently, nor 
were they allocated uniformly around the world. 
Consequently, lesser-developed regions in the world did not 
receive a fair allocation of addresses. “Band-Aid” solutions 
have arisen as a means around the lack of address space. 
NAT/PAT provide a means to route from “private” address 
space to a globally-unique IP address, but that same node 
cannot be routed globally, since its address is private and, 
therefore, non-deliverable directly by design. End-to-end 
connectivity is not possible with this temporary solution. 
The problem becomes increasingly relevant as more and more 
automated systems and commercial services become dependent 
on IP addresses. Realizing the need for additional globally-
unique IP addresses, the IETF decided to increase the next 
generation IP protocol address space by a factor of 2128/232 
or 296 to ensure that lack of addresses would not 
conceivably be an issue.  
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2.  Auto-configuration 
The increased address space resulting from IPv6 means 
that there will be a significant increase in the number of 
devices on the network. As each device joins the network, it 
will need its own IP address. Current IPv4 standards allow 
for a manual static address assigned by a network 
administrator or an automatic IP address assignment by a 
Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) server, which 
dynamically assigns addresses based on the configurations 
set by an administrator. While less work-intensive and more 
responsive to the user’s needs, the DHCP server must still 
be managed like any other network service. When the number 
of possible IPv6 devices is considered, it is clear that the 
network administrator’s workload will increase accordingly. 
Purely static configuration would be improbable, and 
currently-designed DHCP services would occupy a large 
portion of the administrator’s time as well as network 
bandwidth. Recognizing this, the IETF developed a mechanism 
to make configuration transparent and seamless. Auto-
configuration is a process whereby the joining device 
“requests its network prefix from an IPv6 enabled router on 
its link and then joins that prefix with its media access 
control (MAC) address or some other unique, random number to 
make one or more unique global address[es]” (Hagen, 2006). 
This feature makes the administrator’s job considerably 
easier, makes the network less complex by eliminating the 
need for traditional DHCP servers, and provides a more 
timely solution to devices that constantly enter and leave 
the network, such as sensors in a tactical environment. 
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A separate, but related, feature is Mobile IPv6, which 
allows an IPv6 device to maintain its IP address regardless 
of what network it is connected to. This requires a device 
to bind its assigned IP address to a “care-of” address that 
is registered on its home network router. Traffic sent to 
the device’s static address is first sent to its home 
network router and then forwarded to its care-of address 
(Hagen, 2006). The benefit of this feature is that a device 
can have a permanent address that never changes as it moves 
to or through different networks, which provides user 
continuity. However, additional network resources are 
consumed as messages are essentially sent twice, virtually 
doubling the amount of traffic on the network. 
3. Security 
The IPv4 protocol was designed at a time when network 
security was not a concern. Networks were few and users were 
trusted to use the networks with good intentions. Security 
mechanisms were not built into IPv4. Over time, and as more 
networks and users came on-line, malicious users began to 
look for ways to exploit the unsecure network for personal 
gain, notoriety, destructive purposes, or a combination of 
these. Solutions to these problems included security 
mechanisms, such as passwords, and the eventual development 
of Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) (Hagen, 2006). IPsec 
is not widely used with IPv4 because of the difficulty of 
incorporating it into existing networks. Recognizing the 
need to co-evolve a robust security framework during the 




incorporated in the new IP protocol. While IPsec is optional 
for IPv4, it is mandatory for all IPv6 implementations 
(Hagen, 2006).  
IPsec can be implemented in two modes. The first, 
tunnel mode, works like a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The 
entire transmission is encapsulated in a new header 
containing the IP address of the receiving gateway (Hagen, 
2006). This tunnel provides the added feature of 
transmission security, in that packets sniffed “off of the 
wire” will not reveal the source and destination IP 
addresses. The observer will only see the gateway IP 
addresses, since the real addresses are encapsulated. This 
method not only requires more overhead and security 
management, but it also introduces a performance-degrading 
bottleneck. The second method is transport mode, in which 
end-to-end users communicate without an intervening gateway. 
This method requires less overhead and does not create any 
potential bottlenecks, but the actual IP addresses are not 
hidden from view. Transport mode provides a real benefit for 
IPv6 networks. Because NAT/PAT is no longer necessary, end 
users can connect directly and, therefore, encrypt their 
transmissions without any problems with intervening 
networking devices.   
4.  Headers 
The IETF designed the IPv6 header length to be both 
fixed in length and simpler than the IPv4 header. Figure 1 
shows the IPv4 header in comparison with the IPv6 header; 






Figure 1.   Comparison of the IPv4 and IPv6 protocol 
headers (From Adame & Kong, 2008). 
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Figure 2.   The IPv6 header (From Mikm, 2009). 
 
While the IPv6 header is longer bit-wise to accommodate 
two 128 bit addresses, it omits information that is not 
necessary for routing packets through an IPv6 network; the 
base header also has a constant size of 40 bytes. 
Consequently, the following fields have been dropped (Hagen, 
2006). 
a.  Header Length   
 Since the IPv6 header length is fixed at 40 bytes, 
this information is redundant and will only slow down the 
processing time. 
b.  Identification/Flags/Fragment Offset    
 The IPv6 protocol requires a minimum maximum 
transmission unit (MTU) size, so packet fragmentation is not 
normally required. If fragmentation is required, then an 
optional extension header will be appended to the header to 
denote this. 
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c.  Header Checksum    
 Checksums at layer three were included in the 
original IPv4 specifications due to a lack of bit error 
detection at lower layers. Both layer two and upper layer 
protocols now contain error detection, which makes error 
detection at layer three redundant and processor intensive.  
. IPv6 takes advantage of these advances and saves the 
router’s processing power normally used for error checking. 
d.  Type of Service  
Originally designed to denote traffic 
prioritization, Type of Service has been replaced with the 
Traffic Class field (Hagen, 2006). 
e. Protocol Type/Time to Live  
Protocol Type/Time to Live have been replaced and 
incorporated into other IPv6 fields. 
The following IPv6 header fields have been added 
or modified (Hagen, 2006). 
f. Traffic Class  
This field is used to distinguish one data type 
from another and is used to facilitate QoS for real-time 
data traffic. Differentiated Services (DiffServ) makes use 
of this IPv6 field as specified in Request for Comments 
(RFC) 2474, and will be described in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
g. Flow Label  
Flow labels are combined with the source address, 
and are used to distinguish one data flow from another. One 
particular data flow may require different handling through 
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the network, in comparison with another, and will be 
transmitted with associated options. Intervening routers 
will interpret these options and will treat the packets 
accordingly. Flow labels are used in conjunction with the 
traffic class field form the basis for QoS in IPv6 networks 
(Hagen, 2006). 
h. Payload Length 
While similar to the IPv4 header field, total 
length, the IPv6 payload length field includes the length of 
the appended data as well as any header extensions. 
i. Next Header  
Similar to the IPv4 protocol field, the IPv6 next 
header field directs the appropriate network device to the 
beginning of the header it should process. Different 
extensions apply to different network devices; therefore, 
this field will change each time a device finishes 
processing a packet. As with IPv4, this field also contains 
values to denote the protocol for the appended layer four 
data.  
5. Extension Headers 
 As stated previously, the IPv6 protocol standard, RFC 
2460, specifies a header of fixed length, which aids in 
better networking performance (Hagen, 2006). Additional 
information in the form of options can be added to the 
header to provide the networking customization needed by the 
user. All, some, or none of these options may be used, and 
are placed in the order shown in Figure 3. These options are 
called extension headers and are positioned immediately 
behind the IPv6 header, and directly ahead of the layer four 
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header. Extension headers are added by the source node and 
are read only by the destination node, with a few exceptions 
such as router per hop behaviors.  
 
Figure 3.   IPv6 Extension Headers (From Fineberg, 2005). 
 The following extension headers are included in the 
IPv6 protocol. 
a. Hop-by-Hop Options Header  
This extension header carries optional 
information, such as the Resource Reservation Protocol 
intended for each node along the destination to the end 
node. This header must be placed immediately behind the IPv6 
header. The absence of a Hop-by-Hop Options header indicates 
that intervening network devices can forward the packets on 
without any packet processing required (Hagen, 2006).   
b. Routing Header 
Use of this extension header specifies a number of 
intervening nodes that the packet must travel through on its 
way to its destination IP address. This option is based on 
loose source routing; other nodes may be visited in between, 
so long as each required node is visited in the specified 
order (Hagen, 2006). This is in contrast to strict source 
routing which calls for the packet to travel a specified 
path without visiting any other nodes.  
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c. Fragment Header 
If a source node determines that a packet is 
larger than the largest supported maximum transmitted unit 
(MTU) on a particular link, then the source node will 
fragment the packet and use the fragment header to declare 
the fragmentation. IPv6 networks only fragment at the source 
node and not in network devices to increase network 
performance (Hagen, 2006). 
d. Destination Option Header  
This option carries additional information for the 
destination node and it is normally placed behind all other 
extension headers. When placed before the Routing header, it 
then carries information intended for each intervening node 
in the network (Hagen, 2006). 
e. Authentication Header 
Used for IPsec, the authentication header provides 
“integrity and authentication for all end-to-end 
transmissions” (Hagen, 2006). 
f. Encapsulating Security Payload Header 
Used for IPsec, this header provides “integrity, 
confidentiality, data origin, authentication, anti-replay 
service, and limited traffic flow confidentiality” (Hagen, 
2006). 
6. Unicast, Multicast, and Anycast Addresses 
 The broadcast address is not used in IPv6 networks, 
since broadcast addresses have historically caused network 
problems (Hagen, 2006). A large-scale IPv6 network could 
risk a limited self-imposed denial of service (DOS) every 
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time a message is sent to a broadcast address. The IPv6 
protocol makes use of three other addresses: unicast, 
multicast, and anycast. Note that IPv6 interfaces can have 
more than one address assigned to it.   
a. Unicast Address  
The unicast address is synonymous with the global 
address. It uniquely identifies the node’s interface on the 
Internet. 
b. Multicast Addresses  
Multicast addresses replaced the broadcast address 
functionality. Interfaces can be grouped together under a 
single multicast address, and any message sent to a 
multicast address will be “processed by all members of that 
multicast group” (Hagen, 2006).  Weather sensors can be 
assigned an additional multicast address identifying them as 
the weather group, and all will respond to messages sent to 
the multicast address. Weather forecasters can send a single 
“current temperature query” to a specific weather sensor 
multicast address and all weather sensors with that address 
will respond with the requested information. 
c.  Anycast Addresses  
Anycast addresses are also assigned to multiple 
interfaces, but they differ from multicast addresses in that 
a message sent to an anycast address will go to the nearest 
node only.  If a node has traffic for a video server, it can 
then send that traffic on the video server anycast address. 
From there, that traffic will go the nearest video server.  
This concept reduces the amount of traffic traversing the 
network. 
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7.  Quality of Service 
When IPv4 was developed in the 1970s, applications such 
as video teleconferencing (VTC) over IP, Voice Over IP 
(VOIP), and other time-sensitive applications, were far from 
the drawing board. IPv4, and the TCP/IP protocol suite that 
it uses at layers three and four, was designed to provide 
“best-effort delivery.” The definition of best-effort 
delivery is that a transfer can accept delay because of 
temporary network congestion and not degrade service. This 
is in contrast to a service that would be affected if 
network congestion affected time sensitive applications. For 
applications such as file transfer and email delivery delay 
and latency unnoticeable to the human sense of time are 
considered acceptable, since such applications are not 
considered time sensitive.  
Because the need for network QoS was not anticipated 
when IP was first developed, when applications such as VTC 
over IP, streaming live video, and VOIP were incorporated 
into networks, the choice had to be made to either allocate 
a large percentage of bandwidth to those services at the 
heavy expense of others, or to accept a lower-quality 
product that could have often caused more problems than it 
solved. The traffic class field in the IPv4 header was 
originally designed to segregate different classes of 
traffic in order to promote certain traffic flows, thus 
providing real-time applications with a “clear path” through 
the network. A lack of fielded applications and the 
additional processing required on the relatively slow 
networking devices at the time led to a lack of QoS 
implementation with this header field (Hagen, 2006).  
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The increase in time-sensitive applications being used 
over limited bandwidth, and the necessity of providing QoS 
for time-sensitive applications are two reasons that the 
IETF designed the IPv6 protocol to support QoS with its 
“designed from the ground up” traffic class and flow label 
fields. The IETF also stipulated that IPv6 addresses would 
be assigned to interfaces rather than the nodes themselves, 
so that one node could have more than one address “assigned” 
to it. In addition to providing addresses for anycast and 
multicast transmissions, interfaces can be assigned multiple 
addresses. Each of these corresponds to an associated QoS 
level. An application of these concepts is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter II. These three areas form the basis for 
QoS in IPv6. Table 1 is a side-by-side comparison summary of 
















Source and destination addresses 
are 32 bits (4 bytes) in length. 
Source and destination addresses are 128 bits 
(16 bytes) in length.  
IPSec support is optional. IPSec support is required.  
No identification of packet flow 
for QoS handling by routers is 
present within the IPv4 header. 
Packet flow identification for QoS handling by 
routers is included in the IPv6 header using 
the Flow Label field.  
Fragmentation is done by both 
routers and the sending host. 
Fragmentation is not done by routers, only by 
the sending host. 
Header includes a checksum. Header does not include a checksum.  
Header includes options. All optional data is moved to IPv6 extension 
headers.  
Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) uses broadcast ARP Request 
frames to resolve an IPv4 
address to a link layer address. 
ARP Request frames are replaced with multicast 
Neighbor Solicitation messages.  
Internet Group Management 
Protocol (IGMP) is used to 
manage local subnet group 
membership. 
IGMP is replaced with Multicast Listener 
Discovery (MLD) messages.  
ICMP Router Discovery is used to 
determine the IPv4 address of 
the best default gateway and is 
optional. 
ICMP Router Discovery is replaced with ICMPv6 
Router Solicitation and Router Advertisement 
messages and is required.  
Broadcast addresses are used to 
send traffic to all nodes on a 
subnet. 
There are no IPv6 broadcast addresses. 
Instead, a link-local scope all-nodes 
multicast address is used.  
Must be configured either 
manually or through DHCP. 
Does not require manual configuration or DHCP. 
Uses host address (A) resource 
records in the Domain Name 
System (DNS) to map host names 
to IPv4 addresses. 
Uses host address (AAAA) resource records in 
the Domain Name System (DNS) to map host names 
to IPv6 addresses.  
Uses pointer (PTR) resource 
records in the IN-ADDR.ARPA DNS 
domain to map IPv4 addresses to 
host names. 
Uses pointer (PTR) resource records in the 
IP6.ARPA DNS domain to map IPv6 addresses to 
host names.  
Must support a 576-byte packet 
size (possibly fragmented). 
Must support a 1280-byte packet size (without 
fragmentation).  
Single address assigned to a 
single node 
Multiple addresses are assigned to a single 
interface 
Table 1.  Comparison of the IPv4 and IPv6 protocols (From 
Adame & Kong, 2008). 
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B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Given the 2003 DoD CIO memorandum citing the need to 
transition the GIG to IPv6, the OMB memorandum 05-22, 
Transition Planning for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), 
and the DoD IPv6 Standard Profiles for IPv6 Capable Products 
Version 2.0 published in 2007, debate on the merits of a 
IPv6 sensor network versus a IPv4 sensor network has been 
overcome by events. The DoD, like much of the commercial 
world, is transitioning to IPv6 networks. While the benefits 
provided by IPv6 are numerous, its challenges lie in 
managing a network on the scale proposed, while also 
operating in the relatively untried IPv6 domain. 
Transitioning traditional sensors, such as ground and 
airborne video cameras, and network devices, such as servers 
and workstations, is an on-going process. Likewise, testing 
of network management systems for IPv6 compatibility, 
operability, and usability in a tactical network is under 
way. New challenges are also presented by the need to 
integrate into the IPv6 segment new sensor capabilities, 
such as soldier battlesuit-borne IP-enabled drug injection 
and hormone sensing devices, as well as sensors placed in 
spacesuits. Accessing this information also presents 
challenges. Feasibility studies are conducted to show that, 
for these devices, the IPv6 domain is at least as capable an 
operating space as is the current IPv4 domain. Lessons 
learned from planning, installing, and operating these 
devices in the IPv6 domain during a series of Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Tactical Network Topology (TNT) 
studies will be captured for future operational reference.  
Currently, network administrators configure network 
management tools such as Internet Control Message Protocol 
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(ICMP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to 
monitor the network’s health at a higher level and to make 
network configuration changes as needed in order to provide 
service over a “best-effort” network (Perkins, 1996). 
Bandwidth, network traffic, and route availability are in a 
constant state of flux. This in turn causes the network and 
the traffic that traverses it to constantly adapt to 
changing conditions. Adapting a large-scale sensor network 
within the IPv6 address space requires a new look at QoS 
techniques, so that the user can scope his view to a 
particular set (or sets) of sensor clusters and pull real-
time information, all while contending with a multi-layered, 
continually-adapting network topology. A tactical network 
SLA taxonomy has been developed in order to show how the 
commander envisions having his information requirements 
answered by the tactical sensor network supporting his 
mission. This taxonomy will support the “commander’s view” 
at a higher information level than the proposed 
implementation at the network level. This model is proposed 
to assist the operational Information Management Officers 
(IMOs) who will then implement it in support of their 
commander’s information needs through a highly dynamic, 
capable IPv6 tactical sensor network.  
C. THESIS QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: How 
can the benefits and improved capabilities of the IPv6 
protocol improve the integration, deployment, and operation 
of sensor networks, and how can those improved networks 
support a tactical commander’s information needs?   
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The subsidiary questions are: 
 How can the Quality of Service in sensor networks be 
improved by the use of IPv6 and associated Quality of 
Service techniques? 
 How can Service Level Agreements support combat 
operations? 
 Describe a Service Level Agreement taxonomy in support 
of an IPv6 sensor network. 
 Describe a Campaign of Experiments for future IPv6 
tactical sensor networking studies.  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis encompasses a description of 
the IPv6 protocol and the benefits of its application to 
tactical sensor networks. A feasibility study was conducted 
during the TNT series of experiments to qualitatively show 
that the IPv6 protocol is in fact valid for sensor networks. 
Quality of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
for ensuring a certain level of QoS in IPv6 tactical 
networks were studied, with appropriate recommendations 
made. An associated campaign of IPv6 QoS experiments is 
proposed for future work. This study and its associated 
experiments made use of the TNT administered by the Center 
for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) 
laboratory at NPS.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I 
introduces the IPv6 protocol, sensor networks, and why the 
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two domains are a natural combination. Chapter II, the 
literature review, addresses the optimal protocols and 
configurations necessary to provide (optimal) QoS for end-
user decision makers in an IPv6 sensor-networked 
environment. Chapter III describes an IPv6 tactical sensor 
network feasibility study conducted during TNT 09-2 aboard 
Camp Roberts. Chapter IV lays the framework for IPv6 QoS 
techniques and related SLA support of the tactical 
commander’s information requirements. It further develops 
the sensor network taxonomy, by defining tactical SLAs, 
defining the war-fighting functions, and then relating the 
information requirements of those functions to the need for 
service level agreements. Five example SLAs are developed 
using a variety of common, real-world missions; they are 
then compared and contrasted to develop the framework for 
the sensor network taxonomy. Finally, the sensor network 
taxonomy is described in an operational context. Chapter V 
describes an ambitious campaign of experimentation for 
future QoS studies in the IPv6 sensor network environment. 
Proposed variables and experimentation scenarios are 
discussed at length; conclusions follow the experiment 
description and findings. Chapter VI concludes this work 
with a review of the concepts introduced, and with 
suggestions for future work. A systems approach 
experimentation framework to determine the necessary design 
variables, relationships, and performance criteria is 
proposed. This framework provides a means for optimizing QoS 
solutions in a dynamic, large-scale sensor network. A QoS 
TNT experiment for the IPv6 sensor network is also proposed 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SYSTEMS APPROACH TO SENSOR NETWORK ADAPTATION 
For the purposes of this thesis, large-scale tactical 
sensor networks are defined as thousands of various mission-
specific nodes distributed either randomly, selectively, or 
as a hybrid of the two; situated in a given operational 
area; networked together; and which form paths back to a 
command and control node at which point the information is 
aggregated and used for various operational purposes. Yu et 
al. (2001) simulated large scale sensor networks reaching 
upwards of 4800 sensor nodes scattered uniformly in a dense 
pattern. Eschenauer and Gilgor (2002), while studying the 
cryptographic key management problem in distributed sensor 
networks, made a distinction between “traditional embedded 
wireless networks” and distributed sensor networks (DSNs) by 
primarily numbering DSN nodes in the tens of thousands (NAI 
Labs, 2000). Sensor nodes can be employed to transmit 
streaming video from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or 
ground-deployed cameras; to record environmental data in an 
area of interest; to monitor Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical (NBC) detection; to monitor battle suit vital signs 
to quantitatively determine the overall health of a unit; or 
to perform any other mission-dictated purpose in which a 
sensor can provide timely information in response to the 
commander’s information requirements. These sensors can be 
deployed in many different environments and locations, some 
of which may render the sensors immediately useless or may 
cause them to degrade at rates depending on the situation 
and/or location. Likewise, the “physical health” of the 
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sensors is an additional factor in the network’s ability to 
provide timely information (Estrin, 1999).  
In systems thinking, adaptive systems alter their 
behavior according to changes in their environment, or in 
parts of the system itself (Clement, 2008). Capra (1996) 
refers to adaptation in his discussion of feedback loops. 
“The consequence of this arrangement is that the [input] is 
affected by the [output], which results in self-regulation 
of the entire system, as the initial effect is modified each 
time it travels around the circle.” Kim and Shin (2002) 
define network adaptation as the link between high-quality 
demand applications and the underlying physical networks 
that exist in their own widely dynamic environment. 
 Current networks were originally designed to provide 
“best-effort service,” which includes as normal and accepted 
latency, jitter, and packet loss, although efforts are being 
made to reduce these issues (Yu et al., 2002).  Sensor 
networks are dynamic systems subject to constant change of 
state. Routes, bandwidth allocation, availability, jitter, 
complete loss of links, and nodes joining and leaving the 
network almost randomly are some of the constantly changing 
elements of a large-scale sensor network. Both the 
“environmental” impact and health of the network affect 
real-time, dynamic, uninterrupted access to information 
gathered through individual and clustered sensor nodes. 
Feedback obtained from end systems, as well as through 
intervening network devices, forms the impetus for network 
adaptation, which would mitigate the effects of and adapt to 
the network’s environment (Bechler, 2000). IPv6, and its 
inherent capability to provide varying levels of QoS, is 
intended to take the tactical network to the qualified “QoS 
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level.” The QoS level is considered “qualified,” in this 
case, because in a combat environment, as opposed to a non-
combat or commercial environment (such as a Verizon ISP in a 
major United States city), the likelihood of system 
degradation or destruction is real. Although redundancy can 
be built into network resources, time is limited and long-
term network plans are subject to the fluid nature of war. 
Below a certain performance threshold, and due to the 
possibility of loss of equipment and/or denial of service, 
“best effort” service is the most one can hope for.  
B. ADAPTATION APPROACHES 
1. SPEED 
He et al. (2003) proposed improving QoS in sensor 
networks by developing SPEED, a real-time sensor network 
communications protocol. Recognizing that data delivery is 
the primary purpose of sensor networks, the authors designed 
their protocol on the premise that “speed” across the 
wireless network could be used as a metric, regardless of 
whether the communication is between nodes, to the base 
station, or from the base station. By comparing the 
“delivery speed” to the “actual speed” of a packet from a 
distant node, network status can be obtained, from which 
delivery decisions are determined. To adapt to network 
conditions, SPEED takes advantage of common IPv6 
communication networking services such as unicast, area-
multicast, and area-anycast. Unicast is used when data must 
be sent to a specific device. Area-multicast is preferred 
when communicating to a specific set, or a cluster, of 
sensor nodes such as allNBC for all nodes with the ability 
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to detect NBC contaminants, or allWindSpeed sensors for 
sensors that can detect wind speed on certain mountain 
passes and peaks. Area-anycast is used when the same 
information can be obtained from any one, random, sensor in 
a cluster (He et al., 2003). Proactively, SPEED uses several 
adaptive mechanisms to determine an optimal route path based 
on real-time network behavior. The data-link layer 
determines routes and relay speeds to downstream nodes while 
the network layer employs a concept known as back-pressure, 
to reroute traffic when the data-link layer has determined 
that a particular downstream route is not optimal. In 
addition to finding route congestion, SPEED also finds the 
non-congested paths in the network and redirects traffic to 
take advantage of unused bandwidth subject to overall 
performance.  When used together, the protocol is shown to 
improve QoS from end-to-end, and then to provide a linkage 
between the need for real-time information and navigating a 
dynamic network (He et al., 2003). 
2. FICCRD 
Yu et al. (2001) have taken a similar tack in 
developing the Fair Intelligent Congestion Control Resource 
Discovery (FICCRD) protocol in which, simply stated, the QoS 
issue is addressed by core routers determining optimal 
routes and available bandwidth and then forwarding that 
information to the edge routers for routing determination 
decisions. FICCRD intends to achieve a fairness of network 
resource allocation and therefore to improve end-to-end 
connectivity. Since layers three and four of the TCP/IP 
model are essential to providing optimal QoS they are 
continually sampled for environmental impacts. As an 
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example, feedback loops from layer three support TCP with 
their connections and buffer window sizes. The current state 
of the physical resources available is also determined and 
combined with the upper TCP/IP stack information to 
determine the network’s state. This feedback, in turn, 
provides the core routers with the information on the 
current state of the network. The information is then pushed 
back out to the edge routers, thus providing an adaptive QoS 
link between the sensor nodes and the user needing real-time 
information (Yu et al., 2002). 
3. User-defined Priorities 
Bechler, Ritter, & Schiller (2000) researched QoS in 
end-user wireless “node” environments where a user is able 
to make QoS decisions and determine which service(s) will be 
given priority. For example, a user may want to make a phone 
call and need to download email prior to boarding a flight 
in an environment with limited bandwidth. By determining 
that the phone call is the application most in need of the 
limited resources, the user enables a QoS application that 
makes the phone call the priority. At the expense of other 
running applications the phone call will get at least the 
minimum amount of network resources. This example describes 
an architecture proposed by the authors that provides QoS to 
three types of applications: common, adaptive, and 
proactive. Common applications are considered “best-effort” 
and are not capable of obtaining resources to guarantee 
services. Adaptive applications make use of available 
network resources and use techniques such as compression to 
provide QoS in a constricted environment. The authors label 
adaptive applications as “passive” and note that the 
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adaptive application will provide QoS in proportion to the 
available network resources (Bechler et al., 2000). 
Proactive applications, such as the one described above, 
will fence off resources such as bandwidth and processing 
time, should the initial adaptation step not provide minimal 
QoS. These applications give the end-user the ability to 
choose the best service depending on his situation (Bechler 
et al., 2000). The next step in this architecture proposal 
could be one in which the system determines QoS level 
remotely to determine which sensor cluster(s) receives the 
appropriate QoS.  
4. Differentiated Services (DiffServ) 
Bouras et al. (2004) noted that many of the QoS 
services available have been designed to operate in the IPv4 
address space and, thus, to operate under IPv4 conditions.  
Understanding that IPv6 network behavior is considerably 
different than that of IPv4, they hypothesized that the QoS 
services would need to be reexamined. In an effort to 
determine supported QoS mechanisms, they tested DiffServ in 
the IPv6 domain, which puts “strict priorities of packets 
coming from real-time applications” and sends the rest 
through best-effort mechanisms. Different network conditions 
were simulated and the authors’ final qualified conclusion 
is that QoS services can operate in an IPv6 domain; at the 
time of publication they also stated that considerable 
research still needs to be done.  
RFC 2474 defines the traffic class field in the IPv6 
header to be the differentiated services field. This field 
provides the intervening DiffServ-enabled routers with the 
information needed to process the packets in accordance with 
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standardized forwarding rules. Operating within a DiffServ 
domain, the field implements the policies prescribed for all 
networking devices within the DiffServ domain; by extension, 
every network device must have consistent, up-to-date 
instructions on how to handle each packet received in each 
domain. Traffic entering the domain is classified at the 
boundary and labeled in accordance with domain policies. 
Intra-domain traffic is classified at the source device. As 
shown in Figure 4, the first six bits of the field provide a 
combination of 64 codepoint values that provide DiffServ 
routers with handling instructions as each packet header is 
processed while the remaining two bits, congestion 
notification, are not currently used according to RFC 2474. 
  
           
   6 bits 2 bits   
     




         
   DSCP  Differentiated Services Codepoint   
   ECN   Explicit Congestion Notification   
           
Figure 4.   Format of the DS field (From Hagen, 2006). 
Table 2 contains the standard codepoints that are defined as 
“pool one.”  Thirty-two codepoints are contained in this 
pool, while the remaining 32 are divided among pools two and 








Name       Space    Reference 
---------  -------  --------- 
CS0        000000   [RFC2474] 
CS1        001000   [RFC2474] 
CS2        010000   [RFC2474] 
CS3        011000   [RFC2474] 
CS4        100000   [RFC2474] 
CS5        101000   [RFC2474] 
CS6        110000   [RFC2474] 
CS7        111000   [RFC2474] 
AF11       001010   [RFC2597] 
AF12       001100   [RFC2597] 
AF13       001110   [RFC2597] 
AF21       010010   [RFC2597] 
AF22       010100   [RFC2597] 
AF23       010110   [RFC2597] 
AF31       011010   [RFC2597] 
AF32       011100   [RFC2597] 
AF33       011110   [RFC2597] 
AF41       100010   [RFC2597] 
AF42       100100   [RFC2597] 
AF43       100110   [RFC2597] 
   EF PHB     101110   [RFC3246] 
   
Table 2.  DSCP Pool 1 Codepoints Reference (From RFC 2474). 
CS in the first column refers to class selector 
codepoint, AF refers to assured forwarding, meaning better-
than-best effort, and EF refers to expedited forwarding, 
which is the best service the network can provide. These 
designations provide for differing levels of backwards 
compatibility and precedence setting. The codepoint values 
are mapped to Per-Hop Behaviors (PHBs), which specify how 
packets are to be forwarded. PHBs can be individually 
defined within each DiffServ domain with the exception of 
the default value of 000000, which stands for best effort 
delivery/no priority. Where a maximum of 64 codepoint values  
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exists any number of PHBs can exist (Hagen, 2006). Each 
domain can, therefore, specify its own prioritization 
policies.  
 The 20-bit flow label in the IPv6 base header is used 
by the source node to specifically and uniquely identify a 
flow of information between the source and destination 
nodes. RFC 3697 defines a flow as a “sequence of packets 
from a [source] to a specific unicast, anycast, or multicast 
address labeled as a flow by the [source]” (Hagen, 2006). 
Flow labels are chosen in a random fashion to “provide a 
hash key for routers in order to look up the state 
associated with the flow” (Hagen, 2006).  Source nodes can 
handle multiple information flows, since each is uniquely 
identified by a combination of the source address, 
destination address, and flow label. When flow labels are 
combined with the traffic class, field dynamic QoS can be 
attained within a DiffServ domain that is configured with 
the appropriate polices (Hagen, 2006). 
 It must be noted that both the DoD IPv6 Standard 
Profile for IPv6 Capable Products and NISTs Profile for IPv6 
in the US Government stipulate that IPv6 hosts and routers 
must support DiffServ (Office of ASD/DoD CIO, 2007; NIST, 
2008).  
C. SENSOR NETWORKS AND TACTICAL NETWORK TOPOLOGY (TNT) 
Initiated in 2001 as a platform to develop unmanned 
systems and wireless networking capabilities, the TNT 
experiment series, detailed in Figure 5, has developed into 
a large test-bed with which DoD, USSOCOM, and other partners 




















Figure 5.   Diagram showing the Tactical Network Topology 
(TNT) (From Adame & Kong, 2008). 
 
Incorporated with the CENETIX the lab’s mission is to: 
support advanced studies of wireless networking 
with unmanned aerial, underwater, and ground 
vehicles in order to provide flexible deployable 
network integration with an operating 
infrastructure for interdisciplinary studies of 
multiplatform tactical networks, Global 
Information Grid connectivity, collaborative 
technologies, situational awareness systems, 
multi-agent architectures, and management of 
sensor-unmanned vehicle-decision maker self-
organizing environment. (Ferrell, 2006)   
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The TNT testbed provides the opportunity and means to test 
sensor network capabilities and proofs-of-concept on a 
quarterly basis in a plug-and-play network. It is a unique 
environment, in that it enables military and civilian users 
alike to use the TNT testbed on a multitude of layers and 
applications. Examples include: 
 The TNT [users] can integrate their sensors and 
mesh networking elements in the unclassified 
but closed IP space of the TNT testbed by 
getting fixed IPv4 and lately IPv6 addresses. 
[…] This illustrates the online portal enabling 
rapid integration of experimental assets in TNT 
testbed IP space, 
 Users can connect their remote local area 
network, including command and operation 
centers, via the virtual private network (VPN) 
client on top satellite or commercial IP cloud 
services, 
 Sensors and unmanned vehicles can be integrated 
with the TNT Situational Awareness Environment 
via the applications layer interoperability 
interface. The current option includes Cursor-
on-Target (CoT) integration channel, initially 
developed at MITRE (Miller, 2004), comprised of 
the CoT message router and CoT XML adapters for 
each node need[ing] to be integrated[…]. In the 
very near future we will consider adding the 
Common Alert Protocol (CAP), which is becoming 
widely used by the DHS community,  
 Human operators (both remote and local) can 
access the testbed collaborative environment 
via the collaborative portal or [via] peer-to-
peer collaborative clients, situational 
awareness agents, video conferencing room […], 
and video client. This is human layer interface 
to the testbed. 
 At the physical level the testbed reaches to 
even lower levels (like multiple mesh network 
enabled unmanned systems), which permits 
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researchers to experiment with such things as 
airborne sensors and cooperative control […] 
without having to be concerned about network 
connectivity. (Bordetsky & Netzer, 2009)  
 In the TNT environment, Bordetsky et al. (2004) 
performed experiments aboard the Naval Postgraduate School 
to explore network performance awareness in a peer-to-peer 
(P2P) collaborative environment. While a P2P environment is 
somewhat different from a sensor environment, their position 
is similar to that of Bechler, Ritter, and Schiller (2000) 
in that the users need to actively participate in 
determining which applications will have QoS in a resource 
constrained environment. Bordetsky et al., (2004) proposed 
that both application end-users and NOC operators have the 
ability to determine network performance in order to decide 
how to improve QoS, whether it involves moving to a better 
transmission location and/or terminating excessive 
background applications that are hoarding network resources. 
However, sensor networks containing thousands of nodes 
cannot be moved arbitrarily, so some automation is required 
to self-determine the optimal routes for data delivery. In 
“Adaptive management of QoS requirements for wireless 
multimedia communications,” Bordetsky et al. (2003) support 
this idea in their focus on real-time networking 
applications traversing DoD’s GIG, which requires minimal 
amount of bandwidth in order to function properly. Their 
model, based on the Telecommunications Management Network 
(TMN) model, relies on capturing the information from, and 
adapting to, several layers of feedback controls to provide 
the appropriate levels of QoS for future use. For example, 
at the application layer, Call Preparation Control records 
information on end-to-end application connections and 
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determines minimal requirements for future uses. Connection 
Control monitors the current connection and arbitrates for 
necessary network resources to maintain minimal 
requirements. The transport layer makes use of the Real Time 
Protocol (RTP), which determines network performance through 
sub-protocols sending and receiving reports from which 
adaptive decisions can be based on (Bordetsky et al., 2003). 
This layered approach is similar to the approach taken in Yu 
et al.’s (2002) FICCRD approach and He et al.’s (2003) SPEED 
approach. Bordetsky & Hayes-Roth (2007) propose adding an 
eighth layer to the OSI stack to provide a “human-like 
operator inside the network” between the deployed sensor 
nodes and the consumers of the information provided in order 
to increase the QoS capability. A human operator in the NOC 
or technical control facility can monitor the network status 
at near real-time and can then reconfigure the network to 
provide various levels of service. There is, however, an 
inherent delay in this process that may exceed the value 
gained by directing the real-time information to the right 
person at the right time. This eighth layer serves to solve 
the delay introduced by human operators by providing each 
node the capability of a NOC, which automatically provides 
the level of service required or desired, as stated in a 
Service Level Agreement in a network that is undergoing 
constant change (Bordetsky & Hayes-Roth, 2007). During TNT 
09-1, nanotechnology sensors were included as part of a 
developing series of experiments to determine appropriate 
communication and network management methods. Follow-on 
experiments included testing the sensor network within an 
IPv6 network extension within the TNT testbed to test QoS 
issues and other IPv6 network management research.  
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Table 3 presents a comparison among the QoS mechanisms 
used in each protocol discussed in this chapter. 
 
 QoS Solutions for Sensor Networks 
OSI Model IPv4 Solutions IPv6 Solutions 









Layer 4  
FICCRD 
  
Layer “8” Hyper-Nodes Hyper-Nodes 
Advantages 
 
-2128 global address space 
enables end-to-end 
connectivity from anywhere 
-“RFC-backed” Flow labels 
-IPv6 designed for QoS 
Disadvantages -232 address space cannot 
support end-to-end 
connectivity 
-IPv4 QoS never matured 
 
Table 3.  A comparison of IPv4 and IPv6 QoS mechanisms. 
D. IPV6 QUALITY OF SERVICE IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) Internet Protocol 
version 6 (IPv6) Transition Plan, Version 2 is the policy 
that directed the GIG to run IPv6 either is a dual-stacked 
mode or in a native environment by FY2008. During the 
planning and preparation phase, many networking issues were 
examined; one of these was providing QoS through the IPv6’s 
inherent capabilities. Fineberg, in “IPv6 Features for 
Enhancing QoS in the GIG,” (2005) proposes several 
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innovative uses of the IPv6 protocol to provide QoS in a 
unique environment such as the GIG. Fineberg (2005) also 
identifies “two QoS distinctions that exist between the GIG 
and commercial-world networks.” One is that the categories 
of the traffic class field in the IPv6 header are much 
broader and more diverse in the GIG. Commercial networks 
tend to have a known customer base and a known set of 
applications running on the network. The GIG must support a 
wide range of DoD organizations, the intelligence community, 
and any other organization using the GIG for national 
security interests. The range of users and applications is 
significantly higher than in the commercial world and, 
therefore, requires a greater traffic class classification 
system. Classifications such as Precedence and Preemption 
(P&P), Communities of Interest (CoI), and Quality of 
Protection (QoP) are included as QoS sub-classifications in 
the GIG and are labeled at the end user nodes. Additionally, 
Fineberg (2005) underscores the fact that IPv6 assigns 
addresses to interface vice nodes meaning that, from the 
application’s point of view, more than one address can be 
used as a source address. By assigning an address to a 
particular QoS sub-classification level, the application can 
“assign” the appropriate QoS level and inform the network of 
this assignment as the packet is routed to its destination. 
In the same manner, the destination address can indicate a 
different classification by the destination address it 
forwards the packet to as well (Fineberg, 2005). 
 The second issue is that traffic will likely have to 
cross encryption boundaries necessitating a unique solution 
to maintaining the intended level of QoS set in the 
originating node. As shown in Figure 6, traffic originating 
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from classified “red” networks that must travel through 
unclassified “black” networks must be encrypted. Since 
potentially damaging information could be obtained by 
analyzing the unencrypted protocol headers information, 
assurance procedures dictate that an assortment of QoS 
markings be stripped as the packets cross classification 
boundaries (Fineberg, 2005). As shown in Figure 6, the 
proposed solution creatively uses the IPv6 router extension 
header in addition to the proposed multiple interface.  
 
 
 EUD: end user device 
 R:  router in the classified network 
 B:  router in the unclassified network 
 PT: Plain Text packets 
 CT: Cypher Text packets 
 H: High Assurance Information Assurance Encryption (HAIPE) 
device 
 SA: Security Associations between HAIPE devices 
Figure 6.   Packet transition in the GIG (From Fineberg, 
2005). 
Using the interface corresponding to the proper QoS 
level, the end user will input the EUD2 destination address 
in an extension header, and will then input the R1 address 
corresponding to the same QoS level as the IPv6 header’s 
 39
source address. When the packet arrives at R1, the HAIPE 
device will read the destination address in the router 
extension header and will then insert this address in the 
header to become the new destination address. The HAIPE 
device will then encrypt the packet, forward it to B1 for 
transmission to the destination interface corresponding to 
the QoS level associated with it (Fineberg, 2005). The 
author’s proposal represents a creative application of 
IPv6’s capabilities to overcome a unique problem, ensure 
that information security is not violated, and provide an 















































III. TNT 09-2 IPV6 SENSOR NETWORKING STUDIES 
A. TNT IPV6 SENSOR NETWORK FEASIBILITY EXPERIMENT 
 The Battlefield Medical IPv6 Sensor Network field 
experiment is a feasibility study that leverages both the 
architecture and successful discovery and constraints 
analysis step conducted during TNT 09-1 aboard Camp Roberts, 
California. This previous experiment combined new sensor and 
UAV networking solutions capable of supporting the 
battlefield medic in finding, identifying, and assisting 
casualties in the hostile area. The set of solutions 
included reading casualty e-tags (an electronic means of 
identifying an object, as well as the object’s static and 
dynamic characteristics) from a very low-altitude UAV, 
communicating e-tag data to the remote medical data base, 
facilitating medication drop-off from a UAV, and improving 
the battlefield medic’s situational awareness. The 09-1 
experiment had two main objectives. The first was to explore 
the feasibility of integrating a biomedical microdevice, 
developed at the MIT Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology, 
into the TNT testbed; the second was to determine the 
feasibility of activating the device via a remotely located 
medic via the tactical GPRS network or via the UAV loitering 
above the casualty location. These two objectives were 
successfully accomplished by the NPS CENETIX-MIT ISN team. 
 The TNT 09-1 battlefield medical experiment was 
conducted in the IPv4 address space. The next logical step 
in the battlefield network sensor series is to show that the 
network will operate in the IPv6 address space. The main 
objective for the TNT 09-2 experiment was to place the 
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Battlefield Medical Network in a native IPv6 environment and 
show the feasibility of a tactical IPv6 sensor network. It 
is assumed that there will be no loss of previously-
discovered IPv4 network capability in this new IPv6 
configuration. Figure 7 depicts a TNT experiment in 
operation. 
 
Figure 7.   A view of the TOC at Camp Roberts (From 
Clement, 2008). 
 A scenario has been developed to encompass many 
different aspects of the battlefield medical experiment 
series in the anticipation of continued feasibility studies 
in future TNTs. A recommended TNT QoS experiment is 
discussed in Chapter VI. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND DISCUSSION   
1. Question  
 It is feasible to operate a ground video sensor and a 
UAV video sensor over an IPv6 network in support of the 
battlefield medical scenario? 
2. Discussion  
 This experiment was designed to demonstrate the 
following: 
 
 The IPv6 protocol is mature enough to operate with a 
sensor network. The video feeds from both the ground 
and airborne camera were sent to the TOC via the IPv6 
protocol. 
 
 The dopplerVue network management system can support 
the network management requirements for IPv6. 
Performance values from the IPv6 laptop in the casualty 
site and from the server located in the UAV were 
gathered to determine the performance of the overall 
IPv6 sensor network. Wireshark, a network protocol 
analyzer, supported the demonstration by capturing 
packets for later analysis. 
C. BATTLEFIELD SENSOR NETWORK EXPERIMENT SERIES SCENARIO     
A six-man reconnaissance team has been inserted into a 
denied area for the purposes of surveillance and gathering 
intelligence on a target that is suspected to be in the 
area. A set of targets is suspected of planting IEDs in and 
among protected areas such as mosques, hospitals, and other 
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areas deemed neutral zones. The team needs to record the 
target’s actions both in wide-view for general situational 
awareness and close-up view for identification purposes, and 
then to transmit that imagery for real-time viewing. In 
addition to the real-time intelligence evaluation carried 
out by intelligence analysts in a separate location, a legal 
team in yet another location needs to validate the target’s 
actions as illegal before action can be taken against the 
target. The imagery from the two camera views, as well as 
still images from the digital camera, needs to be within 
certain parameters in order to constitute irrefutable proof 
of the target’s activities, and thus provide the basis for 
follow-on action. Likewise, the follow-on action needs to be 
documented in order to show that the appropriate actions 
were taken. Hence, video quality needs to be protected, as 
it streams through the network by use of QoS mechanisms in 
the IPv6 protocol.  
The team has set up their video imaging systems and has 
ensured that the imagery is being received in the manner 
required. They have also received assurance that their 
battlesuits are communicating normally with each other and 
with the gateway to their higher headquarters. The team has 
received several reports indicating that the medical and 
environmental messages received show that everything is 
within normal parameters.  
After a period of time, the target has appeared in the 
recon team’s area of observation. The video and still image 
cameras pick up the imagery and are transmitting as 
required; radio chatter with the intelligence and legal 
teams begins to increase as the activity level increases. 
The VHF nets are relaying through the gateway as well, using 
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the Radio-over-IP network (RIPRNET), which requires a QoS 
level to maintain an intelligible conversation. The 
battlesuits begin to relay signs of increasing stress as 
heart rates begin to quicken. Some of the heartrates exceed 
what is considered normal, which elevates the QoS level of 
the packets associated with those messages. Confirmation 
comes from the legal team that the activity carried out by 
the target does warrant appropriate action. The recon team 
leader then calls in air support to attack the target as it 
leaves the protected area. The attack must be video 
recorded, as well as narrated by the recon team, to provide 
proof that the protected area was not harmed. It is most 
critical at this point that the video and voice stream level 
of QoS do not suffer. At this point, a section of attack 
helicopters attack the fleeing targets, causing the video 
imagery to increase its needed bandwidth to capture rapid 
movement and changes. The narration is quicker, which again 
stresses the data and voice streams that are transmitting to 
the higher headquarters viewing the video and hearing the 
narration. At that moment, two battlesuits begin sending 
medical alarms. Two members of the recon team have been 
wounded in an ensuing small arms fight that has erupted in 
the vicinity of their position.  
The recon team then returns fire on a previously hidden 
security team that was providing cover for the target’s IED 
activity. The battlefield medical collaboration team (BMCT) 
begins evaluating the alarms from the battlesuits, 
projecting possible outcomes based on the situation, and 
discussing possible medical courses of action that could be 
taken should they need to intervene. One item that the BMCT 
can work on is alerting the hospital staff to injuries that 
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they will have to treat when the team returns. This then 
allows the ER team to prepare, and to begin working faster. 
As this happens, the wounded team members radio back that 
they are “OK” for the time being and will extract with the 
team. 
The recon team leader has successfully serviced the 
fleeing target with the section of attack helicopters and 
now asks for the helicopters to return and attack the enemy 
security team. The gunships do so, which allows the recon 
team to maneuver and assault the enemy position. At that 
point, the planted IED explodes and subsequently sets off 
other IED-making material that the enemy security team has 
with them. The IED explodes in the vicinity of a 
marketplace, causing a mass casualty situation; secondary 
explosions severely wound two more recon team members. The 
BMCT now has to go to work. 
Following this event, voice messaging increases and 
video recording must continue; wounded team members also 
need medical attention that can be provided through their 
suits from the battlefield medical team. A UAV has just 
checked in on-station that needs to relay its video feed of 
the ensuing gunfight through the same gateway. In addition 
to these concerns, mission-critical video, audio, and 
messages with high precedence from the battlesuits must be 
delivered in the manner expected. Figure 8 depicts the 




Figure 8.   Operational Topology. 
D. EXPERIMENT PREPARATION 
 Following several weeks of experimental design work and 
experimental topology development, actual preparation with 
the physical devices began ten days prior to the start of 
TNT 09-2. A building block approach was used to ensure that 
all experiment components would work together and that all 
those involved with the experiment understood each 
application and network device. Building the level of 
component understanding was important to ensuring that the 
experiment was conducted properly, that problems could be 
quickly resolved, and that the experiment results were  
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valid. The experimental topology shown in Figure 9 was 
























Rascal UAV IPv6 Video
 
Figure 9.   Experimental Topology. 
1. Operating System, Video Camera, and Media Player 
Selection 
 Microsoft’s Vista and XP operating systems (OS) were 
tested for use with the IPv6 protocol. XP with Service Pack 
3 is reportedly IPv6 compatible, but IPv6 configuration 
tests with the OS were not intuitive. Vista is IPv6 
compatible “right out of the box” and is very easy to 
configure for native IPv4 use, native IPv6 use, or a 
combination of the two. Pinnacle System’s Dazzle was 
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originally selected for video camera use but it was 
discovered that the appropriate drivers did not exist for 
Vista. A Logitech camera was selected in Dazzle’s place and 
was installed on one Vista laptop. A media player is needed 
to view streaming video across the network; VLC media player 
was recommended and installed on both laptops. A freeware 
application, VLC is capable of sending and receiving both 
unicast and multicast video over IPv4 and IPv6.  
2. Proof of Video Streaming Concept   
 In order to ensure that the Logitech camera and VLC 
would work during the experiment, a small network was 
constructed. Both laptops were set to IPv4 as a baseline. 
The VLC application was opened on the laptop with the camera 
connected to it, and the video image was streamed to the 
second laptop. VLC was then opened on the second laptop, the 
stream was captured, and the video appeared on the second 
laptop’s screen. Concept proofing continued with refining 
the streaming protocol, as well as the maximum packet size 
to be streamed. UDP was selected for video streaming since 
UDP is a “connectionless protocol” and would not consume 
bandwidth with additional overhead. It has been noted that 
video is very tolerant of a few dropped packets, whereas 
voice is not (Brosh, 2009). In fact, there was a noticeable 
lag between the video and audio during this phase of the 
benchtest. After a series of codec (coder decoder) tests, 
MPEG-2 was selected since it provided the best quality video 
and voice stream. Wireshark was used to capture packets and 
assist in refining the stream. Figure 10 depicts this 
process.      
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Figure 10.   Video streaming proofing in IPv4. 
3. IPv6 Networking  
 After the video proofing using IPv4, the two laptops 
were switched to a native IPv6 network by enabling IPv6 and 
disabling IPv4. Again, the video stream was transmitted from 
the first laptop, with the video camera, to the second 
laptop in the network. The IPv6 link-local address of the 
second laptop was used for streaming as before. Configuring 
took some time because it was necessary to input IPv6 
address-specific syntaxes and then to ensure that the 
syntaxes were correct. Once configured, video streamed 
across the network in the same manner it did on the IPv4 
network. Wireshark was again used to throttle the packet 













Figure 11.   Video streaming proofing in IPv6. 
4. Video Streaming Proofing over Wave Relay Radios 
As shown in Figure 12, the next step was to ensure that 
the laptops and the video stream would work properly over 
the actual transmission system to be used during TNT. The 
first step was to connect the laptops to the radios and ping 
back and forth in order to ensure that there was a 
connection between the two. For this step, the network 
needed to be switched back to IPv4, since the radios had an 
IPv4 address. The radios could be reconfigured using a Web 
browser and the radio’s IP address. During initial testing, 
it was determined that the radios were set to different data 
rates. Once adjusted, the laptops were able to ping back and 
forth. Video streaming was then tested in IPv4 and once it 
was working correctly, the network was switched back to IPv6 
for another streaming test; IPv6 video streaming also 
worked. The results of this important test were an 
understanding of how the transmission link would work, how 
it could be troubleshot, and that IPv6 video streaming would 
work over the link as well. 
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Figure 12.   Video streaming proofing with Redline wave 
relay radios. 
5. UAV Connectivity   
The UAV segment represents the second segment of the 
experimental topology requiring validation. A Vista IPv6 
laptop was connected into the Rascal control station van, 
which also had connectivity with the Rascal. During testing, 
Rascal was on the ground and cabled into the van. 
Connectivity between the laptop and Rascal was tested with 
the ICMP ping utility. Once connectivity was ensured, 
Rascal’s IPv6 address, 2001:480:211:1100::164 was entered 
into the Firefox Web browser. This address is the location 
of Rascal’s onboard Web server, where its aerial photographs 
are stored for viewing over the network. Connecting to 
Rascal and viewing the Web site indicated a successful test 




Figure 13.   IPv6 connection testing with Rascal. 
6. Network Management System (NMS) Test and 
Configuration   
An NMS was put on-line as part of the IPv6 sensor 
network feasibility test since network management in the 
IPv6 address space is underdeveloped and challenged. While 
auto-configuration, a large address space, and the ability 
to autonomously move nodes cross-domain are benefits of the 
IPv6, they also challenge network managers. Having nodes 
that can join and leave networks with little to no human 
intervention is a new concept for most managers. However, 
having an NMS that is fully compatible with IPv6, as well as 
having a deep understanding how IPv6 works, is crucial for 
NMS tuning specifically, and for IPv6 network management 
generally. For instance, knowing that routers interact with 
IPv6 nodes as they join and leave the network is a key to 
knowing how to track the number and types of nodes on a 
network. NMSs that use the Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP) can periodically send “get” requests from 
the NMS server to the SNMP agents in the routers for 
updates. Alternatively, the agents themselves can notify the 
server with network configuration changes. These are known 
as “traps.”  
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The most challenging aspect of this experiment was 
configuring and implementing the network management system. 
“dopplerVUE” was selected for this experiment’s NMS because 
it has a long history of success and, more importantly, 
because it is IPv6 compatible (Adame & Kong, 2008). As shown 
in Figure 14 the IPv6 laptops were reconnected to the switch 
along with a desktop running the Vista OS.  
           
 
Figure 14.   Network performance testing with dopplerVUE. 
The original plan called for installing dopplerVUE on 
the NOC laptop, but after a trial of several days (and 
following several phone conversations with the service 
representative), it was determined that the laptop was not 
capable of running the NMS. Once installed on the desktop, 
however, dopplerVUE worked as advertised with a few 
exceptions. This experiment was not representative of a 
“true” network with an assortment of servers, routers, and 
many other nodes, and since the Vista OS was used, some 
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workarounds had to be introduced. This network does not have 
any routers for IPv6 address querying; consequently, the 
node’s network addresses had to be manually entered into 
dopplerVUE’s discovery process. Second, unrelated to 
dopplerVUE, the SNMP services on each of the Vista computers 
had to be restarted each time the node was restarted, and 
then reintroduced to dopplerVUE. Third, each time the NMS 
desktop was restarted, the network management and license 
services had to be restarted as well.  Discovering the 
problems and solutions among dopplerVUE, IPv6, the Vista OS, 
and the small-scale network designed for the experiment were 
time-consuming, yet simple to resolve during network 
operation. While this experiment was not designed to test 
dopplerVUE in a large-scale network, it would be a very 
relevant feasibility study to conduct. 
 The purpose of incorporating dopplerVUE into the 
network was to measure the IPv6 sensor network’s performance 
over the TNT network. dopplerVUE makes network management 
fairly transparent by using common performance MIBs as a 
default setting. It also offers the ability to customize the 
performance metrics for each node by providing a list of the 
available MIBs. The following SNMP Management Information 
Base variables (MIBs) were selected from RFC 4293, 
Management Information Base for the Internet Protocol (IP). 
(RFC 4293 is the current RFC addressing MIBs for networking 
use.) dopplerVUE contained these MIBs as well (Routhier, 
n.d.).  
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a. ipv6IfEffectiveMtu  
DESCRIPTION: "The size of the largest IPv6 packet, 
which can be sent/received on the interface, specified in 
octets." 
b. ipIfStatsInOctets  
DESCRIPTION: "The total number of octets received 
in input IP datagrams, including those received in error. 
Octets from datagrams counted in ipIfStatsInReceives MUST be 
counted here. Discontinuities in the value of this counter 
can occur at re-initialization of the management system, and 
at other times as indicated by the value of 
ipIfStatsDiscontinuityTime." 
c. ipv6InterfaceReasmMaxSize  
DESCRIPTION: "The size of the largest IPv6 
datagram that this entity can re-assemble from incoming IPv6 
fragmented datagrams received on this interface." 
d. ifOperStatus  
DESCRIPTION: “The current operational state of the 
interface.”  
e. ifOutOctets  
DESCRIPTION: "The total number of octets 
transmitted out of the interface, including framing 
characters. Discontinuities in the value of this counter can 
occur at re-initialization of the management system, and at 
other times as indicated by the value of 
ifCounterDiscontinuityTime” (Routhier, n.d.).  
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The following Tables (4-6) are a summary of all 
the devices used, their associated characteristics, and 
their IP addresses. The IPv4 addresses are included, since 
they were used for the initial benchtests and connectivity 
tests over the TNT network. 
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5. Web server 
 
Table 4.  Experiment Devices and their characteristics. 
 
 














Table 5.  Device IP addresses. 
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Application Type Version 
dopplerVUE Network Management System N/A 
Firefox Web browser 3.0.6 
VLC Media Player 0.9.8a Grishenko 
Wireshark Network Protocol Analyzer 1.0.6 
 
Table 6.  Application Versions Used. 
E. EXPERIMENT STEPS 
Figure 15 shows an aerial view of the physical setup of 
the three nodes for the battlefield medical experiment. The 
LRV, mannequin, video camera, and one IPv6-enabled laptop 
were located at the casualty site. The second node, at the 
TOC, contained one IPv6 enabled laptop and one desktop on 
which the network management system application operated 
from. The third node was the Rascal UAV, which was airborne 
over the casualty site.  
 
Figure 15.   Aerial depiction of the TNT 09-2 Battlefield 
Medical Experiment. 
 The following steps were followed during the 
experiment: 
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1. Step 1: Movement 
 The LRV, along with other personnel and vehicles 
supporting this experiment, drove to the casualty site 
(35.740N, 120.787E) located in the vicinity of MacMillan 
Airfield aboard Camp Roberts, California and within direct 
line of sight of the airfield radio tower. Once the LRV was 
in place, its radio was connected to the TNT backbone at the 
TOC via the OFDM 802.16 link. The casualty site laptop was 
then cabled in to the LRV’s switch, and subsequently 
connected to the TNT network using IPv6. Once connected, VLC 
was started and video was streamed using UDP over IPv6 to 
the TOC laptop. The TOC captured the stream via VLC and 
viewed the unidirectional voice and video projection from 
the casualty site.     
2. Step 2: Site Setup 
 The casualty role-playing mannequin was positioned at 
the remote area and within view of the laptop mounted video 
camera. The e-tag reader was then positioned with the 
mannequin and was queried by the GPS device to determine its 
position. The e-tag health data was propagated further via 
the GPRS link to the medical database in the TOC. Successful 
e-tag reading was visually confirmed at the TOC on the NPS 
SA screen and by audible alert.  
3. Step 3: System Activation 
 The B-TAC system (a system designed to assess and send 
alerts if certain health parameters are met) was activated. 
An alert was issued in response to the B-TAC assessment of 
the casualty health status. The video camera at the casualty 
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site continued to stream UDP over IPv6 video and audio 
recordings of the casualty’s condition and surroundings. 
4. Step 4: Rascal Overflight 
 The IPv6 enabled Rascal UAV flew to the casualty site 
to take aerial photos of the casualty and the surrounding 
area.    
5. Step 5: UAV Imagery 
 The onboard high-resolution camera took digital 
photographs of casualty and delivered it to the TOC for 
viewing by the IPv6 laptop, using Firefox to access the file 
server. 
6. Step 6: Drug Delivery Device Activation 
 The drug delivery device was activated from the TOC via 
Voice Portal interface over the medical commander’s 
telephone located at the TOC. The drug delivery activation 
process was observed and recorded by the casualty site video 
camera, and then streamed back to the TOC.  
 Concurrent with the IPv6 sensor network experiment,  
dopplerVUE captured the IPv6 network performance metrics, 
while Wireshark captured the packets traversing the link to 
determine the type of traffic traversing the links.  
F. CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT 
1. Casualty Site 
 The LRV was set into place at the casualty site in the 
vicinity of MacMillan Airfield and a radio link was 
established with the TOC. The casualty site IPv6 Vista 
laptop, with an attached video camera, was cabled into the 
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LRV and a connection was established with the IPv6 Vista 
laptop at the TOC. The connection was checked via an ICMP 
“ping” from the casualty site laptop to the TOC laptop, and 
again from the TOC laptop to the casualty site laptop. Upon 
confirmation of a good connection, VLC was opened on the 
casualty site laptop and video and audio were streamed to 
the TOC laptop’s IP address.          
 Concurrent with the laptop installation, the mannequin, 
shown in Figure 16 was placed on the deck at the casualty 
site and the associated GPRS equipment was switched on. The 
e-tag reader was then queried by the GPS device to determine 
its position; it transmitted that information back to the SA 
agent in the TOC. Following confirmation of the TOC 
receiving the mannequin’s position via the SA agent, an 
alert concerning the “patient’s” status was sent through the 
GPRS system to the TOC. The video camera was then positioned 
to observe the mannequin and its immediate surroundings.        
 
 
Figure 16.   Mannequin at the Casualty Site. 
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2. UAV–Rascal 
 The alert from the medical e-tag triggered an 
additional event. Using the position information relayed 
from the GPRS system, the Rascal UAV launched from the 
airfield and was directed to overfly the casualty site and 
take multiple pictures of the casualty, the casualty site, 
and the surrounding area. These pictures were stored in 
Rascal’s onboard video server, which could then be accessed 
over the data link through a Web browser.  
 
 
Figure 17.   Rascal in flight (From Clement, 2008). 
Figures 18 and 19 are images of the video captured by 
Rascal while overflying the casualty site. While the 
pictures are not as revealing as the streaming video, they 
provided an additional, non-repetitive view of the casualty 
site. They also provided different types of information to 
those who would need to see it such as the unit commander, 
medical personnel, or the intelligence section. It bears 
mentioning that the real world application of this IPv6 
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enabled video sensor is that the video can be accessed by 
anyone authorized to see it from anywhere in the world. The 
second point is that the IPv6 address can be set once and 
then published to all who need it. By not changing the 
address as it moves from network to network, sensor address 




Figure 18.   Screenshot of still images from the Rascal 




Figure 19.   Examples of 2-D and 3-D views of the images 
captured by Rascal (From Clement, 2008). 
3. TOC 
 Figures 20 and 21 show the two nodes that were located 
in the TOC. The desktop ran the network management system, 
dopplerVUE, while the laptop displayed the streaming video 
feed from the casualty site, the video images from the 
Rascal UAV, and Wireshark, a packet capturing application. 
The two nodes were cabled into a switch, which was then 
cabled into the TNT network. Prior to the experiment, each 
node was put on-line and a series of ICMP pings was then 
sent to ensure connectivity with each other and through the 
network. Configurations, such as firewalls and the 
experiment’s applications, were tested to ensure that each 





Figure 20.   The TOC laptop and desktop. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Screenshot of dopplerVUE. 
 During the experiment, VLC was opened on the TOC laptop 
and the stream from the casualty site was captured for 
viewing. Similar to Rascal’s “permanent” IPv6 address, each 
node’s globally-assigned IPv6 addresses did not have to 
 66
change, regardless of which network they were on. Assuming 
that the addresses did not change for arbitrary reasons, the 
sender could be confident that the address he entered was 
the correct address for the duration. The Firefox Web 
browser was opened and Rascal’s video server address, 
http://[2001:480:211:1100::164], was entered in anticipation 
of Rascal overflying the casualty site. Wireshark, as shown 
in Figure 22, was also opened and started in order to 
capture and view the packet stream.  
 
 
Figure 22.   Screenshot of Wireshark. 
Visual evidence showed that IPv6 packets were in fact 
streaming through the network to the TOC laptop. Wireshark 
also provided the MTU size and the application protocol that 
VLC was using. This information helped with QoS fine-tuning 
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at a later date. Unfortunately, Wireshark crashed at the end 
of the experiment and all of the captured packets were lost.  
 During this time, dopplerVUE was opened on the TOC 
desktop. As before, the network management and license 
services had to be restarted in order for dopplerVUE’s 
license to operate properly. The discovery process was then 
enabled and the NMS began to search for all four of the IPv6 
addresses, as shown in Table 6. Initially, the only two that 
were discovered were the two PCs in the NOC. The UAV and 
casualty site laptop were not yet on-line. The two 
discovered nodes were queried for the default networking and 
individual node information, which was soon displayed on 
several of dopplerVUE’s many views. From a networking 
perspective the two nodes were reclassified as workstations 
and were displayed as such. “Drilling down” to each of the 
two workstations revealed CPU performance, interface 
information, and other metrics pertaining to overall 
performance. Each individual node’s page was then 
reconfigured to show bits-per-second input and output on the 
active interfaces. This visual information demonstrated how 
the traffic was flowing across the network. 
4. Casualty Site 
 While this activity was occurring in the TOC, the 
casualty site personnel travelled to the site and set up the 
LRV and other equipment for operation. Shortly after, the 
casualty site laptop came on line. This was indicated by 
dopperVUE canceling its alarm indicating a failure to 
connect by the ping poller, and showing connectivity to the 
distant laptop. This event was alternately confirmed by a 
cell phone call to the TOC. The NMS also began to show the 
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same network performance statistics as the other two 
workstations. When connectivity was confirmed by several 
ICMP pings back and forth, the VLC stream was captured from 
the sending casualty site laptop. dopplerVUE and Wireshark 
began to show signs of the video and audio packets streaming 
across the network. Wireshark showed a constant running 
stream but observers were not able to detect the subtle 
starts and stops as the traffic was received. dopplerVUE, on 
the other hand, showed the interfaces sending and receiving 
the packets in bursts, as traffic congestion across the 
network increased and as audio and video activity from the 
casualty site increased; these bursts appeared as spikes on 
the interface views. In other cases, when the network was 
less congested and when there was no change to the video 
picture the stream evened out and was flatter. 
5. Rascal UAV 
 As part of the battlefield medical scenario, the Rascal 
UAV was launched in response to the medical tag alert. The 
link to Rascal was established shortly after becoming 
airborne. dopplerVUE established connectivity to the new 
node it discovered as part of its default discovery process, 
but the NMS was unable to pull SNMP data from the UAV. After 
confirmation of connectivity to the Rascal, the Firefox Web 
browser was opened and video images were received in the 
TOC. The images were aerial pictures taken of the casualty 
site, as shown in Figure 17. In a manner similar to that of 
the streaming video from the casualty site, the video images 
were transmitted through the network in bursts. This was to 
be expected since the UAV was sending still video images and 
not streaming video.               
 69
G. EXPERIMENT CONCLUSIONS 
 The primary question for this experiment was whether or 
not operating a ground video sensor and a UAV video sensor 
over an IPv6 network in support of the battlefield medical 
scenario was feasible.  
1. Performance Non-degradation 
 There was no noticeable performance degradation between 
the IPv4 and IPv6. An important reason for using IPv6 in 
sensor networks is to ensure that there is no loss of 
performance in comparison to the performance provided with 
the older IPv4 protocol. Even a 5% loss of performance could 
be considered unacceptable, if that 5% means the difference 
between mission success and mission failure. 
 During the testing and experimental phases, IPv4 was 
used at the beginning of each step in order to isolate any 
problems to the application or the device undergoing 
usability and configuration testing. Segregating the two 
layer three protocols from the applications meant that only 
one change variable was being tested at a time. When the 
application was configured properly and shown to work, the 
layer three protocol was then shifted to IPv6 to determine 
if the application under consideration would work under the 
new network conditions. In all cases, each application 
showed no noticeable signs of performance degradation or any 
indications that IPv6 would lead to an application error. 
This is as it should be, since the TCP and UDP/IP stack is 
modularly designed so that changes to one or more layers 
should not affect any other layer.  
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2. IPv6 Address Space 
 The IPv6 address space is ideal for tactical sensor 
networks. The vast IPv6 address space means that the number 
of globally assigned addresses is almost limitless. The 
benefit of the address space size means that device 
interfaces can be assigned one or more unique global IPv6 
addresses and those addresses will stay with that device, 
regardless of the network it joins or where in the world it 
is. For the purposes of this TNT experiment, the requested 
IPv6 addresses were consistent throughout the testing and 
experimental phases. The IPv6 addresses were assigned to the 
interfaces, configured, and tested in the CENETIX lab at NPS 
in Monterey. The address’s first 64 bytes, 
2001:480:211:1100, is used by TNT. The second 64 bytes were 
limited to shorter, more manageable numbers such as ::1234 
and ::164, since globally-routable addresses were not needed 
and the closed network provided the opportunity for 
simplification. In practice, the MAC address would have been 
used. Assigning the IP address just one time means that the 
devices’ address(es) can be published in a database for easy 
access and the devices will not have to be continually 
readdressed as is often the case with IPv4 networks. 
However, for this assignment to function properly, “Mobile 
IPv6” must be employed. Mobile IPv6 allows a device to cross 
networks and maintain both a seamless connection and its IP 
address, similar to the way cellular phones work (Hagen, 
2006). These same devices were then put on line at Camp 
Roberts during the experiment phase and successfully joined 
the network using the previously-configured IPv6 addresses. 
The same concept applies to IPv4 but in fact, the IPv4 
addresses had to be changed mid-way through the testing and 
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experimental phases since X.X.99.X is used at NPS and 
X.X.98.X at Camp Roberts, which necessitated a configuration 
change prior to joining the TNT network at Camp Roberts.  
3. Autoconfiguration 
 Autoconfiguration is ideal for sensor networks with a 
large number of IP addressed nodes that autonomously enter 
and exit the sensor network.  When an IPv4 device joins a 
network, it will either need to be assigned a new static 
IPv4 address from a pool of limited addresses by a network 
administrator, or a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP) server will lease the device a dynamic address for a 
specified period of time. When that time has expired, the 
node will need to request a new address. If the node goes 
off line, then the address is released for reassignment. 
Dynamic addressing is beneficial because the only human 
intervention required is to administer the DHCP server. IP 
addresses can also be used more efficiently. Not all network 
devices are on-line all of the time, so dynamic addressing 
reuses a limited number of IP addresses to serve a larger 
number of nodes. In both the static and dynamic address 
assignment cases, the device will have at least one, and 
possibly many, different network addresses for every new 
network it joins. Assuming the new devices are accessible 
from outside the network, the new static addresses must be 
made known to all who might need access to them. This 
process can be cumbersome and consume resources that could 
be dedicated to higher priority tasks. In practice, devices 
requiring access are not assigned static IP addresses, so 
attempts to publish updated dynamic IP addresses are 
improbable. IPv6 autoconfiguration eliminates the cumbersome 
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task of statically assigning IP addresses, as well as 
eliminating the need for a DHCP server (although DHCPv6 
exists to provide network administrators with tighter 
control of their network). Once a device has joined the IPv6 
network, routers can be queried at regular intervals to 
alert users to the presence or absence of a new device, or 
routers can be assigned a “trap” to alert users each time a 
device enters or leaves the network, at the moment it 
happens.   
 As explained previously, IPv6 addresses can be 
permanently assigned to a device and can, in theory, remain 
assigned to the device for the duration of its service life. 
Since each IPv6 device interface can be initially configured 
with its address, it will not require a new address as it 
moves from network to network. Human intervention, after the 
initial address assignment, is no longer required. Stateful 
DHCP servers will no longer be required to dynamically 
assign addresses, and network administrators can spend their 
time on other tasks. The disadvantage to assigning a unique, 
static IPv6 address to a device is that Mobile IPv6 will 
need to be employed to allow that device to communicate 
using its IP address on a different network. This adds a 
layer of complexity to the tactical network and so it may 
not always be advantageous to use this functionality. A 
balance must be struck between the level of network 
complexity desired and the advantages of maintaining a 
single IP address assigned to a device. For example, an 
aircraft designed for Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions would benefit from 
statically-assigned IP addresses, since it would have its 
own access to the GIG and would not rely on other networks 
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for Mobile IPv6 functionality based on its mission profile. 
Conversely, a UAV would be a more appropriate use of dynamic 
IP addresses, since it would rely on tactical networks that 
are better suited to local, autonomous network 
administration via autoconfiguration, rather than reliance 
on Mobile IPv6.  
 During the TNT 09-2 experiment, autoconfiguration was 
not demonstrated but an experience during the experiment 
highlighted its usefulness. While at Camp Roberts, the 
static IPv4 addresses that were assigned to this experiment 
for connection testing were double-assigned and IP conflicts 
occurred as a result. Since no address can be assigned to 
more than one device, the TNT network administrator needed 
to assign another set of static IPv4 addresses to this 
experiment’s laptops. This took time, since he was busy with 
other, more pressing tasks and it must be noted that in a 
real-world situation the network administrator and the 
sensor network operator would not be located in the same 
room for IP address deconfliction. If autoconfiguration were 
available each device, would be able to transparently join 
and exit the network with its own globally-unique IP address 
without the need for humans to enter the configuration loop. 
The network administrator would not need to assign 
addresses, nor would he have to track down IP address 
“grabbers,” or people who arbitrarily “grab” IP addresses 
without prior coordination or permission. To prevent IP 
conflicts, the near-term solution for TNT experiments will 
involve a DHCP server for dynamically assigning IPv4 
addresses. A recommended longer-term solution would involve 
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IV. SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENT TAXONOMY AND 
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE IPV6 
SENSOR NETWORK 
A. IPV6 APPLICATION TO TACTICAL NETWORKS 
1. Identified Need for IPv6 QoS Mechanisms in the 
Department of Defense Global Information Grid 
(GIG) 
 The GIG, depicted in Figure 23  
shall support all DoD missions with information 
technology, …[such as] national security systems, 
joint operations, joint task force (JTF), and/or 
combined-task force commands, that offers the 
most effective, efficient, and assured 
information handling capabilities available, 
consistent with national military strategy, 
operational requirements, and best-value 
enterprise-level business practices. (DoD, 2002) 
The Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), a 
subordinate command of the United States Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), operates and maintains the GIG for worldwide 





Figure 23.   The GIG (From JTF-GNO, 2009). 
In a memorandum published in 2003, the DOD Chief Information 
Officer, John P. Stenbit, cited the following reasons for 
directing that the GIG be transitioned from native IPv4 to 
native IPv6:  
IPv6 is the next generation network layer 
protocol of the Internet as well as the GIG, 
including current networks such as NIPRNET, 
SIPRNET, JWICS, as well as emerging DoD space and 
tactical communications. Implementation of IPv6 
is necessary due to fundamental limitations in 
the current IPv4 protocol that renders IPv4 
incapable of meeting long-term requirements of 
the commercial community and DoD. IPv6 is 
designed to overcome those limitations by 
expanding available IP address space to 
accommodate the worldwide explosion in Internet 
usage, improving end-to-end security, 
facilitating mobile communications, providing new 
enhancements to quality of service, and easing 
system management burdens. Furthermore, IPv6 is 
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designed to run well on the most current high 
performance networks (e.g. Gigabit Ethernet, OC-
12, ATM, etc.) and without experiencing a 
significant decrease in capacity on low bandwidth 
systems. (Office of the ASD/DoD CIO, 2007)   
 While the CIO acknowledges the complexities of 
completely transitioning a network the size of the GIG from 
one layer three protocol to another, he reiterates the DoD’s 
position that the transition is necessary in order to 
provide a network capable of supporting network-centric 
operations and warfare. In other words, IPv4 is obsolete and 
IPv6 is the way ahead. 
2. Battlespace Awareness and Knowledge 
According to Akyildiz et al. (2002) in “A Survey of 
Sensor Networks,” a sensor network is  
composed of a large number of sensor nodes that 
are densely deployed either inside the phenomenon 
or very close to it. The position of sensor nodes 
need not be engineered or predetermined. This 
allows random deployment in inaccessible terrain 
or disaster relief operations. On the other hand, 
this also means that sensor network protocols and 
algorithms must possess self-organizing 
capabilities.  
The author continues by clarifying that tactical sensor 
networks exist as both deliberate networks and ad-hoc 
networks: 
 The number of sensor nodes in a sensor 
network can be several magnitudes of order 
higher than the nodes in an ad-hoc network. 
 Sensor nodes are densely deployed. 
 Sensor nodes are prone to failure. 
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 The topology of a sensor network changes very 
frequently. 
 Sensor nodes mainly use a broadcast 
communication paradigm, whereas most ad-hoc 
networks are based on point-to-point 
communications.  
 Sensor nodes are limited in power, 
computational capabilities, and memory. 
(Akyildiz et al., 2002) 
 
Sensor networks, as shown in Figure 24, give the 
commander and his staff increased battlespace awareness in 
order to provide a basis for battlespace knowledge and to 
ultimately increase the overall operational tempo (Alberts, 
Gartska, & Stein 1999).  
 
Figure 24.   IPv6 Sensor Network (From VieSurIP, n.d.). 
 Digressing from the large-scale system point of view, 
the sensor networks are composed of several subsystems. As 
shown in Figure 25, the sensor nodes themselves, regardless 
of their intended purpose, have some basic physical 
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components common to all: a sensing unit, a transceiver 
radio, an energy source, a processor, software to include 
networking protocols, and some small memory capacity 
(Dohler, 2007). The sensor node’s mission purpose dictates 
the type of sensing unit employed, which then determines the 
makeup of the other sensor components. Each sensor node can, 
therefore, be viewed in terms of “processing capability, 
memory, number of network interfaces, and each network 
interface’s performance characteristics” (Clement, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 25.   Example of an environmental sensor (From 
Culler, Estrin, & Srivistava, 2009). 
 Each of these sensor nodes is networked with 
surrounding sensor nodes to form paths back to a gateway, 
through which each sensor’s information is transmitted back 
to the destination command and control node. Paths on the 
physical network where each node is considered both a sensor 
and a router are determined using routing protocols, which 
then determine logical routes. The routing tables are then 
updated based on the protocol’s standards (Wilson et al., 
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2005). As stated in “Sensor Network QoS in an IPv6 
Environment”, sensor networks are dynamic systems subject to 
constant change of state (Dobrydney, 2008). Routes, variable 
bandwidth allocation, availability, jitter, complete loss of 
links, power loss, higher bit error rates (BER), and nodes 
joining and leaving the network in an almost random fashion, 
are some of the constantly-changing elements in a large-
scale network. Each of the aforementioned attributes can be 
used to provide network performance measurement parameters 
and, therefore, can provide feedback for network adaptation. 
3. Understanding the Battlespace 
Data collected from each sensor in the network are 
considered to be explicit facts, which are then fused 
together to provide battlespace awareness. As shown in 
Figure 26, battlespace awareness is a compilation of three 
elements: the friendly situation, the enemy situation, and 
the environment. The friendly situation is determined by 
sensors, which are carried by friendly forces, and which in 
turn inform the network and provide updated data for the COP 
and human operators who need it.  
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Figure 26.   Elements of Battlespace Awareness (From 
Alberts et al., 1999). 
Likewise, the environmental situation is updated by means of 
mission specific sensors, which aid in understanding the 
current and predicted weather situation. Finally, the enemy 
situation is updated by sensors placed in the battlespace in 
a manner that allows them to collect specific information. 
The information fused from the battlefield sensors forms the 
COP as shown in Figure 27 and provides all who view this 
information with the battlespace awareness needed to plan 
and execute missions. From the COP, several elements of 
information can be derived to describe the current and 
projected situation: 
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 Location (current positions, rate of movement, and 
predicted future locations) 
 Status (readiness postures including combat 
capability, enemy contact, logistics posture) 
 Available courses of action (COA) and predicted 
enemy COA’s (offensive and defensive weapons and 
sensor capabilities and damage assessment) 
 Environment (includes current and predicted 
weather conditions, the predicted effect of 
weather on planned operations and enemy options, 
and terrain features such as trafficability, 
canopy, lines of sight, and sea conditions). 
(Alberts et al., 1999) 
 
 
Figure 27.   Example Common Operating Picture (From 
Intaero, 2009). 
More importantly, however, the COP provides input for 
battlespace knowledge. Whereas battlespace awareness is 
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derived from explicit facts, battlespace knowledge is 
derived from tacit information gleaned from the COP and from 
the experience of those who view this information. In 
contrast to battlespace awareness, which answers the 
question “what happened?”, battlespace knowledge gives the 
commander and his staff an understanding of “why did/is this 
happening?” (Alberts et al., 1999). When this understanding 
is more solid, faster decisions can be made.  
4. IPv6 Enabled Sensor Networks—Supporting the 
Commander’s Information Needs  
Previous sections and the summary contained in Table 1 
have described the benefits of using the IPv6 network 
protocol in comparison with the IPv4. The fact that IPv6 
sensor networks provide global addresses for virtually every 
networking device, inherent QoS and security, as well as the 
ability to join and delete nodes transparently without the 
need for human involvement or excessive networking 
equipment, gives these sensor networks significant 
advantages when compared to the limits IPv4 imposes on 
sensor networks. An IPv6 sensor network gives the rifle 
company commander, introduced at the beginning of the 
chapter, the tools to derive an information-and time-
competitive advantage over his adversary. QoS provides the 
commander and his staff an information-providing guarantee 
to obtain the requested real-time information from the 
sensor network to make time critical decisions. Sensor 
placement will no longer be limited by the allotted number 
of unique IP addresses; constrained only by the quantity on 
hand and delivery methods, sensors can be placed anywhere 
they are needed and can each be accessed by anyone 
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supporting the mission. A CONUS-based UAV squadron operating 
in support of the company commander’s mission overseas can 
quickly access emplaced sensors to determine local weather 
as it affects UAV flight and mission supportability. 
Personnel can monitor their health and their unit’s health 
levels and can even remotely administer drugs through IP 
enabled sensor battlesuits. Sensors placed on roads can help 
determine traffic patterns in an area of operations, as it 
affects logistical support, indigenous population movement, 
and enemy movement. Information provided by these roadside 
sensors can be of great interest to different organizations 
for different reasons. An IPv6-enabled sensor network allows 
each organization in the intended audiences to pull this 
information for its own purposes autonomously, without 
concern for continually-changing network configuration. 
Autoconfiguration streamlines the sensor network joining 
process so that sensors can join without needing human 
intervention. Inherent security features, such as IPSec, 
ensure that not only are end-to-end transmissions not being 
read by unauthorized personnel, but that network encryption 
concerns are simplified from the communications personnel’s 
point of view. IPSec key management is administered through 
the public key distribution, whereas intervening networking 
devices currently require encryption devices that require 
manual rekeying. 
The COP and the information derived from it are only as 
good as the information provided to it, which highlights the 
second key element of the opening scenario.  Service Level 
Agreements and the associated need for QoS in a sensor 
network are requirements for ensuring that the commander 
gets the information he needs in the manner he needs it. One 
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potential drawback of a large address space, given a finite 
amount of bandwidth, is the fact that a large number of 
network devices have the potential to consume network 
resources to the point that critical information will not 
reach the intended audience in the time and the manner 
needed. Put another way, if everyone is trying to answer 
their critical information requirements to the best extent 
possible, no one will be able to fully answer their critical 
information requirements. Commanders and their staffs need 
key pieces of information at key times in order to 
capitalize on fleeting opportunities. During the planning 
process, critical information requirements are determined 
and a plan is then developed to place collections resources 
against those information needs; this enhances the decision-
making process and allows commanders to achieve superior and 
timely action relative to the adversary. SLAs are used to 
put in place temporary control mechanisms, which provide a 
level of guarantee that the information collected from a set 
of sensors will reach its destination in the time and manner 
requested. IPv6 QoS mechanisms and the DiffServ technique of 
providing QoS in a DiffServ network provide the means to 
implement tactical sensor network SLAs.  
B. TACTICAL SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS 
1. Significance to the Warfighter  
The brief scenario presented at this beginning of this 
thesis describes a company commander conducting deliberate 
planning in order to accomplish his assigned mission. As 
part of his planning efforts, he determined that he had many 
information requirements about his particular mission that 
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he could not readily answer. These “gaps” in his knowledge 
of his area of operations (AO) include enemy strengh and 
disposition, the impact of weather on his mobility, 
battlefield visibility, the enemy’s ability to reinforce, 
the current composition and disposition of fire support 
positions, and locations of known non-combatants. While the 
battalion’s intelligence section can provide many of these 
answers, it is the company commander’s prerogative to have 
as clear and up-to-date a picture as he needs, in order to 
successfully complete his mission within the Battalion 
Commander’s intent. As part of the Marine Corps Planning 
Process (MCPP), the commander and his staff determine the 
information requirements that need answering in order to tip 
the scales toward mission success. Those information 
requirements deemed critical to the unit’s success are 
called the commander’s critical information requirements 
(CCIRs). They are also known as the commander’s “wake-up 
criteria.”  If information is obtained that answers or 
partially answers a CCIR, then the commander must be 
notified—even if he is sound asleep.  
As an illustration of a tactical-level SLA development 
proposal and a new and expanded role for the Information 
Management Officer (IMO), consider this scenario. The 
company commander submits information requirements and CCIRs 
as a request to the Intelligence Officer (S2) and the 
Battalion IMO. As part of his request, he asks for real-time 
or near real-time information pull within his company’s AO 
during both the company’s planning and execution phase. 
Consolidating all of the battalion’s information 
requirements, the IMO determines what sensor capabilities 
exist in the battalion’s AO and how those capabilities could 
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answer the battalion’s information requirements. The IMO 
will then build and submit an SLA request based on this 
analysis. Assuming that the SLA, or some modification 
thereof, is approved, the company commander and the other 
staff personnel can then be assured (within the realities of 
the friction of war) that the network will provide him with 
the means to satisfy, or help satisfy, his information 
requirements. It must be carefully noted that network SLAs 
by themselves will not provide the answers to his questions 
or provide him with the situational awareness he needs. The 
SLAs will only ensure that the network will provide the 
resources necessary to deliver the information he requested. 
It is up to the judgment and expertise of both commanders 
and staff alike to properly map the information requirements 
to the proper information-providing capability and to ensure 
that the proper assets are in the proper place. This process 

































Figure 28.   SLA Development Process Model. 
2. SLA Defined 
In the commercial world, service level agreements are 
commonly defined as: 
a contract between a network service provider and 
a customer that describes specific, measurable 
services to be performed, the quality level of 
those services, and the time duration those 
services will be made available to the customer. 
(Marilly et al., 2009)   
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The contract will also routinely specify penalties for 
non-compliance in the hope that damage can be mitigated by 
collecting on those penalties. The ability to consistently 
fulfill the terms of an SLA contract and to provide the 
desired QoS level(s) is what separates one network service 
provider from another. The following requirements have been 
identified as the three which are most important to 
consumers of SLAs: 
 Reliable measurement of the QoS 
 Provisions of the expected QoS 
 Optimization of the resource usage (Marilly, 2009) 
 
A well-defined SLA must contain easily measurable metrics in 
order to allow both the customer and service provider to 
monitor the effectiveness of the SLA and to permit the 
network to properly manage itself in order to maintain the 
expected QoS levels as defined in the SLA. “Metrics” will 
have different meanings to different people. Information 
users will use metrics to define what they want to see, 
while network operators will translate the user’s metrics 
into measurable networking terms. The user will not need to 
understand how the network measures its effectiveness, he 
will simply know if the SLA is effective by determining if 
his metrics have been met.  
 An SLA, for the purposes of a tactical sensor network, 
is defined as a single non-legally binding “contract” 
between the Commander of the network service provider 
(Communications Section, G/S-6) and the headquarters of the 
service requester. It promises to provide a specified level 
of guaranteed service through measurable performance 
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criteria, or services, through the network from the sensor 
source, to the requesting unit’s specified end-user, and 
back again, if required. The term “non-legally binding” is 
used in contrast to the previously-described commercial SLA 
definition, in which a legally binding contract is agreed 
upon between a user and a provider in exchange for money or 
some other form of compensation. A breach of contract can 
result in a lawsuit or some other type of settlement which 
compensates for losses. In the military sense, a “contract” 
is replaced by a formal order and is thus an extension of a 
commander’s legal authority. It can also take on the form of 
a trust relationship between non-related units or entities 
in unconventional situations. Forms of compensation are 
irrelevant in the former case and may be completely 
necessary in the latter depending on the relationship and 
the anticipated outcomes of the services provided by the 
SLA. A “breach of contract” takes on a different connotation 
in a tactical network as well. Networks in austere combat 
locations such as the desert or the mountains are extremely 
difficult to operate, manage, and maintain, due to the 
additional challenges imposed by the environment and the 
opposing side’s will. Providing network connectivity between 
distributed command-and-control nodes, ensuring consistent 
power availability, and providing basic life necessities for 
human network operators at nodes which require human 
intervention must still occur, regardless of the difficulty, 
lack of logistical resources, or amount of time required. 
Command-and-control nodes are considered high-value targets 
and thus may be under constant attack, whether by kinetic or 
non-kinetic means, with the intention of undermining network 
effectiveness.  
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Perhaps the most important aspect of tactical SLAs is 
that they are explicitly defined in measurable terms which 
can be compared to stated performance criteria. While the 
same argument can be made for SLA applications in the 
commercial world, SLAs for tactical use are designed to 
support specific operations and are either event-driven or 
time-driven, based on some actionable information or on a 
commander’s judgment. Opportunities in combat are fleeting 
and rarely present themselves more than once. Commanders in 
need of specific real-time information for planning and/or 
executing operations count on the availability of that 
information as part of their risk-management process when 
they decide where and when to wage battle. An SLA must be 
designed to capture the mind’s eye view of the commander and 
what he expects to see when viewing that information feed; 
at the same time, it is important to realize that there are 
limitations on the network. Quite often, those mind’s eye 
views are qualitative in nature, since most people know what 
they want to see when they see it, but may not be able to 
quantify those same expectations. Thus, expectations 
management is critical at this point. During this process, 
exact metrics and a range of those metrics must be 
determined in order to meet the commander’s expectations, 
while balancing those same expectations within the bounds of 
the network’s performance. Understanding the different 
perspectives that different role players have on SLAs is 
important. The commander has a preconceived notion of what 
he is looking for, which forms the basis of his expectations 
and perspective for what he should see. The IMO has a 
perspective and a notion of what he should see, based on the 
information requirements inputs he has received and the SLA 
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request he builds, forwards, and tracks. The network-
operating center has another SLA perspective, based on 
whether or not the quantitative network performance 
requirements are being met. Regardless of whether or not the 
network supported the SLA performance criteria, if the 
commander does not believe that his qualitative expectations 
were met, in his view the SLA failed to support his 
operation. For this reason, a SLA tactical network sensor 
taxonomy will be proposed in the latter part of this chapter 
to provide structure for mapping the network support of the 
operational commander’s information requirements; this will 
in turn provide his operational missions with measureable 
network SLA performance criteria. To develop that taxonomy, 
several SLAs will be developed based on operational missions 
derived from the six warfighting functions that are critical 
to planning for and successfully executing operations at all 
levels.  
3. SLAs in Support of the Six Warfighting Functions 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0 defines 
the six warfighting functions as:  
Conceptual planning and execution tools used by 
planners and subject matter experts in each of 
the functional areas to produce comprehensive 
plans. [They] help the commander achieve unity of 
effort and build and sustain combat power. Their 
effective application, in concert with one 
another, will facilitate the planning and conduct 
of expeditionary operations. (Marine Corps 
Operations, 2001)   
The six functions are listed, defined, and put into 
context with SLAs as follows: 
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a. Command and Control    
Command and Control is defined as: 
The exercise of authority and direction over 
assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of a mission. Command and 
control involves arranging personnel, 
equipment, and facilities to allow the 
commander to extend his influence over the 
force during the planning and conducting of 
military operations. Command and control is 
the overarching warfighting function that 
enables all of the other warfighting 
functions. (Marine Corps Operations, 2001)   
It must be noted that the mission of Marine Corps 
Communication operations is to support this warfighting 
function by providing communication networks and network 
operators that facilitate command and control provide the 
commander the ability to command and control the forces 
under his control. SLAs support command and control by 
providing the commander with the ability to have a defined 
level of network service that allows him to “virtually” 
insert himself wherever he needs to be, within the 
constraints of the network. 
b. Maneuver   
 “Maneuver is the movement of forces for the 
purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to 
accomplish an objective” (Marine Corps Operations, 2001). 
One key question commanders often ask is “When and where do 
I need to array my forces in order to achieve a favorable 
decision?”  A general rule is that larger units require more 
lead-time to maneuver over greater changes of direction or 
position. A rifle platoon comprised of 40 Marines can 
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maneuver within its battlespace quickly, whereas a Marine 
Division requires considerably more time to maneuver within 
its battlespace. The key to the decision of when and where 
to maneuver is the ability to make that decision as early as 
possible and with as much relevant information as can be 
obtained about the enemy’s forces; it is crucial to then 
monitor the situation to determine the correctness of that 
decision.  
A well-placed sensor network, composed of a 
combination of ground mobile, ground static, and air sensors 
capable of collecting a variety of information types, with 
the proper SLAs supporting the commander’s information 
requirements, can provide real-time indications of when and 
where to move forces into a positional advantage, as well as 
providing a means to monitor both enemy and friendly 
movement during this phase.  
c. Fires   
Fires are the employment of firepower 
against air, ground, and sea targets. Fires 
delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy 
capabilities, forces, or facilities, as well 
as affect the enemy’s will to fight. Fires 
include the collective and coordinated use 
of target acquisition systems, direct and 
indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all 
types, and other lethal and nonlethal means, 
such as electronic warfare and physical 
destruction. Fires are normally used in 
concert with maneuver and help to shape the 
battlespace, thus setting conditions for 
decisive action. (Marine Corps Operations, 
2001)   
SLAs can support fires by providing real-time 
information guarantees to support the targeting process 
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during fire-support planning, as well as during operational 
execution. If the operation requires destroying a mobile, 
high-value target, guaranteed real-time information is 
extremely important. Likewise, a commander who is accepting 
risk by maneuvering his forces through restrictive terrain 
would want an SLA in place to ensure that he has real-time 
sensor information alerting him to any dangers and potential 
targets that threaten his exposed forces.     
d. Intelligence   
Intelligence provides the commander with an 
understanding of the enemy and the battlespace, 
as well as identifying the enemy’s center of 
gravity and critical vulnerabilities. 
Intelligence drives operations and is focused on 
the enemy. (Marine Corps Operations, 2001) 
SLA support of intelligence collection is perhaps 
the most common thought of application for tactical sensor 
networks and SLA guarantees of real-time information. The 
enemy is always operating in some fashion and the enemy 
situation needs constant updating. The commander has 
information requirements that must be answered, and it is 
the intelligence section’s responsibility to provide the 
answers the commander needs to maneuver his forces, 
determine his targets for fires, where to place his sensor 
networks, and determine the threat to his ability to command 
and control his forces. Since intelligence drives 
operations, it is critical for the intelligence to be as 
accurate as possible, so the commander can commit to a 
course of action and a favorable outcome. 
 96
e. Logistics   
“Logistics encompasses all activities required to 
move and sustain military forces” (Marine Corps Operations, 
2001).  Communications equipment requires maintenance, 
power, spare parts, people, food, shelter, and 
transportation in order to function properly and to support 
sustained combat operations 24 hours a day. Common supply 
routes need to be protected, so that supply and logistical 
support items can travel along those routes unhindered. 
Sensor networks can support this effort and SLAs can provide 
real-time information in support of the logistics effort 
when the commander determines its necessity.  
f. Force Protection 
“Force protection consists of those measures taken 
to protect the force’s fighting potential so that it can be 
applied at the appropriate time and place” (Marine Corps 
Operations, 2001).  Force protection is a constant and 
continuous mission, but there are several occasions when 
military forces are most vulnerable and require a heightened 
protective posture. Large troop movements into and out of 
theaters, amphibious landings, helicopter insertions and 
extractions, and moving into assembly areas prior crossing 
the line of departure (enemy spoiling attack prevention) are 
some events where the ability to generate overwhelming 
combat power is limited by the evolution that a force is 
undergoing. These stages require a heightened awareness of 
the physical threats the force faces and represent an 
occasion where real-time information guaranteed by an SLA 
will support the commander’s force-protection mission and 
preserve potential combat power.        
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4. SLA Cross-functional Supportability 
In addition to supporting individual warfighting 
functions, the SLA support provided to one function enables 
that warfighting function to in turn provide support to 
another function. For example, SLA support to force 
protection will enable the force to maneuver, provide 
logistical support, and properly apply decisive fires. SLA 
support to logistics will help support command and control 
and maneuver, by ensuring that the correct people and gear 
arrive at the correct location, at the proper time. SLA 
support to intelligence will support maneuver, fires, 
command and control, logistics, and force protection. 
Finally, SLA support to command and control will support the 
entire operation, since command and control is the function 
that binds all of the other functions together into a 
cohesive system more capable than its individual parts. 
SLAs, when properly used, are an additional combat 
multiplier for the operational commander.  
C. EXAMPLE TACTICAL LEVEL SLAS IN SUPPORT OF WARFIGHTING 
FUNCTIONS 
1. Introduction 
In order to develop an SLA taxonomy that supports 
tactical SLA development, five examples of SLAs have been 
developed that support each a unique mission. Each SLA 
incorporates different roles, units, and missions of a 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) at the MEF level and 
below. From these five examples, commonalties have been 
extracted, which then aids in developing a corresponding SLA 
taxonomy. Each mission has both unique characteristics and 
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requirements that distinguish it from other missions. For 
example, a reconnaissance mission is different than an 
offensive attack in that enemy contact is not desired in the 
former, but it is most definitely desired in the latter. At 
the same time, commonalities among all of these exist in the 
form of the warfighting functions, although each mission 
will emphasize each function differently.  
2. Infantry Battalion on the Offense 
An Infantry Battalion Commander conducting offensive 
operations is primarily concerned with supporting maneuver 
with his remaining warfighting functions. Collecting, 
developing, and using timely intelligence to support the 
commander’s maneuver plan is of primary concern. When the 
maneuver plan requires movement through restrictive terrain, 
or involves moving a small assault force rapidly through an 
unsecure area, precise information about the tactical 
situation can be the difference between mission success and 
mission failure. Knowing how to support that maneuver force 
just prior to enemy contact on the objective, and while the 
assault is taking place, assists the commander with the 
proper application of fires, as well as assisting with a 
more accurate after-action report to help refine the 
intelligence picture. The following SLA request is from an 
Infantry Battalion assigned the mission of assaulting an 
objective and doing so on a compressed timeline in order to 
take advantage of a fleeting opportunity provided by 
intelligence. Planning must be kept short and operational 
security (OPSEC) is strictly enforced so that the enemy is 
prevented from either making preparations to repel the 
assault or from withdrawing. The “main effort” company will 
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travel along a threatened route, while “supporting effort” 
rifle companies will travel along alternate routes. The SLA 
request is intended to support the main effort company’s 
mission to attack rapidly along Axis BLUE, to assault the 
objective, and to prepare to defend that objective from 
counterattack until the rest of the battalion can 
consolidate on that position and transition to a battalion 
defense.         
 
From 0445Z until 2200Z on 25 Oct 08, 2d Battalion, 
3d Marines requests real-time feeds from: 
  
1. UAV’s orbiting grids AZ123456, AZ234567, and 
AZ345678 – video resolution of 1 meter. 
 
2. Ground sensor clusters located in boxes X1Z, 
X2Y, and X3Y- video resolution of 1 meter. 
 
3. TACON of one platoon from the ground mobile 
sensor company to be initially positioned at grid 
AY987654 and prepared to move in a northerly 
direction to provide streaming video of all action 
to the west of their direction of travel.  
 
4. One reinforced rifle company operating along 
Axis BLUE will need access to feeds in priority of 
UAV’s; the ground sensor clusters X3Y, X2Y, and 
X1Z; and finally the ground mobile sensor platoon.  
 
5. This HQ requires access to all feeds during 
the time allotted and will have GW’s located at 
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grids AZ124578, AZ123987, and AZ987123. The main 
COC will be located at grid AY 987650 and it is 
anticipated that the forward COC will be located 
in grid square 0102.  
3. Air/Ground Reconnaissance Mission 
Reconnaissance gives the commander better situational 
awareness of his assigned battlespace and of the areas 
surrounding it. Reconnaissance can be conducted to develop 
an unknown situation in a new area of operations, determine 
an adversary’s habits or patterns of operations, determine 
bomb damage assessment (BDA) after a strike, and to support 
a maneuver force in the conduct of offensive operations. 
This mission directly supports the intelligence warfighting 
function, although it can also directly support maneuver, if 
the situation specifically calls for it. Reconnaissance 
support to the overall intelligence picture will support the 
entire force. 
Reconnaissance can be carried out by either ground or 
airborne vehicles. Ground reconnaissance can be conducted by 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) using radios to transmit 
real-time information back to their headquarters, by static 
sensors emplaced that will transmit their mission-designed 
information through a sensor network, or by mobile sensors 
mounted on vehicles or personnel which transmit their 
information in a manner similar to that used by static 
sensors. Air reconnaissance can be conducted by UAVs, by 
manned aircraft, or by spacecraft, such as satellites 
designed for specific information gathering tasks, as shown 











Target of Interest  
Figure 29.   Air/Ground Reconnaissance.  
A MAGTF commander needs to gather information about his 
AO and specific enemy operating patterns in as near real-
time as possible. He has several intelligence-collecting 
assets at his disposal, and it would be prudent to develop a 
diverse collection plan in an effort to provide alternate 
means to verify the gathered information and properly 
analyze and fuse it for possible follow-up action. The 
following SLA request is submitted for the express purpose 
of developing knowledge of an elusive adversary’s 
operational habits. Real-time information collection is 
important since different sources are feeding information 
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and the time-stamp on the data must be correct in order for 
a more accurate analysis to take place.  
 
From 0200Z on 1 Nov 08 until 1800Z on 2 Nov 08, 3d 
Marine Division requests real-time video feeds 
from: 
 
1. Three UAV’s orbiting grids AZ123456, 
AZ234567, and AZ345678 – video resolution of 1 
meter. The UAV’s need to focus on building 
rooftops, street level between buildings, 
projections from windows, movement to and from 
buildings, and other taskings from the division 
that can be executed within one minute of request 
in order to provide indications and warnings of 
pending insurgent activity.  
 
2. The ground sensor clusters located along:  
 
 a. ROUTE SIXPACK from grid 123456 to 234561 
 b. ROUTE SHIRLEY TEMPLE from grid 345612 to 
456123 
 c. ROUTE TOM COLLINS from grid 654321 to 
543216 
 
3. SOF team 1: from a concealed position located 
vicinity 123456, position a video sensor to take 
real-time video of insurgent identified vehicles 
operating alone ROUTE SIXPACK in order to fully 
develop the enemy’s daily and weekly battle 
rhythm.  
 103
4. This HQ requires access to all feeds during 
the time allotted and will have GW’s located at 
grids AZ124578, AZ123987, and AZ987123. One UAV 
will remain overhead to provide additional GW 
access. The main COC will be located at grid AY 
987650 and it is anticipated that the forward COC 
will be located in grid square 0102. 
   
4. Conduct of an Amphibious Landing 
The landing phase of an overall amphibious landing 
operation is perhaps the most dangerous time for an 
amphibious force. Moving ashore from sea leaves the landing 
force exposed both visually and from the effects of enemy 
fire. Once committed, there is no turning back without 
admitting defeat and suffering sizable losses. While D-Day 
(the landing date), H-Hour (the time the landing force 
crosses the beach), L-Hour (the time the helicopter-borne 
force lands), and the landing beach locations can be kept 
secret until the last minute, once the secret is out the 
date, time, and destination will be known. Obtaining this 
vital information will give the enemy an additional 
advantage over the classic defender’s advantage. In 
addition, the defender can absorb the landing force’s combat 
power by trading space for time while the landing force 
risks getting thrown back into the sea. Forward, increasing, 
and sustainable momentum for the amphibious force must be 
maintained.  
The landing force commander needs to know a great deal 
of information about his landing beaches, the terrain 
beyond, and, most importantly, the enemy situation and how 
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the enemy can use his capabilities to oppose the landing 
force. As shown in Figure 30, information concerning the 
beaches can be obtained from many sources such as overhead 
imagery, open-source human intelligence derived from locals 
familiar with the operating area, or hydrographic 
reconnaissance performed by Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams 
or other reconnaissance units. However, well-placed sensors 
can provide the commander with real-time information on 
enemy locations, capabilities, and intentions. Sensor 
emplacement would be conducted in phases, as the situation 
and the commander’s essential elements of information are 
further developed.  
 
Figure 30.   Amphibious Landing. 
It must be noted that any type of unusual activity 
observed, combined with other information, can provide an 
indication that action may occur, which is why a firm 
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balance among the six warfighting functions is essential. 
The quest for better intelligence must be tempered with the 
need to maintain a high level of force protection. An 
obvious example is flying UAVs or manned aircraft over the 
landing area days and weeks prior to the operation. If the 
aircraft were detected, the enemy could reasonably assume 
that the area in view of the airborne sensor is of interest 
to someone with both the capability of flying UAVs and 
potentially landing a force. This works both ways as well. 
The clever commander would consider using this perceived 
risk to his advantage by feeding false information to the 
enemy while obscuring his real intentions. Therefore, sensor 
and gateway emplacement must be well thought-out, 
coordinated with other ongoing operations, and complimentary 
to the intelligence plan. Initially, ground sensors would 
consist of static sensors emplaced by SOF teams as well as 
SOF teams themselves recording and transmitting real-time 
information back to their higher headquarters for analysis 
and incorporation into the planning process. Timing for 
amphibious landings is critical. As D-Day, and then H- and 
L-hour, count down, different fire support, information 
operation, and troop movement plans are executed. An 
opportunity to emplace and take advantage of information 
gained from additional sensors should not be missed during 
the conduct of the above supporting missions. Just before 
the execution of the fire support plan for the landing force 
has begun, the sensor network must have rapidly expanded to 
its fullest, pre-D-Day capability. At this point, known 
enemy locations must be confirmed, net enemy locations must 
be detected for possible targeting, and enemy intentions and 
capabilities must be detected and assessed to determine the 
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threat posed to the landing force. UAVs, manned aircraft, 
SOF teams, and the other ground sensors will form the basis 
of the active landing sensor network. As forces flow ashore 
via seaborne and airborne vehicles, more sensors will be 
added to the network. Battle suits, ground mobile units, 
additional gateways, and other information-gathering devices 
will continue to automatically join the network via the IPv6 
auto-configuration capability.  
It is critical to plan SLAs in support of the 
amphibious landing in concert with the flow of forces ashore 
and the scheme of maneuver of forces once ashore. During the 
planning phase, bandwidth is limited by the number of 
gateways emplaced and the connectivity of the gateways to 
the GIG. Connectivity to the sensor network and 
responsibility for maintaining the COP will be provided by 
the amphibious ships that the landing force is embarked on, 
until the landing force can establish itself sufficiently 
ashore. During the landing phase, the bulk of the landing 
force’s communication equipment is moving ashore and is, 
therefore, offline and incapable of providing bigger pipes 
to handle the growing network ashore. However, the sensor 
network ashore is still operating and will be capable of 
providing information, even as more and more sensors come 
ashore and join the network. Once established ashore, the 
landing force will be responsible for providing its own 
connectivity to the GIG and for maintaining the COP for the 
amphibious force. One critical event for SLAs will be the 
transfer of control for the landing operation from the 
amphibious task force to the landing force.  
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Table 7 shows several phases of an amphibious landing 
and the network characteristics that an SLA request would 
need to support per given phase, in order to support the 
amphibious landing operation. Once the landing force is 
established ashore, the force will then transition to 
sustained combat operations and SLAs will no longer support 
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Table 7.  Amphibious Landing SLAs. 
5. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) 
One of the most complex and dangerous combat 
environments is urbanized or built-up areas. Locating the 
enemy, reducing collateral damage and civilian casualties, 
preventing fratricide, and maneuvering faster than the 
adversary are all much harder than in other combat 
scenarios. This type of terrain is a great equalizer and can 
nullify some of the advantages of a militarily superior 
adversary. Movement through these areas is very slow and 
confused; an area thought to be cleared one day can be 
tomorrow’s trouble spot. MOUT can be very costly in terms of 
human lives, infrastructure, and even in the political 
arena. The action that occurred in October 1993, in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, is one of the more recent examples of 
MOUT in which a militarily superior force found itself 
decisively engaged with thousands of indigenous attackers. 
Through sheer willpower, the Americans completed their 
original mission of capturing two of Somali warlord Mohamed 
Farrah Aihid’s lieutenants, while extracting its stranded 
assault force. The human toll was politically damaging, with 
18 American dead, 70 casualties and thousands of Somalis 
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killed; broadcast news showed scenes of jubilant Somalis 
dragging dead Americans through the streets. While the 
mission was a “success” in the eyes of the world, it was 
viewed as an American failure in a small, third world 
country (Bowden, 1999). The more recent examples of fighting 
in the cities of Fallujah, Baghdad, and Nasariyah, Iraq, 
further illustrate the ferocity of fighting in an urban 
environment. 
Villages, towns, and cities have some of the most 
challenging terrain to operate in, and are described as 
three-dimensional battlefields. For the defender, multi-
story buildings offer good, all-around visibility, multiple 
firing points, cover from return fire, and a good command-
and-control vantage point. From the inside, each floor 
offers additional protection, since the attacker must 
contend with a defender who is defending from above. A city 
block typically contains several buildings from which 
mutually-supporting and interlocking fire can be employed; 
one building can observe targets and direct the fire from 
another building or a row of buildings. Additionally, the 
streets between city blocks are narrow corridors, which 
naturally channel traffic. Very little cover, protection, 
and concealment are offered, which makes unobserved mobility 
extremely difficult. In some areas, sewer systems and 
subways are below ground. For both the defender and 
attacker, these underground routes provide mobility that is 
unobserved from street- and building-level, and must be 
guarded accordingly. 
Referring to the warfighting functions detailed above, 
intelligence drives operations. Intelligence support to 
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operations and an intelligence collection plan focused on 
the enemy in a MOUT environment are essential to success. 
Knowing where the enemy is and understanding the enemy’s 
battle rhythm, capabilities, and external operational 
support beyond the urban environment are all essential to a 
successful operation in urbanized terrain. A well-placed 
sensor network can assist in intelligence collection by 
providing real-time information from multiple sources in 
varied locations. The IMO, Operations, Intelligence, and 
Communications section must keep track of and balance both 
operational requirements and command-and-control 
capabilities. The best case is when the sensor network can 
support any operational contingency with the appropriate mix 
of sensors in place in time to support the SLA and, 
therefore, the operation. This could be achieved over the 
long-term, with tactical situation and terrain sensor 
network optimization, where an analysis is conducted to 
study the enemy’s patterns, the terrain, the operational 
habits of allied forces, and the capabilities of the sensors 
and gateways to be placed. However, urban terrain can keep 
both friendly and enemy forces off balance. Initially, SOF 
teams operating in the environment can place sensors in 
buildings, underground structures, on top of buildings, and 
on the approaches in and out of the environment. UAVs and 
manned aircraft orbiting over the city can take general 
observations or can be tasked to target specific locations 
for a specific length of time. When sensor support for an 
operation or a specific intelligence collection task is 
required, an SLA can be put into effect so as to ensure that 
the network will support the stated mission. Below is an 
example of a SLA request submitted to support an infantry 
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battalion whose mission is to cordon and search several 
buildings within a hostile city block. These buildings have 
been previously identified as terrorist weapons caches, and 
one contains facilities and equipment for an operational 
planning cell. All equipment is to be confiscated, and all 
persons seen within the vicinity of this equipment are to be 
detained for identification and questioning. The battalion’s 
main effort company will begin its mission when terrorist 
activity is at its lowest point, as indicated by 
intelligence analysis derived from information collected in 
part by the sensor network. It will be assumed that once the 
battalion’s mission begins, the enemy will begin to discern 
the battalion’s intent and will try to counterattack, so the 
battalion needs to know of all activity within the target’s 
vicinity 24 hours prior to the start of the operation to 
determine enemy and civilian positions. Approaches to and 
from the area need to be observed, as do any surrounding 
buildings from which enemy observation and fire can come. 
UAVs orbiting the area will be tasked with providing 
observation of key locations. By having key routes and 
buildings identified as high-risk under observation, the 
unit will have the early warning it needs to either launch a 
spoiling attack or to bring the target under fire. Drawing 
on history and previous experience, both the primary and 
alternate egress routes will be under real-time sensor 
surveillance in order to provide the commander with an 
accurate picture of the enemy situation as the battalion 
egresses. The regimental rapid reaction force’s insert and 
egress routes will be covered by real-time sensors as 
required in order to safely and quickly reach the infantry 
battalion assault force, should they need the assistance. 
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From 0200Z/1 Nov 08 until 1800Z on 2 Nov 08, 2d 
Battalion, 3d Marines requests real-time video 
feeds from: 
 
1. Three UAV’s orbiting grids AZ123456, 
AZ234567, and AZ345678 – video resolution of 1 
meter. The UAV’s need to focus on building 
rooftops, street level between buildings, 
projections from windows, movement to and from 
buildings, and other taskings from the supported 
battalion that can be executed within one minute 
of request.  
 
2. The ground sensor clusters located in the 
following buildings: 
 
 a. 12145-X1Z: face north towards the city 
block containing target buildings located in grid 
square 123456–video resolution of 1 meter, focus 
on building windows, avenues of approach, and 
movement to and from the target buildings along 
the adjacent streets and avenues of approach.   
 
 b. 12145-X2Y: face north towards the 
avenues of approach leading towards the building 
for possible enemy reinforcement.  
  
 c. 12145-X3Y: face south and west- video 
resolution of 1 meter, focus on building windows, 
avenues of approach, and movement to and from the 
target buildings along the adjacent streets and 
avenues of approach.   
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 d. SOF team 1: from a concealed position 
located vicinity 123456, position a video sensor 
to take real-time video of insurgents entering or 
leaving building 12145-ZZ1, a suspected 
operational planning cell in order to refine the 
terrorist cell network that exists in this 
vicinity. In addition, be prepared to video in 
real-time any movement to and from the target 
buildings in order to fully develop the enemy 
situation prior to the assault. 
 
 e. SOF team 2: Emplace seismic sensors 
along the drainage system in order to detect 
motion and provide early warning of possible 
incursion. 
 
3. One team from Combat Camera to record and 
transmit real-time video from the assault to 
counteract any negative propaganda, which may 
result from the assault on this city block. After 
the assault, record video of all captured 
equipment and any personnel detained for further 
intelligence analysis. 
 
4. Two supporting reinforced rifle companies 
performing the cordon within a 0.5 radius of the 
target buildings will need access to the UAV feeds 
and the sensors located along routes GUINESS, ST 
PAULI GIRL and BUD LIGHT in order to locate and 
identify insurgents, allied personnel, or 
civilians attempting to approach, leave, or breach 
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the cordon. The two company HQ’s will be located 
at grids 12345678 and 23456781. These two 
companies are third in priority.  
 
5. The main effort company performing the search 
mission will have priority access to all of the 
feeds requested in this SLA. The company HQ will 
be co located with the battalion forward CP.  
 
6. The Regimental Reaction Force (RRF) will 
require access to UAVs and sensors located along 
routes PALE ALE, COORS, ANCHOR STEAM, and SAM 
ADAMS. Priority will shift to the RRF when the RRF 
has been activated. 
 
7. This HQ requires access to all feeds during 
the time allotted and will have GW’s located at 
grids AZ124578, AZ123987, and AZ987123. One UAV 
will remain overhead to provide additional GW 
access. The main COC will be located at grid AY 
987650 and it is anticipated that the forward COC 
will be located in grid square 0102. 
6. MEF-level Sustained, High-tempo Combat Operations 
This level encapsulates the operations of the five 
preceding examples before it. An MEF that has been deployed 
overseas for the purposes of engaging and defeating an enemy 
may have to perform an amphibious landing, or may have to 
conduct sequenced offensive operations as part of a larger 
campaign in support of strategic objectives. It may also be 
ordered to perform deep reconnaissance missions to determine 
 115
when and where to engage the enemy as part of the sequenced 
offensive operations, and may have to engage the enemy in an 
urbanized environment. Some of these operations may occur 
simultaneously, some may occur sequentially, and all may 
occur at the same time. Ultimately, the communications 
network and the information that is transferred over that 
network must support the unit’s operational needs. As in the 
case of air support, fire support, and other forms of low-
density, critical resources, not every unit can have a 
priority on network resources. SLA requests, and the 
management system that the IMOs within the information 
management hierarchy use to determine which SLA requests 
will be approved or denied, should support the operational 
plan. Main effort units should have priority on SLA 
requests, while supporting effort units’ requests should be 
prioritized; likewise, the management system will have to 
determine if there are enough resources to equitably support 
the supporting units’ needs. In addition, if the main effort 
unit designation will shift based on time or events then the 
SLA’s management system should accommodate, and even 
anticipate, the network resource shift to the new unit.  
7. Compare/Contrast of Sample SLAs 
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Table 8.  SLA Comparison. 
a. Physical Layer 
 Table 8 depicts a side-by-side comparison of five 
example tactical level SLAs written in support of the 
warfighting functions. The first section, the physical 
layer, shows a commonality among the sensor types, 
geographic size, and terrain. Sensors such as UAV video 
cameras, weather, and seismic detectors are not mission-
specific, so they can be used for a wide variety of tasks 
and to support a wide range of missions. Geographic size 
indicates the size of the unit’s AO, while the terrain is a 
key indicator of the difficulty in establishing links among 
the nodes. Since combat units must be able to operate in all 
types of terrain, terrain cannot be a limiting factor in 
providing QoS. The physical layer must take distances and 
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terrain into account when the network nodes are emplaced and 
the links between them are established.  
Table 8 differentiates among network size and 
type, including an infantry battalion’s network that is 
comparatively smaller then the MEF’s network, the size of a 
network in an urban environment, or a dynamically-changing 
network supporting an amphibious landing. The infantry 
battalion will have fewer nodes and gateways to place and, 
with the exception of human sensors, will not have the means 
to continually relocate them around the battlespace. An 
infantry battalion’s generic mission statement is to locate, 
close with, and destroy the enemy; thus, the battalion 
commander will want to place his limited assets in a way 
that achieves his goal by shortening his decision-making 
cycle.  
The assets that the battalion receives for a 
specific mission will be tasked by higher headquarters, and 
will be appropriate to its role in the mission. While the 
battalion commander can request more assets, it is the 
higher unit’s prerogative to deny the request. The battalion 
commander can also submit requests for information (RFI) and 
take advantage of the information gained from higher 
headquarters’ sensor assets. Reconnaissance missions are 
focused on answering information requirements; for this 
reason they can be very focused on specific locations; 
alternately; alternately, they can be broad in scope and 
cover virtually the entire AO. Operational success relies on 
timely answers to the commander’s information requirements 
(assuming the information requirements are both correct and 
relevant), so the proper mix of ground, air, static, mobile, 
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and SOF sensor assets will be deployed to properly capture 
the data to answer the information requirement(s). An 
amphibious landing network environment will be initially 
small, but will increase as more assets move ashore and 
begin to join the network. The network will then expand and 
grow denser as the landing force expands the AO by pushing 
inland and joining even more assets to the sensor network. 
In contrast, the MOUT environment is more compact and needs 
a larger, denser network, since the “sensing distance” of 
most sensors is far more constrained by the urban 
environment than it is by a more open environment. The MEF 
has many more assets and operations to manage, so network 
size is not a matter of a linear scale. Transmission media 
is predominantly the same, regardless of the type of 
supported mission.  
The network operations center (NOC) and combat 
operations center (COC) location are listed in this layer, 
since the information received from the sensor nodes must be 
relayed to these two locations in a timely manner for it to 
be of value; it should also be noted that the NOC/COC are 
considered nodes themselves. Doctrinally, these locations 
must support the commander’s ability to command and control 
his forces. Therefore, the COC/NOC must be in a protected 
location, but still in a position to communicate. More often 
than not, these two requirements are opposed to each other 
and the need for protection is deemed the more important of 
the two.                       
b. Data Flow Layer 
The next section, the data flow layer, depicts the 
variations in the flow of data among the different mission 
 121
SLAs. The infantry battalion SLA shows a low ratio between 
the average number of sensor nodes and the size of the AO, 
whereas the reconnaissance mission, amphibious landing, and 
MOUT operation have notably higher ratios. The infantry 
battalion’s sensor assets are relatively limited because 
units at that level can have a reasonable expectation that 
higher headquarters’ assets will provide the information 
they need. Any information gaps identified by the battalion 
staff can then be covered with the battalion’s assets.  
Reconnaissance, amphibious landing, and MOUT 
operations will have a higher ratio since operations such as 
these require a higher degree of battlespace knowledge in 
order to generate the higher operational tempo required for 
mission success. Reconnaissance missions are specific in 
nature and are executed to answer the commander’s 
information requirements. As noted previously, amphibious 
landings and MOUT operations are comparatively more complex 
and dangerous then a typical infantry battalion offensive 
operation in more permissive terrain. Network congestion is 
mission-dependent but will most likely be related to the 
sensor node/AO ratio. More congestion is likely for units 
and missions with a smaller ratio of sensors to AO size.  
c. SLA Layer 
The next set of categories is grouped under the 
SLA layer heading. This layer includes the areas in the SLA 
specifically related to providing QoS within the network. As 
this SLA compare/contrast analysis progresses up the layers 
an expected pattern begins to emerge with respect to the 
SLAs and the unit level and mission types. As one might 
expect, the infantry battalion’s more generalized offensive 
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operations receive fewer resources to support QoS than do 
more specialized operations and higher echelon units. The 
infantry battalion will have fewer resources to use and will 
have less capability to control the network once operations 
are underway, since every additional person and resource 
above the minimum required to run the network will be one 
less person and resource devoted to mission accomplishment. 
Mission failure with perfect information is still mission 
failure.  
The next two categories, mobile and static sensor 
emplacement, again highlight the differences in units and 
missions. The value of increased battlespace knowledge 
includes a higher operational tempo and more effective 
action in accomplishing the unit’s mission. While infantry 
battalions theoretically have the ability to implant and 
replant sensor nodes, the time and resources required to do 
so take away from its ability to take advantage of increased 
battlespace awareness and thus to accomplish its mission 
more effectively. The ability to maneuver mobile units is 
dependent on whether or not those same units are under the 
battalion’s span of control. This is a command-and-control 
issue that would be resolved during the planning process or 
during execution with requests and fragmentary (frag) orders 
to the involved units.  
With respect to the remaining missions and higher 
echelon units, the level of control and the ability to move 
static sensors and mobile sensors increases with mission 
complexity and the size of the unit involved. More 
specialized missions will have the appropriate resources  
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devoted to them in order to ensure mission accomplishment 
since other, more far-reaching missions rely on the success 
of those specialized missions.  
The data types category lists the data types 
common among the different SLAs. With the exception of the 
hydrographic data needed for an amphibious landing, the data 
types are the same throughout. This makes sense, since the 
information provided by the different data types is very 
similar within the warfighting model so as to provide the 
commander with the intelligence he needs. The statement from 
MCDP-1, “[i]ntelligence provides the commander with an 
understanding of the enemy and the battlespace, as well as 
identifying the enemy’s center of gravity and critical 
vulnerabilities,” is true across the spectrum of operations 
and from a tactical perspective collection methods are 
basically the same.  
The traffic class category uses the traffic class 
field in the IPv6 header to denote different levels of QoS 
for each flow label. Within the MEF sensor network each of 
the 64 codepoint values will map to MEF-defined PHB’s for 
each DS domain. These domains can be built around the 
traditional MEF command structure.  
The Command Element, Air Combat Element, Ground 
Combat Element, Combat Service Support Element, and the new 
“fifth element of the MAGTF” will each have their own DS 
domains and sub-domains with PHBs defined for each.  
The codepoint, PHB values, and the IP addresses on 
the node interfaces will be structured so that traffic flows 
passing through higher, adjacent, and/or subordinate units 
will receive the same level of QoS treatment until they 
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reach their intended DS domain. From this point the 
individual units can then define the PHBs as required. The 
primary means to communicate this QoS information to all 
interested units is through the SLA request.   
d. Information Layer 
The final categories are grouped under the 
Information layer heading. This layer captures specific 
operational characteristics that directly affect the level 
of QoS provided for the conduct of the operation. As with 
the lower layers, the sample SLAs emphasize the differences 
between unit size and mission types.  
The infantry battalion will be allotted relatively 
few SLAs to implement in the network. The reasoning for this 
is simple: the infantry battalion is the smallest self-
reliant tactical unit capable of managing network functions 
and, therefore, the smallest tactical unit capable of 
coordinating and submitting SLA requests. In a manner 
similar to the fire support restrictions governed by the 
supporting artillery battalion and its ability to support a 
finite number of targets at any one given time, an infantry 
battalion staff must determine which information 
requirements cannot be answered by higher headquarters (the 
information requirement gaps) by means of RFIs and referring 
to the MEF SLA request database. If these gaps still exist, 
the staff must determine which information requirement gaps 
will be most effectively served by submitting the 
battalion’s sensor network SLA request. This SLA request 
will be incorporated into other SLA requests submitted 
throughout the MEF for decision, incorporation, merging, or 
denial.  
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Likewise, a single reconnaissance mission will 
also receive a low number of allocated SLAs since, by 
design, each mission will be specific enough and the 
supporting SLA request should encompass the entire mission. 
“Mission” in this sense refers to the actual mission 
statement and not necessarily the insertion or extraction 
phase.  
The amphibious landing operation will have a 
relatively high number of SLAs since this type of operation 
is perhaps the most complex, has the highest capacity for 
the “fog of war,” and is very difficult to command and 
control. Commanders at all levels will want to know as much 
as they can about the enemy situation, friendly situation, 
terrain, weather, and battlespace so they can keep the 
operational tempo high, reduce the number of casualties, and 
achieve mission success within the commander’s intent, as 
soon as practical.  
MOUT operations will have several SLAs in effect 
as well, but not to the same degree as the amphibious 
operation. MOUT operations must be highly synchronized and 
therefore everyone must have the same level of battlespace 
knowledge in order to achieve a high degree of coordination. 
The high degree of synchronization calls for an equally high 
degree of coordination and centralization at higher command-
and-control levels. SLAs will be determined by the senior 
level headquarters responsible for the MOUT operation; this 
accounts for a reduced number of SLAs in the network at any 
one time.  
MEF-level sustained operations will have many SLAs 
in effect at any given time since the MEF encompasses a wide 
 126
variety of units and missions. A successful reconnaissance 
mission conducted by the force level reconnaissance unit can 
then lead to an upcoming offensive operation for the air 
wing and the ground division. Each unit will have SLAs in 
place for the success of their mission. 
Operational phase shift is an important notion for 
proper SLA support and network QoS. For example, 
reconnaissance missions can either be conducted for general 
battlespace awareness, which can then lead to offensive 
operations should the situation warrant, or they can be 
conducted prior to planned combat operations in order to 
provide the needed intelligence support for mission success. 
In some instances, the reconnaissance mission is executed in 
conjunction with a larger operation. In this case, the 
reconnaissance unit will be the “main effort” as they insert 
and gather information critical to the success of the larger 
operation. Once that larger operation commences, the main 
effort will shift to the assaulting unit and the 
reconnaissance unit will shift to a “supporting effort.”  
This is an important distinction to make because when 
designating a unit the main effort is how the commander 
explicitly determines and “communicates” to the entire force 
which unit will get priority on all of the resources it 
needs for mission success. Priority of resources extends to 
the network as well, so when the operational phase shift 
occurs, the network needs to know this and understand what 
it means. The network will accommodate this shift and 
reprioritize the main effort units by manipulating the MEF-
defined codepoints and PHBs. The amphibious landing phase 
shifts will occur in the same manner but on a larger, more 
complex scale. 
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It must be understood that the no one will have 
the perfect information from which to make the perfect 
decision. General George Patton was known to say that a good 
plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan 
executed next week. In keeping with the model developed so 
far, the infantry battalion commander must realize that his 
unit is one of nine infantry battalions within the ground 
combat element of the MEF. In short, he may have to accept a 
less-than-perfect level of quality in his level of QoS when 
the entire MEF operational tempo and cycle of operations is 
considered. The battalion IMO must, therefore, be 
experienced enough to determine which other SLAs will be in 
effect, from which other relevant information can be pulled.  
The information provided by the reconnaissance 
mission needs to be of high quality since pending operations 
and high-level decisions depend on the information developed 
from the recon. Amphibious landings need the best 
information possible that can be gleaned from the network, 
while both MOUT and MEF high-tempo operations require 
varying levels of information quality, which are dependent 
on the operations being conducted. 
The Common Operating Picture (COP)/User Defined 
Operating Picture (UDOP) are the visual means for the 
commander and his staff to spatially view the information 
received from the sensor network (see Figure 26). The COP is 
presented in a standardized format with many different 
associated layers that show different degrees of detail. 
Each commander has his own vision of what he wants to see on 
a general, day-to-day basis and of what he needs to see for 
specific operations. It is up to the IMO and the Operations 
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section to configure the COP in a manner to meet the 
commander’s requirements. Likewise, the UDOP can be tailored 
so that each staff section can display the information they 
need to best accomplish their assigned tasks.  
D. TACTICAL NETWORK SENSOR TAXONOMY  
1. Taxonomy Development and Incorporation with IPv6 
Table 8 and the associated discussion of the five 
example SLAs describe the tactical characteristics within 
each of the four layers of tactical sensor network QoS 
implementation. From top to bottom, these layers range from 
the vision the commander has when he describes his mission 
and how he wants to see his information requirements 
answered, to how the network will physically support the QoS 
needed to support the overall mission. After analyzing the 
sample SLAs within their respective unit sizes and mission 
types, both unique and similar tactical QoS considerations 
emerged; the number of sensor nodes, the transmission media, 
and the terrain were among these. While each SLA had unique 
aspects for each of these considerations, their physical 
layer generalities logically placed them together at the 
tactical sensor network physical layer. Similar 
considerations had a natural grouping as well and from this 







Tactical Network Sensor Taxonomy 
Information Layer 
SLA Layer 
Data Flow Layer 
Layers 
Physical Layer 
Table 9.     Tactical Network Sensor Taxonomy. 
2. Tactical Network Sensor Taxonomy Described 
a. Information Layer   
The Information Layer is the layer at which the 
commander articulates how he wants his information 
requirements answered and what he intends to do with that 
information. These requirements can be captured in the SLA 
request template and supported at the lower layers of the 
taxonomy. The battalion staff supports the commander’s 
efforts by working through the Marine Corps Planning Process 
(MCPP) to give him the best product under the circumstances 
which he can then use as a basis to operate his unit in the 
accomplishment of a mission statement. As a member of the 
staff, the IMO must determine if the sensor network’s 
current configuration can support answering the developed 
information requirements, or if those requirements can be 
answered or provided in real-time by higher headquarters or 
other means. Taking the commander’s guidance for what he 
needs to see and the products developed by the planning 
process, the IMO will draft and submit the battalion’s SLA 
for review and incorporation into the MEF’s SLA database. 
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The following scenario, which builds upon this thesis’s 
opening scenario, illustrates the echelon and staff 
interactions that take place at this layer: 
A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is forward 
deployed and is engaged in high tempo combat 
operations to secure a foothold from which to hand 
over sustained operations to a follow-on Army 
Corps. The MEF Commanding General (CG) desires to 
make use of recently fielded technology to support 
the high operations tempo by providing information 
to the requesting user at the appropriate time so 
that the MEF will operate on a compressed 
decision-making cycle.  
This shorter cycle will provide the CG the 
edge he needs to mass his combat power at the 
point of decision and to take advantage of his 
force’s inherent speed, mobility, and lethality. 
Based on the CG’s guidance, his staff recommends 
the increased use of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in the form of 
UAV-born sensors, ground-deployed static sensors, 
ground-mobile sensors, and the battlesuit sensors 
worn by his reconnaissance and other selected 
units to feed real-time information to the 
respective Combat Operation Centers (COC). Each 
staff section at each level will have the ability 
to tailor a user-defined operating picture (UDOP) 
to display the feeds in the manner most 
appropriate for them in order to act on the 
information obtained and then provide 
recommendations based on their analysis. The CG 
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approved and the operation planning team (OPT) set 
to work incorporating this capability into their 
planning effort.  
  One of the MEF’s operational assumptions was 
that the MEF’s organic assets, supporting units, 
and higher headquarters would be spread all over 
the globe in order to mass whenever and wherever 
needed. The distances between units necessitate 
the use of the GIG, which provides the 
WAN/communications backbone for the MEF’s higher, 
adjacent, and subordinate units. This global 
connectivity requires the use of IPv6 for its 
increased address space, end-to-end connectivity, 
and ease of auto-configuration.  
To address these issues, develop the ISR 
asset employment plan, and determine how the 
network will support prioritizing the information 
flow, the MEF IMO and representatives from the 
operations (G3), intelligence (G2), and 
communications (G6) sections formed the IMO cell. 
The IMO’s pre-established tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) in addition to standard operating 
procedures (SOP) guided the planning effort which 
resulted in the creation of the related sections 
of the IMO, Intelligence, Communications, and 
Operations annexes and appendices to the base MEF 
order.  
The G3 reiterated the scheme of maneuver that 
the intelligence, communications, and information 
management plans needed to support. The G2 
provided input about where the MEF-level sensors 
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should be located to support the intelligence 
gathering effort. The G6 provided input about how 
and where the sensors and gateways should be 
located in order to provide maximum connectivity. 
The IMO developed the MEF’s information management 
plan, which would ensure that the information 
gained from every sensor located within the MEF’s 
influence was properly managed and coordinated up, 
down, and laterally; a sensor network covering a 
MEF-sized battlespace can become quite congested 
and can restrict the ability for real-time 
information to reach its destination as intended. 
(One item included as an exhibit in the IMO’s 
annex covers the use of SLAs for the MEF sensor 
network in order to deconflict potential sources 
of network congestion.) Standardization, 
submission procedures, and access to the 
management database are all addressed and cross 
coordination with the G3 is made to ensure that 
SLAs are included in the MEF’s operational 
synchronization matrix (sync matrix). The G6, 
keeping in mind that communications supports 
operations, noted the overall scheme of maneuver 
and the types, locations, and availability of 
employed ISR assets that needed to connect with 
the network to provide the information required, 
and the IMO’s plan to disseminate that information 
throughout the MEF. The G6’s plan needed to 
include GIG connectivity, managing an IPv6 sensor 
network, and managing QoS assurance mechanisms to 
 133
ensure that the SLAs would be supported within the 
physical capabilities of the network.   
  Three levels down at an Infantry Battalion, a 
staff planned its part in a MEF-wide operation in 
which it is designated the MEF’s main effort. As 
the designated main effort, the battalion enjoys 
the majority of the assets it requests. For this 
specific operation, significant real-time 
information is required for both the planning 
effort and the assault itself. The user in this 
case is the battalion commander who needs to pull 
sensor imagery and real-time sensor feeds from 
multiple sources through a network that is 
delivering different levels of traffic to various 
destinations, for a specific time interval, and at 
a specified QoS level. In this case, he needs more 
than one specific feed and needs to have a certain 
QoS level to guarantee at least the minimal 
network resources, and he needs this guarantee for 
a specified time to cover the projected length of 
his assigned task. This request would come in the 
form of a standardized SLA in accordance with unit 
TTP’s, SOP’s, and applicable operations orders. A 
suggested, single SLA request, to support this 
experiment’s scenario, would be the following: 
 
 From 0445Z until 2200Z on 25 Oct 08, 2d 
Battalion, 3d Marines requests real-time feeds 
from the UAV’s orbiting grids AZ123456, AZ234567, 
and AZ345678 – video resolution of 1 meter; the 
ground sensor cluster located in boxes X1Z, X2Y, 
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and X3Y- video resolution of 1 meter; and TACON of 
one platoon from the ground mobile sensor company 
to be initially positioned at grid AY987654 and 
prepared to move in a northerly direction to 
provide streaming video of all action to the west 
of their direction of travel. One reinforced rifle 
company operating along Axis BLUE will need access 
to feeds in priority of UAVs; the ground sensor 
clusters X3Y, X2Y, and X1Z; and finally the ground 
mobile sensor platoon. This HQ requires access to 
all feeds during the time allotted and will have 
GW’s located at grids AZ124578, AZ123987, and 
AZ987123. The main COC will be located at grid AY 
987650. 
 
Once reviewed by the Operations Officer and approved by 
the Commanding Officer, this SLA is the product of this 
layer of the taxonomy. Subsequent layers will take this 
“human readable language” and translate it into language 
that would support the operation by “informing” the network 
of the requesting unit’s information requirements so that 
each packet can be tagged appropriately and subsequently 
prioritized throughout the network. Operating at the eighth 
layer, the SLA is then translated into application QoS by 
incorporating the specified or derived locations, distances, 
times, source nodes, destination nodes, information quality 
levels, and application bandwidth requirements from the SLA 
request in order to determine how to move the tagged packets 




the QoS decision-making ability in the network, where it is 
much more responsive than a human operator located some 
distance away at the NOC. 
b. SLA Layer 
The Service Level Agreement Layer is the layer at 
which specific characteristics affecting the supportability 
of the Information Layer are captured and configured, thus 
supporting the information views that the commander and his 
staff need in order to answer the commander’s information 
requirements. The IMO must have an understanding of the data 
types that the commander and his staff wish to see that 
require the real-time QoS guarantee. Referring back to the 
UDOP/COP, configuration at the Information Layer will 
specify the information views. The IMO needs to then specify 
the data types and the specific requirements for each in 
order to pass each traffic flow from the sensors to the 
NOC/COC for display. Different data types have different 
bandwidth requirements, data formats, and security levels, 
which the IMO will need to know for QoS assurance. In 
conjunction with the data types, are the assigned classes of 
traffic, codepoints, and PHB’s for each traffic flow 
traveling in the DiffServ-enabled IPv6 network. The IPv6 
header, shown in Figure 1, contains a 24-bit flow label 
starting at the eighth bit, which provides the routers a 
quick method of determining the packet’s QoS level. In IPv6, 
this flow label is marked with the appropriate 
Differentiated Service CodePoint (DSCP) value to 
differentiate one traffic class from another. This is the 
mechanism used by DiffServ to prioritize traffic as it flows 
through the network. At this layer, each traffic flow will 
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be assigned a traffic class and codepoint which map to 
specific PHBs, depending on which DS domain the traffic flow 
is travelling through.  
Traffic class and codepoints are selected from a 
common database maintained by the IMO hierarchy. For 
example, an SLA criterion for one-meter resolution from a 
certain sensor node or cluster of nodes will be assigned a 
PHB, which ensures that the packet carrying video data 
relating to a particular sensor, source, and destination IP 
gets the QoS it requires. Knowing that one-meter resolution 
requires a certain minimum bandwidth to ensure that it will 
stream properly, forced routing may need to be invoked at 
the application layer. Having an understanding of the level 
of network control is important to ensuring QoS from the 
sensor node to the NOC/COC. Information which is traveling 
through several DS domains with several SLAs already in 
effect or in the queue could suffer higher congestion levels 
and poorer QoS than information travelling through one DS 
domain with none or fewer SLAs. Knowing this network 
information ahead of time gives the IMOs several options. 
Static routing, which forces certain traffic flows to take 
certain routes, can be requested to provide for better QoS; 
likewise, the IMO annex to the OPORD could direct adjacent 
DS domains to provide a certain level of QoS through their 
domains for specific operations. In cases where the sensor 
nodes themselves are not in a position to transmit data 
through the sensor network, the IMO needs to understand the 
degree of maneuverability of the mobile sensors and must 
know how easily the static sensors can either be moved or 
new sensors placed in a more advantageous position. The IMO 
also needs to make recommendations for initial sensor 
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placement with respect to QoS assurances during the MCPP, 
taking into account that deployed static sensors can be used 
for more than one mission and for general battlespace 
awareness. 
c. Data Flow Layer 
The Data Flow Layer defines the quality level of 
the data flows from the sensor nodes to the NOC/COC and 
serves as the bridge between the physical layer and the SLA 
layer. During the planning phase, this layer can help the 
IMO and the communicators determine if the physical sensor 
layout and data paths will provide the QoS needed for proper 
functioning in the upper two layers. During execution, the 
metrics gathered from this layer will help both the network 
and the network operators determine if the current 
configuration is meeting the minimal QoS requirements, as 
defined in the SLA Information Layer requirements section. 
It is crucial that the three categories (average sensor to 
AO size ratio, ratio of nodes to gateways, and traffic flow 
data rates) are determined as accurately as possible during 
the planning phase, since the upper two layers depend on the 
accuracy of these figures to provide the necessary QoS for 
the commander and his staff. A failure at this level will 
cause a lag in the network’s ability to provide the needed 
QoS. Of the three categories, data rates are the easiest to 
reconfigure on the fly. Gateways can be added and new 
sensors can be implanted but this effort could siphon 
resources away from the supported operation.  
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d. Physical Layer 
The Physical Layer defines the physical 
implementation of the sensor network with respect to the 
expected QoS levels needed in the above three layers to 
fully provide the commander and his staff with the level of 
QoS needed to support mission accomplishment. Knowing the 
sensor types, the potential number of sensors in the 
network, and their locations will provide the IMO with an 
idea of potential congestion points and an estimate of the 
number of network gateways and aggregate bandwidth needed to 
move the sensor information to the NOC/COC. This layer is 
the most dynamic since with IPv6, sensor nodes can enter and 
leave the network without human intervention through 
autoconfiguration. While the network itself will need to 
dynamically reconfigure itself to provide the best paths 
through the network, the planning effort must take this into 
account and the initial sensor network laydown must be 
designed to accommodate it. Referring back to Table 8, it is 
obvious that different missions and different-sized units 
will have different physical layer characteristics which are 
unique to each situation and which are based on the 
differences between each SLA in the other layers. Because 
terrain affects communication among nodes, it is easier to 
communicate across open terrain than it is in an urban 
environment.  
Network size and density will also have an impact 
because a denser network offers more links to communicate 
across. While specific sensor node locations cannot always 
be determined, their general locations will be known, based 
on the OPORD’s scheme of maneuver. Gateway locations and 
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transmission media can then be planned accordingly. The 
NOC/COC’s locations need to be determined as well, since all 
sensor node communications need to terminate in these 
facilities. It should be noted that any other users who need 
the information from these nodes should be able to access it 
through the unit’s LAN rather than having to pull it from 
the sensor network.  
  Figure 31 is a summation of the sensor network 
taxonomy discussion as it applies to the IPv6 networking 
protocol. It is a “snapshot in time” on D-Day, at L-Hour, 
which is the date and time an amphibious landing begins. The 
upper third of the figure depicts a MEF conducting an 
additional three supporting simultaneous operations to 
ultimately ensure a successful amphibious landing. The 
landing has been deemed the main effort, while the remaining 
three operations are in support of it and are labeled as 
such. The arrows on the left side show how each level flows 
into the next.  
In the SLA Layer, the data types supporting each 
operation are shown. These data types correspond to sensor 
types that will support the unit commander’s information 
requirements. The classes of traffic field depicts how each 
operation will each have different quantities of traffic 
class. The flow label field emphasizes the fact that 
DiffServ is enabled in the tactical sensor network. DiffServ 
uses the flow label in the IPv6 header to set codepoints and 
Per Hop Behaviors (PHBs) that correspond to different units 
in the network. Assigned by the IMOs and monitored by the 
communications units, this information is loaded into the 
DiffServ-enabled network and is updated as operational needs 
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dictate. Routers read these flow labels and queue packets 
according to their priority, based on the pre-set codepoints 
and PHBs. The bottom third layer shows the IPv6 packet 
header, which facilitates the settings made in the SLA layer 
in order to support operational requirements by providing a 
means of answering the commander’s information requirements.     













































have BEST EFFORT 
delivery priority 
after the MAIN 
EFFORT










have BEST EFFORT 
delivery after 
SUPPORTING EFFORT#1


























Sensors employed to answer the Unit Commander's Information 













IPv6 packet header (Figure 2) showing the Flow Label used by 
DiffServ to prioritize packets in the tactical sensor network
 
Figure 31.   Operational Application of the IPv6 Protocol 
in a Tactical Sensor Network. 
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V. CAMPAIGN OF EXPERIMENTS FOR IPV6 SENSOR 
NETWORKING STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Command-and-Control Research Program (CCRP) 
publishes a series of books aimed at researching and 
defining how the DoD can take advantage of and apply 
emerging technologies in the Information Age. Concepts such 
as Network-Centric Warfare and Agile Organizations have been 
the subjects of much research and subsequent publication. 
Another area that the CCRP addresses as part of its 
Information Age Transformation Series is how experimentation 
can be applied to the DoD to build synergy between the needs 
of the DoD and the technology being researched. 
Experimentation is considered to consist of three separate, 
distinct, yet related purposes: Discovery, Hypothesis 
Testing, and Demonstration. Experimentation begins as vague, 
immature ideas and evolves to useful knowledge from which 
doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) are developed, or which 
adds to more abstract theory. These three purposes have 
since evolved to produce the four phases of an experiment 
campaign: formulation, concept definition, refinement, and 
demonstration (Alberts & Hayes, 2005).  
Formulation is the seed of an idea and can originate 
from multiple sources. Ideas from journals, ideas tried 
during field exercises, or the latest hardware devices or 
software applications can serve as the genesis of discovery  
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experiments. At this stage, the campaign is scoped, the 
initial problem is stated, and the planning effort is 
started.  
Concept definition, the next step, produces the 
conceptual model, resulting from considerable research and 
several design iterations; the rest of the campaign is based 
on these. This step requires so much research and so many 
design iterations and research method specifications because 
the goal is to produce a quality, robust model worthy of the 
time and resources dedicated to the campaign. 
The refinement stage consists of “robust, rigorous 
hypothesis testing on both the concept itself and how the 
concept will be applied” (Alberts & Hayes, 2005).  Testing 
at this phase must show broad concept application in 
addition to the innovative use of the application, or the 
experiment risks being labeled as “stove-piped” or too 
narrowly defined. Both the concepts of command and control 
(C2) and information technology are very broad in scope and 
have many, many different applications in DoD alone. C2 can 
cover the range of military operations from two-man teams to 
theater-wide commands. Information technology applications, 
such as the TCP/IP protocol, are designed for use in all 
manner of networking applications. The breadth and depth of 
the application must be determined at this stage.  
The final stage, demonstrations, displays the newfound 
concepts to users who will either incorporate the concept as 
is, or further develop it for their own unique purposes. 
Three experiments for the refinement phase are briefly 
proposed while Experiment Four, the capstone, is explained 
in greater detail. 
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Figure 32 depicts the overarching structure used to 
design this particular experiment campaign. Shown as a 
networking adaptation model, the familiar seven-layer OSI 
model is incorporated in a large feedback loop with two 
“control entries” at the application and physical layer and 
three “measurement entries” at the transport, network, and 
data link layer.  
 
Figure 32.   Layers of Adaptation in the TNT Testbed: the 
Adaptive Management Interface   (From 
Bordetsky & Netzer, 2009). 
Bordetsky and Netzer (2009) in “TNT Testbed for Self-
Organizing Tactical Networking and Collaboration” developed 
this model to show how networks can adapt to their 
environments, as well as allow users to “have [a] unique 
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capability of exploring possible adaption patterns, i.e., 
management of their resources by experimenting with 
applications load or physically moving and re-aligning their 
assets”.  The design of the sensor networking experiment 
campaign that follows was based on this unique thought 
process and subsequent model. The experiment control 
variables were derived from the application and physical 
layers while measurable parameters were selected from the 
three measurable layers. The selected variables and 
parameters follow in subsequent sections.  
IPv6 sensor networks that are based on an adaptive 
networking model, such as the adaptive management interface 
shown in Figure 32, will provide users with a network that 
can operate in a more robust and survivable manner 
especially during fluid, unpredictable combat operations. 
The TNT testbed introduced in Chapter II provides a unique 
opportunity to explore networking applications using the 
adaptive management interface model in a plug-and-play 
environment to define the boundaries of this model and of 
applications based on it. 
B. EXPERIMENT ONE: DETERMINE THE SENSOR NETWORK TESTBED’S 
BEST-EFFORT CHARACTERISTICS WITH INCREASING LEVELS OF 
TCP AND UDP NETWORK TRAFFIC 
1. Purpose 
A baseline for network best-effort performance only 
needs to be established in order to determine the network’s 
performance characteristics. The network testbed adapted 
from Bouras et al.’s (2009) work in “QoS Issues in al Large-
scale IPv6 Network” is a native IPv6 network with foreground 
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traffic generators (both OSI layer four TCP and UDP data) 
passing data through an IPv6 exercise network and then 
ultimately to a traffic receiver. The traffic generators 
could be augmented with a combination of live or recorded 
UAV feeds, ground sensor feeds, and mobile sensor feeds.  
Adjacently, a background traffic generator passes background 
data through the same network to its own receiver, bypassing 
the IPv6 exercise network. QoS mechanisms such as DiffServ 
are implemented on several routers inserted between the 
traffic generators.  
These routers are connected through a link to a 
bandwidth appropriate to that of a sensor network. TCP 
traffic and UDP streaming traffic is then passed through the 
network at increasing levels while several parameters are 
measured by means of a packet analyzer sitting astride the 
network at the receiver end. For the purposes of this 
experiment, the QoS features will be turned off so as to 
measure the best-effort performance. The QoS experiments to 
follow will be compared against this network baseline to 
analyze what techniques are working and how well they are 
working.  
2. Parameters Measured 
Table 10 is a compilation of the parameters to be 








Name Model Layer Description Units
Congestion Network A measure of packet loss 
and throughput 
Bits/second 
Jitter Network Fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery within 





Network The quantity of traffic 
that passes a point on the 
network in one second. 
Bits/second 
Packet loss Network The overall number of 
packets lost compared to 





Network Measured as a ratio of the 
number of packets that are 
delivered out of order to 





Network The percentage of traffic 
that must be resent for a 
given application 
Percent 
Table 10.   Experiment One Parameters Measured. 
3. Parameters Controlled 
Table 11 is a compilation of the controlled variables 
for this experiment. The traffic will be steadily increased 
as the parameters in Table 10 are measured or derived 












Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 




Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 
Bits per second 
Table 11.   Experiment One Control Variables. 
4. Performance Criteria 
This experiment will be conducted to establish a best-
effort delivery network baseline.  
C. EXPERIMENT TWO: DETERMINE THE SENSOR NETWORK’S QOS 
CHARACTERISTICS WITH ONE APPLICATION ON A NETWORK WITH 
INCREASING AND VARIABLE LEVELS OF NETWORK CONGESTION 
1. Purpose 
The scenario applicable to this experiment is a 
military, law enforcement, or emergency services commander 
or staff officer, a user, who needs to pull sensor imagery 
or a real-time sensor feed from a single source through a 
network that is delivering different levels of best-effort 
delivery traffic to various destinations. That single source 
could be a single UAV feed, a single ground video camera, or 
a single cluster of homogenous sensors. In this case, the 
user wants one specific feed and needs to have a specific 
QoS to maintain a certain level of performance guarantee. 
This performance level is affected by several factors 
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outside the application’s control. The network’s resource 
availability is increased or decreased based on other users 
pulling their own feeds, the state of the network, and the 
performance of the sensor nodes themselves. These issues are 
transparent to the user, who is not only unaware of the 
network’s state, but does not need to know or care. 
Application performance and getting the needed information 
is the priority.  
This experiment expands on Experiment One by 
implementing the QoS mechanism in the router and then 
measuring the performance variables as one real-time 
application is streamed from one end of the testbed to the 
other. The application will be streamed from the foreground 
traffic generator from a real-time feed such as UAV, ground 
sensor, or a mobile sensor feed as background network 
traffic will be generated to simulate varying network 
conditions. One method of ensuring QoS in streaming real-
time data is the use of the flow label in the layer three 
header.  
The 24-bit flow label, marked with the appropriate 
Differentiated Service CodePoint (DSCP) value to 
differentiate one traffic class from another traffic class, 
provides the routers with a quick method of determining the 
packet’s QoS level. The real-time streaming data will have 
one pre-set DSCP value while the background traffic will 
have another. This experiment uses the same mechanism to 
differentiate the foreground streaming traffic from the 
background-simulated traffic. As these packets traversed the 
network, the intervening network devices queued the traffic 
based on these values. As part of this experiment, the 
background traffic will be steadily increased until the 
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network becomes too congested to easily pass the streaming 
real-time traffic. The foreground traffic will be then 
increased and the background traffic measurements will be 
repeated until network congestion again precludes the 
minimum application performance requirements. The foreground 
traffic will be increased until the bandwidth exceeds the 
capacity of the sensor network maximum bandwidth. 
2. Parameters Measured 
Table 12 is a compilation of the parameters to be 
measured during Experiment Two.  
  
Name Model Layer Description Units
Congestion Network A measure of packet loss 
and throughput 
Bits/second 
Jitter Network Fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery within 




Network The quantity of traffic 
that passes a point on the 
network in one second. 
Bits/second 
Packet loss Network The overall number of 
packets lost compared to 





Network Measured as a ratio of the 
number of packets that are 
delivered out of order to 




Network Percentage of different 
DSCP values contained in 
the IPv6 header for 
DiffServ architectures 








Network The percentage of traffic 
that must be resent for a 
given application 
Percent 
Table 12.   Experiment Two Parameters Measured. 
3. Parameters Controlled 
Table 13 is a compilation of the controlled variables 
for this experiment. The traffic will be steadily increased 
as the parameters in Table 12 are measured or derived 
through the use of a packet analyzer. 
 




Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 
Streamed generated traffic 
or real-time traffic 




Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 




Physical Maximum network bandwidth 
available 
Bits per second 
Table 13.   Experiment Two Control Variables. 
4. Performance Criteria 
The following criteria will be used as a measure of 
streaming data performance and can be viewed on a level 
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higher than those monitoring network performance 
characteristics in the NOC; this is what users see and are 
interested in. Optimal performance for voice is a clear, 
intelligible sound from the distant end devoid of “pops,” 
delay, or broken/inaudible sound. Likewise, optimal 
performance for streaming video is a clear screen devoid of 
latency and jitter. While it should be noted that video is 
more flexible than voice, video also requires more bandwidth 





data streaming  
Streaming data will not suffer 
from latency or jitter and will be 
viewed in real-time from any 








Critical information from any 
source in the network will be 




Table 14.   Experiment Two Performance Criteria. 
 
D. EXPERIMENT THREE: DETERMINE THE SENSOR NETWORK’S QOS 
WITH MULTIPLE REAL-TIME APPLICATIONS WITH INCREASING 
AND VARIABLE LEVELS OF NETWORK CONGESTION 
1. Purpose 
The applicable scenario is a commander or staff 
officer, a user, who needs to pull sensor imagery or real-
time sensor feeds from multiple sources through a network 
that is delivering different levels of traffic to various 
destinations. In this case, the user wants more than one 
specific feed and needs to have a certain QoS level to 
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guarantee at least the minimal network resources. The 
network’s demand will be increased or decreased based on 
other users pulling their own feeds, the state of the 
network, and the performance of the sensor nodes themselves. 
This experiment expands on Experiment Two by adding real-
time feeds to the testbed architecture in order to determine 
how the network will deliver multiple real-time applications 
and support associated performance criteria. The foreground 
traffic generator will add alternate real-time traffic as 
the background network traffic is generated to simulate 
varying network conditions. The background traffic will 
initially be set to a low level. The foreground traffic will 
start with one streaming application and will then be 
increased as more and more real-time applications are 
streamed across the testbed via the foreground traffic 
generator until the network becomes too congested to easily 
pass the streaming real-time traffic. The background traffic 
will then be increased and the foreground traffic experiment 
will then be repeated. When the background traffic generator 
produces too much network congestion to pass more than one 
application the experiment concluded. 
2. Parameters Measured 
Table 15 is a compilation of the parameters to be 
measured during Experiment Three.  
 
Name Model Layer Description Units 
Congestion Network A measure of packet loss 
and throughput 
Bits/second 
Jitter Network Fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery 




Name Model Layer Description Units 
Average 
Throughput 
Network The quantity of traffic 
that passes a point on the 
network in one second 
Bits/second 
Packet loss Network The overall number of 
packets lost compared to 
the total number of 




Network Measured as a ratio of the 
number of packets that are 
delivered out of order to 





Network Percentage of different 
DSCP values contained in 
the IPv6 header for 
DiffServ architectures 






Network The percentage of traffic 
that must be resent for a 
given application 
Percent 
Table 15.   Experiment Three Parameters Measured. 
3. Parameters Controlled 
Table 16 is a compilation of the controlled variables 
for this experiment. The traffic will be steadily increased 
by the number of streaming data applications, as the 
parameters in Table 15 are measured or derived through the 










Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 
Streamed generated traffic 
or real-time traffic 




Application MTU’s transmitted over the 
network to simulate various 
levels of network use. Both 
TCP and UDP are common 
transport layer protocols. 
Bits per second 
Table 16.   Experiment Three Control Variables. 
4. Performance Criteria 
The following criteria will be used as a measure of 
streaming data performance. Optimal performance for voice is 
a clear, intelligible sound from the distant end devoid of 
“pops,” delay, or broken/inaudible sound. Likewise, optimal 
performance for streaming video is a clear screen devoid of 
latency and jitter. Here again, while it should noted that 
video is more flexible than voice, video also requires more 
bandwidth than voice does. For the purposes of Experiment 









 Name Description Max/Min
Stream multiple 
high image feeds 
from various 
sources 
The commander and staff can view 
one or more data streams from 
multiple sources without having to 
shut down one or more sources to 




data streaming  
Streaming data will not suffer 
from latency or jitter and will be 
viewed in real-time from any 





Critical information from any 
source in the network will be 
delivered to its destination 
without delay 
Max 
Table 17.   Experiment Three Performance Criteria. 
E. EXPERIMENT FOUR: DETERMINE THE SENSOR NETWORK’S QOS 
CHARACTERISTICS WITH MULTIPLE-USERS AND MULTIPLE SLAS 
WITH INCREASING AND VARIABLE LEVELS OF NETWORK 
CONGESTION. THIS IS THE CAPSTONE EXPERIMENT FOR THIS 
CAMPAIGN 
1. Purpose 
The applicable scenario builds on this paper’s opening 
scenario and can be found in Chapter IV, Section D, 
Paragraph 2a. This experiment expands and builds on the 
three previous experiments by adding more granularity to the 
levels of QoS in order to determine how the IPv6 sensor 
network will support SLAs. Experiments Two and Three 
differentiated network traffic levels by dividing traffic 
into best effort and priority by manipulating the DSCP 
values in the IPv6 header. All priority traffic cannot be 
considered equal or with equal queuing considerations, since 
different data types have different bandwidth requirements 
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and users may wish to prioritize one data type or one set of 
mission-related data streams over another. This experiment 
will explore this further classification of priority traffic 
by manipulating location, node density, time, source and 
destination nodes, information quality level, and 
application bandwidth requirements to determine how those 
manipulations are affected by a dynamic network simulated by 
the background traffic generator and competing SLAs.  
2. Baseline SLA 
  A baseline SLA incorporating all of the parameters in 
Table 18 will be established based on Experiments One 
through Three and will be the cornerstone to which all other 
SLAs modified in this experiment will be compared.  
 
Name Model Description Setting 
Sensor Node 
Location 
Physical The node’s distance 
from the gateway as 
measured by the 





Physical The ratio of sensor 




8th Layer Information priority 








8th Layer Video, voice, 
imagery, or file 












Name Model Description Setting 











Time interval 8th Layer The time the SLA is 
in effect 
Seconds 
SLAs 8th Layer The number of SLAs 
in effect on the 
network 
Number 
Table 18.   BSLA Settings. 
 
This baseline SLA (BSLA) will be tested in the same manner 
as Experiment Two. Foreground traffic with the BSLA will be 
streamed as the background traffic is systematically stepped 
up until the SLA cannot support the user’s QoS requirement. 
Once that threshold has been achieved, the bandwidth level 
of foreground traffic is stepped up and the experiment with 
the increasing background traffic is repeated. From this 
data, a threshold curve will develop which will show QoS of 
steamed data at the BSLA as a function of the level of 
background traffic.  
3. Experiment  
The experiment will then continue by using the live 
feeds contained in the scenario to determine which control 
parameters should be manipulated to increase the threshold 
and thereby to provide the user with the requisite QoS in 
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the face of increasing background traffic for each level 
(bandwidth) of foreground traffic. For example, if the key 
sensor nodes were moved, the bandwidth could increase 
because of a better line of sight (LOS) to the gateway. 
Reducing the SLA latency or the image resolution request by 
a fraction could increase the overall throughput and 
therefore maximize uninterrupted, high quality, real-time 
data streaming performance overall. A relationship may 
develop between increasing the density of sensor nodes 
and/or gateways, network load balancing, and QoS. Better SLA 
management may prove to be useful as well. If separate SLAs 
are overlapping, and therefore competing for the same 
network resources, they could be combined to share sensor 
information with several requesting users. An online 
collaborative tool would be useful for this purpose. A user 
could query an SLA database and see all pending and active 
SLAs to determine if he could “piggyback” on one of these, 
request an extension to an SLA, or use one as a template 
from which to build a new one.  
Likewise, the SLAs could be linked to the database 
where information/knowledge gained from expired SLAs could 
be pulled. Finally, SLA network metrics could be obtained 
for QoS performance analysis. The goal is to determine what 
parameters can be manipulated to fulfill the QoS requirement 
in light of the dynamic network and is also to attempt to 
shift the improved SLA (ISLA) curve to the right, in effect, 
providing more QoS per level of background traffic as 
compared to the generic BSLA curve.  
The culmination of this experiment campaign is to 
determine how to support multiple ISLAs streaming through 
the network at the same time. The experiment will then 
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continue by determining which design parameters should be 
manipulated in order to increase the performance threshold.  
These discovered parameters will then provide more resources 
to the separate SLAs, at the requisite QoS, in the face of 
increasing background traffic for each level (bandwidth) of 
foreground traffic and with other SLAs in competition for 
the same network resources 
4. Parameters Measured 
Table 19 is a compilation of the parameters to be 
measured during Experiment Four.  
 
Name Model Layer Description Units 
Congestion Network A measure of packet loss 
and throughput 
Bits/second 
Jitter Network Fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery 





Network The quantity of traffic 
that passes a point on 
the network in one 
second. 
Bits/second 
Packet loss Network The overall number of 
packets lost compared to 
the total number of 




Network Measured as a ratio of 
the number of packets 
that are delivered out 
of order to the total 




Network Percentage of different 
DSCP values contained in 
the IPv6 header for 
Percentage 
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Name Model Layer Description Units 
DiffServ architectures 





Network The percentage of 
traffic that must be 
resent for a given 
application 
Percent 
Table 19.   Experiment Four Parameters Measured. 
5. Parameters Controlled 
 Table 20 is a compilation of the controlled variables 
for this experiment. Each variable is assigned a controlling 
entity or a role player who is responsible for manipulating 
or stipulating the conditions to cause SLA success and to 
thus meet the performance criteria outlined in Table 21.  
 
Name Model Layer Description Units Roles
Sensor Node 
Location 
Physical The node’s 
distance from 
the gateway as 










Physical The ratio of 









tags    
Scale Requesting 
Unit/IMO/G6
Bandwidth 8th Layer Video, voice, Bits/second Requesting 
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8th Layer Dependent on 



















Time interval 8th Layer The time the 




SLAs 8th Layer The number of 
SLAs in effect 











of network use. 
Both TCP and 























of network use. 
Both TCP and 







Table 20.   Experiment Four Control Variables. 
The roles are defined as follows: 
 Sensor Operating Unit: A generic term for the 
individual unit responsible for initially placing the 
static nodes, moving the mobile ground sensors, flying 
the UAV, or wearing sensor-adorned battlesuits. Units, 
such as reconnaissance and sniper teams, or VMU’s can 
be tasked by the higher headquarters COC, on the advice 
of the G6 and IMO, with placing sensors or moving 
sensors in accordance with TTPs, SOPs, the operations 
order, and the current situation as dictated by 
Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain and Weather, Troops and 
Fire Support Available, Space, and Logistics (METT-
TSL).  
 IMO: The Information Management Officer sets the 
Information Management policy in accordance with the 
MEF operations order, TTPs, SOPs, and the current 
situation.  
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o The IMO at each level can make recommendations to 
their respective operations section and higher and 
adjacent IMOs to move sensors to best support the 
ISR plan within their area of operations (AOR). 
o SLA approval and management: The IMO collects, 
evaluates, manages, and forwards SLAs submitted by 
subordinate units. The IMO also resolves conflicts 
with competing SLAs within the G3’s scheme of 
maneuver with the advice of the G6.  
 G3: The MEF operations section responsible for the 
conduct of all MEF operations. This is the supported 
section which the communications, ISR, and IMO plan 
must support. The IMO and G6 need G3 approval to make 
any changes to their operations. 
o The G3 is responsible for ensuring that the SLAs 
are synchronized with ongoing operations and are 
included as part of the operational sync matrix.  
 G6: The MEF communications section is responsible for 
planning, installing, operating, and maintaining the 
MEF communications network. 
o   The G6 has responsibility for the network and 
must support the G3 and the IMO’s plan within the 
physical limits of network capabilities. Network 
changes that will affect operations need approval 
from the G3. 
o G6 support to SLA approval and management: The G6 
advises the IMO on the network’s status and 
ability to support submitted SLAs. 
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o SLA execution: The G6 is responsible for 
monitoring SLA execution and will advise the IMO 
when QoS levels fall outside of the expected level 
of service. 
 IMO cell: A group headed by the IMO and consisting of a 
G3 representative, a G6 representative, and a G2 (MEF 
Intelligence Section) representative, which makes 
decisions concerning the MEF’s information flow in 
support of operations. 
 Requesting Unit: The unit requesting the SLA for 
uninterrupted, real-time data in support of an 
operational task. A battalion is the lowest level unit 
authorized to submit an SLA to higher headquarters for 
action and approval.  
o The battalion operations officer, S3, in 
conjunction with the battalion communications 
officer, S6, and in the context of the higher 
headquarter’s operation order consolidates the 
battalion’s requirements, drafts, and submits the 
battalion’s SLA request(s). 
o The battalion monitors the feed for SLA QoS 
performance feedback. 
 Exercise Controller: The exercise controller controls 
the level of traffic generated by the foreground and 
background traffic generators. They are also 
responsible for monitoring, recording, and deriving the 
parameters detailed in Table 19 with the use of a 
packet analyzer, such as Wireshark.     
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6. Conduct of the Experiment 
Combining this experiment’s technologically oriented 
purpose with the tactical scenario, a notional construct of 
a MEF staff, subordinate commands, and the sensor network 
will be used to determine two things. First, it will 
determine how the IPv6 sensor network will support multiple 
SLAs by adding more granularity to the QoS levels. Second, 
it will determine how the sensor network’s QoS 
characteristics including multiple-users and multiple SLAs 
with increasing and variable levels of network congestion 
will provide the MEF IMO cell with the ability to support 
multiple SLAs over an extended period. 
This experiment incorporates additional tactical role 
players to simulate one MEF staff (G2, G3, G6, and IMO), one 
division staff (G2, G3, G6, and IMO), one ACE staff (1 
person), one FSSG staff (1 person), 2 regimental staffs (S2, 
S3, S6, and IMO), and four battalion staffs (CO, S2, S3, S6, 
and IMO); real-time sensor feeds from several static 
locations, several ground mobile sensors, and two UAV feeds 
in addition to the foreground and background traffic 
generators; and a change in location to an exercise area 
such as Camp Roberts, California. This location allows the 
sensor network to be set up over a wide area and has use of 
airspace for UAV flights. Over the course of seven days, 
staffs subordinate to the MEF will be given a partial 
operations order at the beginning of the experiment and 
fragmentary orders thereafter. From these orders, they must 
derive their own concept of operations and their information 
management plan. Part of this plan requires supporting the 
ISR effort and building SLAs that will support crucial parts 
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of the operation. The IMO cells at intervening levels will 
attempt to sync the SLAs with operations and the MEF IMO 
cell will do the same in addition to sequencing the 
requests.  
During this process, the exercise controllers are 
independently manipulating foreground and background traffic 
to simulate network variability and a common network rhythm 
that syncs the normal flow of best-effort delivery traffic 
with ongoing operations. For example, if the MEF is heavily 
engaged in combat operations all over its AOR, the network 
would be heavily used if not actually approaching high 
levels of congestion. At the other end of the spectrum, if 
very little action were occurring the network would be 
relatively “quiet.” The exercise controller adjusts the 
level of traffic generated by the foreground and background 
traffic generators and will use a packet analyzer to monitor 
the parameters in Table 19.  
Keeping within the play of the scenario, combat 
operations will start off slowly as the MEF develops and 
secures its footprint, and will then rapidly increase combat 
operations to achieve the increased operations tempo desired 
by the CG. Network traffic will therefore be minimal in the 
beginning, with few active SLAs. As operations continue, the 
network will become more taxed, SLA requests will increase 
proportionally, and performance will begin to suffer as a 
result. If at any point in the experiment the network cannot 
support the SLAs as requested, the role models, with the 
exception of the exercise controllers, will adjust the 
variables under their control detailed in Table 20 so as to 
provide the optimal performance levels as shown in Table 21. 
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7. Performance Criteria 
 The following criteria provide a measure of streaming 
data performance. Optimal performance for voice is a clear, 
intelligible sound from the distant end that is devoid of 
“pops,” delay, or broken/inaudible sound. Likewise, optimal 
performance for streaming video is a clear screen devoid of 
latency and jitter. As above, while it should be noted that 
video is more flexible than voice, video also requires more 
bandwidth than voice. Each SLA will need to meet all of the 
requirements outlined in Table 21 and will need to meet the 
expectations of the requesting Infantry Battalion(s) in 
order to be considered successful. The evaluators are 
defined as follows: 
 Battalion Commander (CO): The officer ultimately 
responsible for everything the battalion does and 
fails to do. All correspondence and requests, to 
include SLAs, are submitted in his name. As the “SLA 
customer” it is his opinion, backed up by facts, on 
whether or not the SLA meets its intended performance 
criteria. The Battalion Commander is a consumer of the 
information that is obtained and derived from the 
networked sensors and from the analysis conducted from 
his staff. 
 Battalion Staff: The principle officers responsible to 
the CO for their individual staff sections. The 
battalion staff is three abstractions below that of 
the MEF staff. The staff uses the information obtained 
and derived from the networked sensor to then update 
the situational status within their AOR.      
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 Subordinate Commanders: The officers commanding 
companies within the battalion. They work directly for 
the CO and will be consumers of the products from the 
battalion staff and possibly from the sensor feeds 
themselves. 
Name Description Max/Min Evaluator
Stream multiple 
high image feeds 
from various 
sources 
The commander and staff can 
view one or more data 
streams from multiple 
sources without having to 
shut down one or more 











Streaming data will not 
suffer from latency or 
jitter and will be viewed in 










Critical information from 
any source in the network 
will be delivered to its 













VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Large-scale, dynamic sensor networks provide a wealth 
of information to users who need that information to plan, 
execute, and monitor the full range of military operations. 
Real-time information collected and forwarded from UAVs, 
ground sensors, battlesuits, mobile video sensors, and other 
environmental collection devices to traditional NOCs and 
COCs provides commanders and their staffs with a virtual 
picture of the battlespace and surrounding areas of 
interest. This view thus provides an information advantage 
from which rapid-tempo combat operations can be generated. 
When those same sensor networks operate within the IPv6 
domain, the increased capabilities of increased globally-
unique addresses, end-to-end connectivity, 
autoconfiguration, and inherent security provide the 
commander with the ability to achieve a significantly more 
robust view of the battlespace and gain a significantly 
increased knowledge advantage from which a proportionate 
level of combat power can be generated.  
Perhaps the most promising aspect of structuring sensor 
networks within the IPv6 domain is that QoS is an inherent 
functionality contained in the IPv6 header and can be used 
in conjunction with the proper QoS protocol architecture. 
QoS techniques, such as Differentiated Services, which are 
implemented in the native IPv6 network are able to label 
packets accordingly, examine the IPv6 headers as the packets 
move throughout the network, queue if needed, and then 
forward traffic flows based on preset levels of priority. 
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The SLA taxonomy developed in Chapter IV describes the 
hierarchical relationship between the commander’s vision of 
how he wants his information requirements answered and how 
the traffic flows associated with those requirements can be 
given QoS priorities in a large-scale sensor network. SLAs 
developed from this vision and then implemented at the NOC 
provide the network the knowledge about which data streams 
have performance guarantees and, therefore, pre-set levels 
of QoS.  
 An IPv6 sensor network experiment conducted as part of 
the battlefield medical IPv6 sensor network experiment 
series during TNT 09-2 demonstrated the feasibility of 
operating sensors in a native IPv6 network. Throughout the 
course of preparation for the experiment, and during the 
experiment itself, the IPv6 protocol proved to be compatible 
with network sensor operations. No noticeable performance 
degradation between the IPv4 and IPv6 was detected which is 
qualitatively important from the commander’s view. The huge 
IPv6 address space is ideal for networking sensors which can 
be accessed from anywhere in the world. Autoconfiguration is 
beneficial because it allows sensors to autonomously enter 
and leave the IPv6 network with little to no human 
intervention.     
 The following sections outline two separate but related 
approaches to continue studying the IPv6 QoS boundaries. The 
first proposal is a continuation of the battlefield medical 
experiment series, which seeks to determine the ranges at 
which critical messages begin to experience latency and then 
are no longer received at their intended destination. The 
second proposal uses the systems approach to explore the QoS 
boundary. 
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B. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: PROPOSED TNT IPV6 SENSOR 
NETWORK BATTLESUIT QOS EXPERIMENT 
1. Purpose 
  This Battlefield Medical IPv6 Sensor Network field 
experiment is a feasibility study that leverages the 
architecture and successful discovery and constraints 
analysis step conducted during TNT 09-1 and -2 aboard Camp 
Roberts, California. The details and results of the 09-2 
experiment can be found in Chapter III. The next logical 
step in the battlefield network sensor series is to begin to 
show how QoS techniques can be applied to sensor traffic 
flows. To do so, the boundary of traffic latency and packet 
loss must be explored. 
2. Research Question 
Given a selection of operational messages with levels 
of prioritization from routine through priority, immediate, 
and flash, a specified level of mission-critical streaming 
data, a native IPv6 network, a unit’s specified number of 
battlesuits of a specified type of sensors, and an available 
level of aggregate bandwidth, at what point does priority 
traffic experience packet loss as mission-critical streaming 
traffic increases over the transmission link of a specified 
available bandwidth? 
3. Discussion     
A six-man reconnaissance team will wear battlesuits 
with different biometric sensors and a capability to 
transmit and receive data. These battlesuits will have 
intra-team connectivity with the other teams’ battlesuits 
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and will rely on an aggregate pipe emanating from a local 
gateway for reachback and connection to the GIG. For the 
reasons stated in the Introduction to this thesis, the IPv6 
protocol will be used for layer three Internet routing. 
Depending on a sensor’s function, each will transmit 
messages to other battlesuits, a Network Operations Center 
(NOC), a battlefield medical collaboration team, or any 
other interested parties (see Figure 33). For example, one 
set of sensors can measure the battlesuit wearer’s core 
temperature and transmit periodic messages. These messages 
can be routine for general-force health awareness, priority 
for an incident such as an increase in body temperature 
above an environmentally-driven threshold, immediate when 
the temperature has been above a threshold for a certain 
period of time, or flash when the battlesuit wearer’s 
temperature indicates an immediate danger that requires 
immediate action or risks losing life and limb.   
The message priority dictates which Quality of Service 
(QoS) level the message will have as it travels through the 
network. A message marked “immediate” will have a higher QoS 
level than a message marked “routine” and will therefore 
have priority of network resources to ensure that it gets to 
the destination node first. This makes sense. A battlesuit 
wearer with a dangerously high temperature needs to ensure 
that his message is not delayed, due to excessive TCP 
retransmissions or dropped altogether in the network by 
routine messages sent by the battlesuits of wearers who are 
“well.”  A second example of the necessity to differentiate 
QoS among common function sensors is the need to identify 
wearers who have suffered the effect of NBC contaminants. 
Those wearers need medical attention as soon as possible and 
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would need the flash precedence set so that their 
information is not waiting for less urgent traffic.  
In addition to messages originating from battlesuit 
sensors, priority-marked messages also have to compete for 
bandwidth on the aggregate link with any other transmissions 
the recon team is transmitting. Voice communications, 
streaming video, static sensors placed by the team, and 
other units who may need use of the gateway will all contend 
for space on the aggregate pipe. Providing QoS by marking 
the priority messages originating from the battlesuits, both 
wearers and higher headquarters personnel can be assured 
that critical messages will not be delayed or lost.   
The team will also have connectivity via their 
battlesuit sensors and single-channel voice radios to rear 
echelon units in addition to the video imagery. Table 1 
displays a list of the type, frequency, and the QoS levels 
of the messages that the battlesuit can send. A majority of 
the messages sent from the team’s battlesuits will be 
considered routine so long as everything remains within the 
mission parameters that were developed during the team’s 
mission planning. The notes for Table 23 show that routine 
messages are sent with a low QoS rating, therefore, routine 
messages will not have any interference with streaming video 
data. 
In cases of immediate or flash messages with a high or 
critical QoS, video streaming will no longer be the priority 
traffic.  At some level, video streaming will begin to 
degrade in order for the network to route additional 
traffic.  
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4. Operational Topology 
 
Figure 33.   Operational Topology for Battlesuits. 
a. Information Produced from the Communications 
Devices External to the Battlesuit   
 
Message Type Frequency Latency Tolerance QoS Level 
Video Streaming High Mission 
Dependent 
(High for this 
scenario) 
Voice Periodic Low Medium 
Text Chat Burst High Low 
Image Burst High Low 
Table 22.   External Communication Messages. 
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b. Information Produced from the Battlesuit 
Sensors 
Type Category Frequency Tolerance QoS Precedence
Core body 
temperature 
Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 
Hydration 
level 
Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 
O2 level Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 
Perspiration 
level 
Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 


















Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 
Position/GPS Periodic High As noted 1,2,3,4 
Wind Speed Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 
Humidity 
Environment 
Periodic  As noted 1,2,3,4 





1. Precedence: Routine    QoS: Low 
2. Precedence: Priority   QoS: Medium 
3. Precedence: Immediate  QoS: High 
4. Precedence: Flash   QoS: Critical 
c. Communication Path 
 Each battlesuit has a communication path to every 
other battlesuit in the unit, as well as to the gateway to 
the GIG. The bandwidth to the gateway is determined by the 
unit that is conducting the mission; however, the available 
bandwidth of the link(s) from the gateway to the GIG point 
of entry will determine the aggregate data rate. This 
available bandwidth is mission-dependent. 
d. Scenario 
 A six-man reconnaissance team has been inserted 
into a denied area for the purposes of surveillance and 
gathering intelligence on a target that is suspected to be 
in the area. A set of targets is suspected of planting IEDs 
in and among protected areas such as mosques, hospitals, and 
other areas deemed neutral zones. The team needs to record 
the target’s actions both in wide-view for general 
situational awareness and close-up view for identification 
purposes and then transmit that imagery for real-time 
viewing. In addition to the real-time intelligence 
evaluation carried out by intelligence analysts in a 
separate location, a legal team in yet another location 
needs to validate the target’s actions as illegal before 
action can be taken against the target. The imagery from the 
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two camera views and still images from the digital camera 
needs to be within certain parameters in order to provide 
irrefutable proof, and therefore a basis for follow-on 
action, of the target’s activities. Likewise, the follow-on 
action needs to be documented to show that the appropriate 
actions were taken. Hence, the video quality needs be 
protected as it streams through the network by use of QoS 
mechanisms in the IPv6 protocol.  
The team has set up their video imaging systems 
and has ensured that the imagery is being received in the 
manner needed. They have also received assurance that their 
battlesuits are communicating normally with each other and 
with the gateway to their higher headquarters. The team has 
received several reports indicating that the medical and 
environmental messages received show that everything is 
within normal parameters.  
After a period of time, the target has appeared in 
the recon team’s area of observation. The video and still 
image cameras pick up the imagery and are transmitting as 
required. Radio chatter with the intelligence and legal 
teams begins to increase as the activity level increases. 
The VHF nets are relaying through the gateway as well, using 
the Radio over IP network (RIPRNET), which requires a QoS 
level to maintain an intelligible conversation. The 
battlesuits begin to relay signs of increasing stress as 
heart rates begin to quicken. Some of the heartrates exceed 
what is considered normal, which elevates the QoS level of 
the packets associated with those messages. Confirmation 
comes from the legal team that the target’s activity does 
warrant appropriate action. The recon team leader then calls 
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in air support to attack the target as it leaves the 
protected area. The attack must be video recorded as well as 
narrated by the recon team to provide proof that the 
protected area was not harmed. It is most critical at this 
point that the video and voice stream levels of QoS not 
suffer. At this point, a section of attack helicopters 
attack the fleeing targets, which causes the video imagery 
to increase its needed bandwidth in order to capture rapid 
movement and changes. The narration is quicker, which again 
stresses the data and voice streams that are transmitting to 
the higher headquarters viewing the video and hearing the 
narration. At that moment, two battlesuits begin sending 
medical alarms. The suits’ wearers have been wounded in an 
ensuing small arms fight that has erupted in the vicinity of 
their position.  
 The recon team then returns fire on a previously 
unknown enemy security team that was providing cover for the 
target’s IED activity. The battlefield medical collaboration 
team (BMCT) begins to evaluate the alarms from the 
battlesuits, project possible outcomes based on the 
situation, and collaborate among themselves regarding 
possible medical courses of action that could be taken 
should they need to intervene. One item that the BMCT can 
work on is alerting the hospital staff to injuries that they 
will have to treat when the team returns. This then allows 
the ER team to prepare, and to begin working faster. As this 
occurs, the wounded team members radio back that they are 
okay for the time being and will extract with the team. 
 The recon team leader has successfully serviced 
the fleeing target with the section of attack helicopters 
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and now asks for them to return and attack the enemy 
security team. The gunships do so which allows the recon 
team to maneuver and assault the enemy position. As that 
happens, an IED explodes and subsequently sets off other 
IED-making material that the enemy security team left 
behind. Because the IED exploded in the vicinity of a 
marketplace, there is a mass casualty situation. Secondary 
explosions have also severely wounded two more recon team 
members. The BMCT now has to go to work. 
 Following this event, voice messaging increases 
and video recording must continue; wounded team members also 
need medical attention that can be provided through their 
suits from the battlefield medical team. A UAV has just 
checked in on-station that needs to relay its video feed of 
the ensuing gunfight through the same gateway. In addition 
to these concerns, mission-critical video, audio, and 
messages with high precedence from the battlesuits must be 
delivered in the manner expected.  
5. Experiment 
a. Experimental Topology 
 The experimental topology is shown in Figure 34, 
below. The PelcoNet video system will stream video to the 
Video PC. This data stream will traverse the link between 
the two switches, which will have a data rate limit of X 
Mbps. The traffic generator will simulate varying levels of 
voice traffic traversing the link. The IPv6 Laptop with the 
Medical E-Tag will simulate the battlesuit by sending high 
priority messages with a QoS level; this will ensure that it  
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has priority while traversing the link. This experiment will 
make use of the IPv6 traffic class header and DiffServ to 
provide QoS in the network.  
 
 
Figure 34.   Experimental Topology. 
b. Experiment     
  (1) Stream a given video data rate from the 
streaming video source and receive on the Video/Voice PC. 
Observe packet flow via Wireshark and on NMS.  
  (2) Stream a given level of background 
traffic via the traffic generator to simulate voice traffic 
(use XXX protocol) and receive on the Video/Voice PC. 
Observe packet flow on Wireshark and on NMS.  
  (3) Send messages with differing priority 
from the Medical E-Tag laptop to the Medical Monitor laptop 
and observe the video streaming and priority message 
performance parameters. 
 181
  (4) Increase the voice traffic and then send 
the same differing priority messages as in (3), while 
observing the video streaming and priority message 
performance parameters. 
  (5) Repeat step (4) until the priority 
message traffic begins to experience latency in the form of 
dropped packets and requested re-transmissions.  
  (6) Repeat step (5) until the link is 
saturated in generated voice traffic and no priority 
messages are received at the distant end. 
6. Expected Results 
The research question was posed to determine the point 
at which priority traffic experiences packet loss as mission 
critical streaming traffic increases over a transmission 
link of a fixed bandwidth. Packet latency and loss can be 
considered acceptable in some sensor applications, such as 
routine building security surveillance, where a video image 
of someone approaching an unauthorized area is enough reason 
to warrant further investigation. High-quality network 
service is not necessary in this case. On the other hand, 
sensor applications such as those as described in this 
experiment, which require a high degree of granularity and 
fidelity for legal decisions, cannot accept packet latency 
or loss, because they can introduce doubt into the minds of 
those rendering a legal opinion based on what they see. For 
this application, it is of primary importance that the 
network support the operational needs to the extent that it 
can.  
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In this experiment, streaming video was defined as 
priority traffic, and battlesuit medical sensor information 
that passed predefined levels was defined as critical 
traffic. High-quality priority traffic is an operational 
necessity. The legal team needs to watch the streaming video 
in real-time in order to determine if the operation can 
proceed, as well as to preserve the video as evidence that 
the operation was legal, should it be challenged at a later 
time. In the scenario, critical traffic increases in 
response to the recon team’s health status. The experiment 
simulates this by increasing the generated traffic and 
observing both the streaming video and, later on, the 
aggregated results from the packet-capturing application. It 
is expected that priority traffic will begin to degrade both 
quantitatively and qualitatively once TCP-transported 
critical messages begin to “drop” and the TCP protocol 
begins requesting retransmissions. These retransmission 
requests will place an additional burden on a network which 
is already experiencing stress. Each retransmission request 
will require an answer from the source, which must now 
resend “old information” in addition to continually sending 
priority traffic and additional critical traffic. The 
experiment will reveal the point at which video quality 
degrades, qualitatively in the form of jitter as seen on the 
display screen, and quantitatively with the number of TCP 
retransmission requests sent and the number of packets 
dropped in the network. The operational personnel will be 
interested in the video quality, while the network operators 
will be interested in retransmission levels and in the point 
at which the network begins to drop packets and request 
retransmissions. It is possible that a meaningful 
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relationship exists among fixed bandwidth, priority and 
critical traffic data rates, and number of retransmission 
requests and packets dropped, which will aid network 
operators in developing network QoS applications.  
C. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS: SYSTEMS APPROACH TO QUALITY OF 
SERVICE 
1. Sensor Network Topology 
Adapting a large-scale sensor network so that it will 
function properly within the IPv6 address space requires a 
new application of QoS mechanisms. In this way, users can 
scope their view to a particular set or sets of sensor 
clusters and can pull real-time information, all while 
contending with a dynamic, continually-adapting network 
topology and with other demands that may be made on the 
network. While relatively untested, IPv6 appears to be the 
protocol of choice, as it inherently supports QoS with its 
“designed from the ground up” traffic class and the flow 
label fields which are contained in the IPv6 header; this is 
a functionality which was not practically implemented in 
IPv4.  
This section will develop the experiment framework by 
using the multivariable analysis method, as described by 
Bordetsky et al. (2004), to determine the necessary design 
variables that bound a large-scale sensor network within the 
IPv6 domain, to determine the relationships that define QoS 
within a dynamic and adapting network, and to determine the 
performance criteria, which will then lead to optimizing QoS 
solutions in the dynamic environment.   
One scenario contained in Chapter IV, a battalion in 
the offense, outlines a tactical application of sensor 
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networks in which the information collected by the sensor 
nodes and subsequently relayed back through the network to a 
command-and-control node, such as the Combat Operations 
Center (COC). This application was also used to speed up the 
initial observation, orientation, and decision-making cycle 
for a company commander (CO) who was preparing to conduct a 
deliberate assault on an objective through by using UDOPs. 
While in the attack and assault phases, the CO and 
supporting battalion staff have the ability to monitor 
changes in the environment, which allows the CO to adapt and 
act accordingly. These dispersed sensor nodes, the network 
they are part of, the information they collect and transmit, 
and the address space and capabilities provided by IPv6 all 
provide an exploitable tactical advantage for the CO in the 
conduct of his mission.  
Different mission requirements, data types, and 
categories of streamed data all necessitate IPv6 compatible 
QoS mechanisms integrated within the network to provide 
acceptable levels of service. In the cases where various 
sensor nodes are clustered together to form multiple 
mission-specific or mission-tailored packages to provide 
real-time information, the network can become extremely 
congested due to these operational demands being placed on a 
dynamic network that is already attempting to adapt to 
provide best-effort service. Voice, imagery, data, and 
sensor data types require increasing degrees of QoS in order 
to sustain acceptable service. Time-sensitive, time-
insensitive, and operational-level support are the three 
categories of streamed data in descending order. Routine 
voice data may be considered operational level support, 
since it does not have direct mission impact, while sensor 
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data is considered time-sensitive due to the necessity to 
properly time stamp sensor readings. Common QoS metrics to 
support mission information flow include the following: loss 
of data, regardless of the cause; latency; delay from source 
to destination; jitter or fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery; and throughput/bits per second (Wilson 
et al., 2005). 
2. Sensor Network Model 
There have been various types of protocols, approaches, 
and research connected to QoS in sensor networks in the IPv4 
domain; however, this is less often the case in the IPv6 
domain, due to its relative lack of widespread use. The QoS 
model described by Dohler (2007), the “adaptive network 
stack,” outlines a means of mapping from the familiar OSI 
































Node CPU speed, 
Node Buffer size, 
Flow 
size/delay/loss, 
Flow buffer, Flow 
Retransmit Cost  
Network Layer Network Performance 
Metrics 
Node NIC Buffer 
size, Flow Path, 
Connectivity, Link 
MTU size, Link 
Reliability, 
Jitter, Packet Loss 




Physical Layer Physical Layer 
Performance Metrics 
Connectivity, Node 
NIC Speed, Link 
Quality, Link Speed 
Table 24.   The adaptive network stack (After Bordetsky, 
2006; Clement, 2006; Wilson et al., 2005). 
This model supports the application’s QoS requirements 
by providing, at the uppermost layer, information about the 
state of the network so as to then determine the best way to 
adapt to the network’s changing conditions. Through polling, 
each layer determines its metrics and then communicates with 
its adjacent layers to ultimately derive the state of the 
network, thus providing a path for an appropriate level of 
QoS. This “eighth layer” provides each sensor node with 
Network Operation Center (NOC) capabilities that can 
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effectively assure the network performance required. In 
other words, the eighth layer puts the network management 
function into the network one node at a time. Because large-
scale sensor networks are complex, reducing latency caused 
by the human network operator’s decision cycle through 
automating portions of the network-management function will 
improve overall QoS. Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth (2007) 
identified two limitations, and, thus, two areas on which to 
focus in order to ensure that the correct information 
reaches the correct destination, at the correct time: (1), 
limitations in bandwidth and (2), limitations in the ability 
of human decision makers to quickly process complex 
information and make decisions that will have the desired 
effect on the network. Therefore, as a result of its 
management function, the eighth layer, along with the 
physical layer, are the two layers that have controllable 
variables from which QoS can be achieved and maintained. The 
layers in between are governed by protocols that facilitate 
network operation and provide metrics via SNMP polling. 
At the bottom of the stack is the physical layer, which 
transmits the frames received from the data link layer; this 
layer also sends frames to the data link layer after having 
received them from another node or nodes in the network. 
Mobile sensor nodes that are not able to communicate with 
the network can be repositioned in order to gain a better 
signal with other sensor nodes or the gateway. In the case 
of static nodes or mobile nodes not easily moved, the 
gateway can be moved to a more advantageous position or 
another gateway could be inserted. For this reason, the 
sensor node insertion-planning phase is important.   
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 Because nodes can enter and leave the network due to 
recent implantation or destruction, variations can occur in 
signal propagation. Power fluctuations or losses can also 
occur, and mobility can change the data link and network 
layer topology. Sensors must continually determine new 
routes to the gateway and back to the destination node. In 
this regard, interlayer communication is especially 
important between the data link and network layer, 
particularly as the level of mobility increases, and as 
these layers relay their performance metrics to the upper-
most layer. The function of the sensor node application 
layer is to gather the mission-specific data and push it 
down the stack for eventual transmission. When combined with 
the application layer QoS requirements, the information 
gathered from the model’s performance metrics will provide 
the eighth layer with the input it needs to support the 
application’s minimum QoS. The top layers’ use of SLAs, as 
briefly discussed and used in the opening scenario of 
“Sensor Network QoS in an IPv6 Environment,” provides a user 
or a group of users with a particular level of guaranteed 
service, for a specific time duration, over a specific area 
of the network (Dobrydney, 2008). These QoS assurances, 
managed from the NOC at the eighth layer, provide QoS 
configurations for mission-specific requirements such as 
real-time information flow from specific sensors or entire 
clusters of sensors. The information from all three layers 
within the QoS stack, as shown in Table 25, is thus polled 
to provide the level of support desired within a large-scale 
dynamic sensor network. 
When combined with IPv6 QoS capabilities and operated 
with the Differentiated Services (DiffServ) architecture, 
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the eighth layer concept provides the stool’s proverbial 
third leg. One key of the eighth layer is that the network 
“must know the information requirements of each recipient” 
(Nichols et al., 2009) and, therefore, must tag each packet 
appropriately. IPv6 has both the Traffic Class and Flow 
Label fields in its header, which are intended to provide 
QoS in a network configured to interpret these fields in 
intervening network devices. DiffServ makes use of the one-
byte Traffic Class field to map a set of behavior to 
routines contained in the network routers. The routers, in 
reading the traffic class field, then determine how to 
handle the specific packet, based on the contents of the 
field (Nichols et al., 2009). This functionality in the 
DiffServ architecture and the IPv6 header provides the means 
to support the eighth layer’s efforts to communicate the 
level of QoS required for each packet as part of a greater 
information flow.    
3. Multiple Criteria Design Variables 
In complex systems where many opposing variables must 
be considered, multiple-criteria decision techniques are 
used to find the optimal solution per the given criteria 
within numerous evaluations. As described by Bordetsky et 
al. (2004), all too often decision makers do not correctly 
frame the engineering problem within the confines of the 
variables. It is often difficult to properly define a model, 
which may optimize one variable at the expense of another, 
ultimately reducing the entire system’s optimality. As a 
result, a badly-posed question will result in an equally 
badly-derived solution. The Parameter Space Investigation 
(PSI) method was developed in order to aid in correctly 
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defining the large-scale engineering problem by defining a 
criteria space from which optimal Pareto solutions, or the 
feasible solution set, can be determined. Large-scale system 
solution sets can be derived because PSI can determine 
results with “thousands of design variables and dozens of 
criteria constraints” (Bordetsky, 2004).  Like other 
optimization methods, such as nonlinear programming and 
genetic algorithms, PSI determines the system’s criteria-
defined optimal solution by using the system’s inputs and 
outputs, and the relationships between the two, to correctly 
formulate the problem. However, PSI implicitly provides the 
mechanism for stating the problem correctly. In formulating 
the problem, the decision maker must study the system and 
determine the relevant design variables which will describe 
the system behavior, and from which will determine the 
system’s optimal solution set (Clement, 2006). The design 
variables in Table 25 are proposed. Those in bold face are 
the proposed control variables.  
       
Name Model Layer Description Units
Sensor Node 
Location 
Physical The node’s distance from 
the gateway as measured 





Physical The ratio of sensor 
nodes to gateways 
Ratio 
Connectivity Physical    Determine if the node is 
or is not connected to 
the network 
Boolean 
Active nodes Physical Number of active nodes 
on the network at any 




Name Model Layer Description Units
Link Quality Physical The quality of a 
physical link, defined 




(One way and 
round trip) 
Physical The delay inherent in a 
link as it propagates 





Data Link The amount of traffic on 
a particular link 
Bits/second 
Jitter Network Fluctuation in source to 
destination delivery 
within the same data 
stream 
Microseconds 
One-way delay Network The delay inherent in a 
link as it propagates 
through its transmission 
medium 
Microseconds 
Packet loss Network The overall number of 
packets lost compared to 
the total number of 




Network Measured as a ratio of 
the number of packets 
that are delivered out 
of order to the total 




Network Percentage of different 
DSCP values contained in 
the IPv6 header for 
DiffServ architectures 






Network The percentage of 
traffic that must be 
resent for a given 
Percent 
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8th Layer Information priority 
level, determined by 






8th Layer Video, voice, imagery, 





8th Layer Dependent on the type of 
communication service 
contained in the SLA 
Video: pixels, 









Time interval 8th Layer The time the SLA is in 
effect 
Seconds 
SLA 8th Layer The number of SLAs in 
effect on the network 
Number 
Table 25.   Design Variables (After Clement, 2006 and 
Dobrydney, 2008). 
Note: Control Variables in bold 
 
a. Design Variable Constraints 
 Tactical sensor networks must be compatible with 
the TCP/IP protocol suite, in order to seamlessly 
interoperate with the DoD GIG and other commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) equipment. The network layer must use the IPv6 
protocol natively in order to take advantage of inherent 
capabilities that are not present in IPv4, such as end-to-
 193
end connectivity, standard MTU size, IPSec, the increased 
address space previously mentioned, the reduced overhead of 
running two network layer protocols on the same network 
devices, and the IPv6 flow labels. Although IPv4 is more 
mature at this point in networking development, it is 
limited in its use for global connectivity and sensor 
monitoring. QoS mechanisms must provide better service than 
the current best-effort service that the current network 
standard provides; “better service” is defined as minimal 
QoS application requirements.   
b. Performance Criteria 
 At this stage, the decision maker seeks to 
optimize the design variables through derived relationships 
among the system design variables, and between the design 
variables and a set of system performance criteria. In the 
case of dynamic sensor networks, the performance criteria in 
Table 27 are derived to optimize QoS for the applications 
that are traversing the network. The point of view of the 
performance criteria is that of the commander and his staff, 
who need the information for mission purposes. These 













high image feeds 
from various 
sources 
The commander and staff can view 
one or more data streams from 
multiple sources without having to 
shut down one or more sources to 




data streaming  
Streaming data will not suffer 
from latency or jitter and will be 
viewed in real-time from any 





Critical information from any 
source in the network will be 
delivered to its destination 
without delay 
Max 
Table 26.   Performance Criteria. 
c. Design Variable Relationships 
  The design variables listed in Table 26 will be 
considered as inputs to the Pareto set solution described 
below. However, the relationships between the variables, at 
this point, can only be theorized and require the PSI 
problem and the subsequent campaign of experiments in order 
to be fully developed and executed. From the results, the 
relationships among the variables in this dynamic, 
continually adapting network can be determined, from which 
the eighth layer can then manage QoS for the information 
delivered over the network. 
d. Pareto Set Solution 
 By design, the Pareto set offers many optimal 
solutions along a curve, each of which cannot be improved 
upon without negatively impacting one or more design 
criteria. The best Pareto solution is determined by the 
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decision maker, who will find the solution that best matches 
his prioritized criteria (Bordetsky, 2004). Several of the 
design variables were chosen to simulate a network under 
various conditions, such as low use/low congestion, low 
use/high congestion, high use/low congestion, and high 
use/high congestion. The results of the subsequent campaign 
of experiments will be used to find the Pareto set of 
solutions for the eighth layer, that is to say, the network 
management function contained in the uppermost layer in each 
sensor node. By determining the optimal solution based on 
the design variables and on the observed relationships 
between the relevant design variables, the sensor node’s 
management layer will be able to properly support SLAs and 
thus to maximize the performance criteria listed in Table 
26. The human operator will still determine the information 
requirements of the commander and his staff by developing 
appropriate SLAs, but the sensor node’s eighth layer will 
have responsibility for using the relevant feedback 
mechanisms developed by the Pareto set solution so as to 
adapt to the dynamic network. 
4. Expected Results 
 At the conclusion of this unique approach to 
determining optimal network QoS in light of multi-variable 
interaction in a dynamic environment, proper design variable 
selection and performance criteria will be validated, in 
addition to determining the relationships among the 
variables in this dynamic, continually adapting network. The 
curve developed from the Pareto Set Solution will show the 
optimal solution along the problem space boundary and, 
therefore, the optimal relationships among the design 
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variables within the problem space. From this boundary 
(i.e., the variables and the relationships between them), 
eighth layer network management logic can be developed and 
incorporated into the network to manage QoS for the 
information delivered. This eighth layer logic will then 
provide a model for incorporating more agile SLAs that will 
support the operational and information layers in providing 
information through a dynamic sensor network. In cases such 
as an amphibious landing or an active operation in a 
contested MOUT environment, perhaps two of the most dynamic 
tactical situations described in Chapter IV, agile eighth 
layer SLA management logic based on appropriate design 
variables and performance criteria will greatly aid in QoS 
performance in the network. This performance increase is due 
to the ability to continually adapt to environmental changes 
that occur. Sensors will enter and leave the network, others 
will be destroyed, electromagnetic interference will block 
some paths, and changes at the informational and SLA layers 
will occur. The tactical network that has optimized SLA 
management logic based upon multiple criteria decision 
techniques will be the network most able to support 
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